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Abstract
The factor determinants of industry and investment location patterns in transition 
economies can be expected to differ from those frequently  observed in developed 
countries. Historically, centrally planned economies have suffered from inefficient 
industrial policies that are generally assumed to have had distortive effects on spatial 
location of industry. The process of economic transition and regional integration that 
followed the demise of socialist structures is assumed to have subsequently affected the 
geographical distribution of economic activities within and between countries of the 
region. Given the above this thesis capitalises on the quasi-natural experiment setting to 
further explore industry and investment location decisions in transition economies.
In particular, the research presented here follows three main objectives. First, it intends to 
provide a comprehensive picture of changes in industry location patterns over time. 
Second, it aims to contribute to the debate on factor determinants of industry location at 
various levels of spatial aggregation. Third, it seeks to explore location determinants of 
foreign direct investors in particular, given their pivotal role for economic development 
of transition economies. In all instances, the research is geared towards a better 
understanding of the role of institutional factors, such as reforms and policies, in affecting 
distribution of economic activity across space. Thus, the work conducted qualifies as a 
further contribution to the analysis of structural changes that have affected the economies 
under examination. In broad terms, the findings presented here point towards significant 
changes in spatial location patterns of industry  and investments that are leading to 
increased polarisation of economic landscape over time. Nonetheless, we find evidence 
that certain institutional factors qualify  as viable policy levers, thereby providing ample 
scope for policy makers to impact existing location patterns of economic activity. 
JEL Classifications: F15; P20; R12; F21; L50.
Keywords: Economic transition; economic integration; spatial distribution of economic 
activity; international investment; economic policy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 2008, Paul Krugman became a Nobel laureate for his distinguished scholarly work 
dedicated to the ‘analysis of trade patterns and location of economic activity’.1 The prize 
certainly elevated the recipient into the economists hall of fame; more importantly, it 
reaffirmed the significance of New Economic Geography (hereafter NEG) as an 
important field of mainstream economics. Over the past two decades the work of spatial 
economics community  has gradually expanded beyond the realm of academia to 
prominently  feature in policy debates. As a recent testimony, the World Bank’s flagship 
publication, the World Development Report (WDR), presented the title ‘Reshaping 
Economic Geography’ and stressed the need for a deepening of inquiry into the 
geographical aspects of uneven development and the structural changes affecting the 
spatial economy [WDR (2009); also, Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2009)].
Yet, the inquiry into the spatial aspects of economy is not a recent phenomenon. Already 
in 1875, scholars associated with the ‘German school of location theory’ had raised one 
of the certainly most intriguing questions in the field of economics: why do certain 
economic activities choose to establish themselves in particular places of a given area? 
The early works of von Thunen (1875), Christaller (1933) and Weber (1929), among 
others, provided a simple yet powerful explanation to the question at  hand: economic 
1
1 http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2008/press.html
activity will tend to locate in places that generally  maximise its profits. The idea of 
focusing on profits as the driving force behind the location decisions of firms is pervasive 
one; it  suggests that if we were to search for factors explaining location of productive 
activity, these would have to be associated with the cost  and revenue side of the 
production. This notion remained preserved throughout the time. For instance, within the 
confines of traditional trade theory, location of economic activity  was a matter of supply-
side dynamics assumed to be a result of different factor-proportions endowments between 
regions. Marshall (1920) approached the question from a regional science perspective 
adding additional explanatory factors to the equation. In particular, he introduced the 
concept of external economies of scale to explain the dynamics of early industrial 
districts. Accordingly, it was the tacit  knowledge and technological spillovers present in 
such districts that were the true factor determinants of agglomeration, making the 
producers located within more cost effective and competitive [also, Arrow (1962); Romer 
(1986)]. 
On the revenue side, Harris (1954) initially suggested the concept of market potential as a 
determining factor of industry  location. His analytical framework was simple and 
intuitive in that it linked demand for a product to firms’ own prospects for generating 
greater turnover. The work has been subsequently expanded within the confines of the 
New Trade Theory  (NTT) characterised by  tractable general equilibrium models based on 
imperfect competition and in presence of transportation (trade) costs. More importantly, 
NTT gave rise to the development of NEG type of models that for the first time allowed 
agglomerations to arise endogenously  as a result of a cumulative causation process.2 They 
allowed for a more accessible and context specific framework to address some of the 
contemporary  issues of economic integration, structural change and the role of state and 
policy in affecting locational outcomes [see, e.g., Martin and Rogers (1995); Dupont and 
Martin (2003); Forslid (2004); Blien and Wolf (2002)]. In other words, NEG significantly 
expanded our knowledge of how different  location determinants affect industry  location. 
2
2 We will describe the agglomeration process as proposed in basic NEG models in greater detail below. For 
a broad based discussion of the corresponding literature see Fujita and Krugman (2004). 
At the same time, it highlighted the fact that location decisions of economic actors are 
non-trivial. 
The empirical inquiry into the subject matter has followed rather slowly, often limited by 
data availability and largely  confined to an examination of economic factors only. In a 
recent survey of the literature, Behrens and Robert-Nicoud conclude that “more work is 
needed on purely empirical front” (Behrens and Robert-Nicoud, 2009, p. 483). To this 
end, the work undertaken here is to be regarded as a contribution to existing stock of 
empirically  motivated research on industry location factors in the context of transition 
economies. Hereby, it  is explicitly assumed that the answers as to which location factors 
matter are context specific while being, above all, empirical in nature. In particular, we 
source insights from the main streams of economic literature to operationalise some of 
the theoretical prediction in a diverse array of empirical models on industry location. 
Results from cross- and within-country investigations are reported and demonstrate that 
economic transition and integration have indeed impacted spatial production patterns in a 
set of transition economies. Ultimately the findings highlight the role of institutional 
factors in affecting the industry location outcomes. 
3
1.1 BACKGROUND
The determinants of industry and investment location patterns in the Central Eastern 
Europe Countries (hereafter CEEC) might be expected to differ from those frequently 
observed in developed countries.3 Historically, centrally planned economies have suffered 
from inefficient industrial policies that are generally assumed to have had distortive 
effects on industry location decisions. In particular, their economic geography during the 
Soviet era was largely determined by political forces within the Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA), with relatively little consideration for country- and 
region-specific comparative advantages [Traistaru et al. (2003); Kancs (2007)]. 
Starting in 1989, the collapse of central planning set the stage for a wave of radical 
reforms that aimed at a fundamental re-organisation of existing economic and 
institutional structures within the region at large. The phenomenon has become to be 
known as ‘the  transition process’. In the process, government allocation-plans have been 
substituted by  market forces resulting in greater inter-firm competition for resources and 
markets. Besides, early  in the transition process the CEEC expressed also their intention 
to institutionally  integrate into the European Union (EU). However, for that to happen 
market-based institutional structures had to be built first. Thus, the process of the EU 
integration started with the signing of Europe Agreements in the first half of the 1990s 
which established the legal framework of relations between the EU and the CEEC. These 
agreements were adapted to the specific situation of each integration partner individually, 
while highlighting common political, economic and institutional objectives to be reached 
as a pre-requisite for full membership  (European Commission, 2009). Their role has 
therefore been instrumental in building up and aligning the inherited Soviet-style 
institutions of the CEEC with those operating in the single market, thus also changing the 
dynamics of economic interactions within and between the countries (Baldwin and 
4
3  Unless otherwise indicated, throughout this thesis the term CEEC includes following 10 transition 
economies: Bulgaria, Czech Republic,  Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. 
Wyplosz, 2006). The process has been further supported by the formation of regional 
trade initiatives (FTAs) that were encouraged as a means to foster market-based cross-
border cooperation between the countries. In other words, they served the CEEC as a 
‘training-ground’ for their wider integration into the EU (Dangerfield, 2006).4  Those 
unprecedented changes are therefore expected to have also contributed to changes in the 
geographical distribution of economic activities within and between the CEEC. 
However, transition process also entailed heavy costs that had to be offset by the society 
at large. Particularly, the process of structural change affected domestic production 
structures. Following the dissolution of the CMEA, most of its producers lost their 
previously  secure export markets while being faced with growing competition from more 
efficient foreign producers. Even thought foreign direct investments (FDI) and trade have 
been embraced by the CEEC as drivers of change from the start, their direct 
consequences for the organisation of economic activities in native markets were not 
immediately evident. Thus, the role of policy became pivotal as a means to soothe the 
negative effects of structural change but also to further support emerging opportunities of 
economic transition. The complex nature of the transition process also implied the 
existence of a complex web of policies operating next to each other. In particular, a 
number of commentators reported on a noticeable trend towards the application of 
implicit vertical (i.e. sector-specific) policies introduced as a way to accommodate 
potentially negative effects of increased competition [e.g. Torok (2007); Fink (2001); 
Holscher and Stephan (2009); Hashi et al. (2007)]. Yet, the transition has also been 
marked by  policy reform aimed at advancing the role of support institutions and making 
them an input factor that would advance countries’ position in terms of generating 
investments and growth. This process has been actively  supported by the EU which made 
available significant resources through its structural funds vehicle, to advance growth and 
5
4  Specifically, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia established Central Europe Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA) in 1992. The agreement entered into force in 1994 and has been geographically 
expanded to include Slovenia (1996), Romania (1997) and Bulgaria (1999). In parallel, the three Baltic 
countries including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania established Baltic Free Trade Agreement (BAFTA) in 
1994 (Dangerfield, 2000; 2006).
catching up of prospective member states. When taken together, the role of policy may  be 
expected to have a profound impact on the re-organisation of production structures and 
the geographical location of economic activity. There is an emerging empirical literature 
on the causal link between economic transition and regional integration in the context of 
Eastern European transition countries. Our research presented here builds on the existing 
insights coming out the existing studies, however, at the same time we intend to broaden 
the knowledge base in several different ways that are to be described further below. 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The purpose of the following research is to advance our understanding of the link 
between above mentioned structural changes and industry location proper, as measured 
by various spatial concentration measures. Hereby, the CEEC economies are deemed to 
be an especially  suitable region for advancing the inquiry  as they provide a quasi natural 
experiment type of setting. In particular, countries of the regions have experienced both 
centrally planned and free market economic systems within a relatively short period of 
time. 
In general, we follow three main objectives here. The first is to provide a comprehensive 
picture of changes in industry location patterns over the course of time. The analysis is 
conducted at different levels of spatial aggregation thus accounting for changes within 
and between countries. The second main objective is to contribute to the debate on factor 
determinants of industry location at the sub-national level. In particular, our analysis 
qualifies as an original contribution to the ongoing debate on structural changes affecting 
the economies under examination. Here in particular we aim to account for the role of 
structural policies in determining the location of economic activity, controlling at the 
same time for more traditional economic factor determinants. We believe that policy 
aspects deserve greater attention in existing analytical frameworks: as better 
understanding of their impact on industry location is a pre-requisite for devising more 
6
efficient policies that are indeed capable of stimulating regional convergence at national 
and supra-national levels. In this respect our study is exploratory in nature since the 
limited number of existing inquires have been predominantly focused on examining 
traditional factors of industry  location. The third main objective directly  builds on the 
policy argument in that we explore locational determinants of foreign direct investments 
(FDI) given its pivotal role in the economic development plans of transition countries. 
Here, our specific focus is geared towards understanding the role institutional reforms 
and quality  play in the process. While FDI determinants have been previously  explored in 
the context of transition economies, there is a dearth of knowledge on how specific 
institutional factors affect the location decision of international investors. 
The process of economic transition and regional integration and their likely impacts have 
made understanding the evolution of production patterns an exciting topic in academic 
research. There have been nevertheless direct spillovers into the policy arena as well. In 
particular, the research topic has attracted great interest among policy  makers in that a 
better understanding of issues at hand may also lead to a better design and 
implementation of policy tools. Although research conducted here is primarily  of 
academic interest, it is nevertheless applied in nature and therefore might be regarded as a 
relevant contribution to the policy debate. We find this especially stimulating given the 
fact that other Eastern European countries are following the CEEC path of transition and 
European integration, hence may benefit from some of the lessons learned here. 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
This dissertation consists of three self-contained empirical essays. Each of the essays 
aims at making a reasonable contribution to the understanding of location determinants in 
in its own respective setting and literature. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 
launches a broad based and comprehensive assessment of changes in patterns of 
geographical concentration (agglomeration) across 23 manufacturing industries. We use a 
7
novel dataset for 10 CEEC and deploy industry-specific locational GINI coefficients to 
account for the extent of changes in spatial co-location patterns of industries over time, in 
our case 1995 to 2005. The role of economic transition, integration and (vertical) 
industrial policies is discussed in greater detail as we empirically uncover underlying 
determinants of industry  location patterns. Chapter 2 therefore provides a solid basis for a 
more specific inquiry in the essays to follow. 
Chapter 3 examines the location of 31 manufacturing and services industries at the 
regional, i.e sub-national, level. As a result, we are able to track temporal changes in 
secondary  and tertiary  sector location patterns within and between countries. Our special 
interest is dedicated to an empirical investigation of the border effect as a factor 
determinant of industry location. In the context of European integration, the changes in 
geo-political position of regions are expected to have a profound impact on location of 
economic activity. In other words, they may potentially  lead to diverging development 
trajectories of homogenous types of regions, hence increasing the incidence of regional 
divergence. Given that the theoretical literature suggests border regions to be particularly 
affected by regional integration, we investigate in addition the role of regional policies 
and specifically  European structural funds as a means to enhance border regions’ 
geographical position and attractiveness for investment. 
Chapter 4 shifts then the focus away from the border effects to the analysis of spatial 
determinants of FDI distribution, given the importance of the latter for economic growth 
and development of transition economies. Understanding FDI location patterns is 
therefore of vital interest for policy makers as well, especially  those eager to stimulate 
economic development of disadvantaged regions by attracting foreign production. In 
contrast to existing research, however, our main focus in this chapter is dedicated to a 
better understanding of institutional determinants of FDI at the national level. In 
particular, we aim to explore the role of institutional factors in determining the extent of 
foreign presence in the countries under examination, in both secondary and tertiary 
8
sectors. We do so by clearly  distinguishing institutional factors between institutional 
efforts, i.e. structural reforms, and institutional outcomes, i.e. perceived institutional 
quality. In order to further enrich the discussion we apply  both static and dynamic 
empirical modelling approaches in our panel dataset  that spans over the period 1995 to 
2005; hence, our approach considers almost the entire period of CEEC’s EU integration 
process. 
Finally, in Chapter 5 we summarise the main findings of the research, outlining some of 
the perceived limitations while also suggesting possible extensions for future research.
9
10
Chapter 2 
Transition, Integration and Geographical Location of 
Manufacturing*
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In the opening remarks we have argued that factor determinants of industry location in 
transition economies, such as the CEEC, may differ from those frequently observed in 
developed countries.5 Indeed, their economic geography  during the Soviet era was largely 
determined by political forces within the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA), with little consideration for country-specific locational advantages (e.g., 
Traistaru et al., 2003). Over the past two decades, the simultaneous process of economic 
transition and regional integration has led to the introduction of market forces that are 
jointly expected to have also affected the distribution of economic activity within and 
between the countries.
However, the structural changes brought by the transition to market-based economic 
systems also entailed heavy costs, primarily for domestic producers. Following the 
11
* A modified version of this chapter has been released as a part of the OECD Working Paper Series (Seric, 
2010).
5  CEEC include following transition economies: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
dissolution of CMEA, most of them lost their previously  secure export markets while 
being faced with growing competition from more efficient foreign producers. As a 
consequence, there has been a noticeable trend towards application of various industrial 
policies, often vertical in nature, that have been frequently  introduced as a way to soothe 
negative effects of increased competition [Fink (2001); Torok (2007)]. We might expect 
them also to have a profound impact on geographical location of economic activity. 
Hence, in addition to examining the effects of market forces and integration, we also aim 
at testing the potential impacts of policy intervention on location of economic activity in 
CEEC.
The aim of this chapter is as follows. First, using novel data for the period 1995 to 2005 
we assess whether and to what extent have patterns of manufacturing location changed 
during CEECs’ transition to market based economic systems. Second, we aim to uncover 
underlying determinants of those changes as we consider traditional location factors but 
also include some more specific components, such as the effect  of targeted industrial 
policies. 
There are a limited number of studies examining spatial location patterns of 
manufacturing industries in European transition economies (reviewed in next section). 
Although they have greatly contributed to our understanding of factors influencing 
industry location there remain a number of gaps in the literature. To this end, our paper 
makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, the time period considered so 
far has been limited to the 1990s. In addition, most of the studies examining location 
patterns in the context of Eastern European transition have been confined to individual or 
small number of countries. In contrast, our inquiry  is based on a cross-country sample of 
10 CEEC and focuses on the period 1995 to 2005. The length of our time series is worth 
highlighting as it spans almost the entire transition period. Thereby, we treat the time 
component as an important indicator of overall regional integration. Second, to the best 
of our knowledge this is the first study to use a comparatively larger number of industries 
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at lower level of industry aggregation. This allows us to sketch a more detailed and 
precise picture of concentration patterns across the region. Third, previous studies used a 
rather restricted number of explanatory variables in examining spatial location patterns 
which limited the analytical power of their inquires. This has been mainly  due to the lack 
of reliable and comparable cross-country data. Instead, our study makes use of a new data 
set that enables us to construct somewhat more elaborate measures of spatial 
concentration as well as proxies for various theoretical concepts that have been put 
forward in the literature. EU KLEMS data set provides a detailed industry account at  an 
adequately aggregated level for almost all countries in our sample. Finally, to the best of 
our knowledge there is no systematic study that accounts for the potential impact of 
industrial policies on geographical location in the Eastern European context of transition.6 
In this respect, our exploratory analysis provides a basis for a new field of inquiry. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In section 2 we introduce the 
theoretical concepts and summarise existing empirical evidence on industry location in 
the CEEC. In section 3 we then propose statistical measures of geographical 
concentration and present descriptive statistics. Subsequently, in section 4 we formally 
analyse the factors determining spatial concentration of manufacturing activity in the 
CEEC. Finally, in section 5 we conclude the discussion and highlight possible limitations.
2.2 THEORY AND EMPIRICS 
2.2.1 Market Forces and Industry Location 
Market forces are expected to have significant  impact on location of economic activity, 
especially so in the context of transition economies. Scholarly work has examined 
industrial location and related spatial concentration phenomena based on the theoretical 
frameworks guided by, among others, the neoclassical trade, new trade and new 
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6 For recent contributions examining the issue in the Chinese context see, among others, He et al. (2008), 
also Wei (2001). 
economic geography models [see, for instance, Wolfmayr-Schnitzer (2000); He et  al. 
(2008)]. We may summarise the most salient features of those theories as follows: 
The neoclassical trade theory, according to Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin, postulates that 
industry location is determined exogenously by what has been labelled as “first nature” 
factors (Krugman, 1993). In other words, the observed production landscape may be 
explained with reference to the concept of comparative advantage whereby pronounced 
differences in terms of relative factor endowments determine location of economic 
activity. Hence, emerging agglomeration patterns are dominated by inter-industry 
specialisation, extent of which depends on the actual size of existing trade costs. Though 
intuitive, comparative advantage alone is insufficient to explain observed geographical 
concentration as it fails to clarify why seemingly identical countries (or regions) in terms 
of factor proportions develop different production structures. Besides, empirical evidence 
suggests that intra-industry trade flows by far outweigh inter-industry  exchange of goods 
(Greenaway and Torstensson, 1997). 
New trade models abstract  from comparative advantage altogether as they advocate 
presence of internal scale economies in relation to market access as the main 
determinants of industry concentration [Krugman (1980); Helpman and Krugman 
(1985)]. Krugman and Venables (1990) show that more firms are willing to set up 
production in the country  with the larger (core) market in order to avoid transportation 
(trade) costs in a larger fraction of their sales. Generally speaking, the combination of 
increasing returns to scale and trade costs encourages firms to locate close to large 
markets, i.e. those having relatively more firms. This creates pecuniary externalities 
which favour the agglomeration of economic activities. Although new trade models entail 
strong explanatory power they nevertheless describe the evolution of industrial location 
as a process driven by exogenously determined differences in market size. However, that 
is restrictive as it  prevents us from understanding why seemingly identical locations can 
develop into developed cores and lagging peripheries over time.
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New economic geography  models formalise the so called cumulative causation process 
that can even explain diverging concentration patterns in locations with identical initial 
structures, i.e. market sizes (Ottaviano and Puga, 1997). In contrast to previous theories 
the process of industrial location is determined endogenously by  interaction between 
demand and cost linkages on the one side and the level of trade costs on the other 
[Krugman (1991); Venables (1996)]. We will discuss the mechanisms of agglomeration as 
well as their implications in greater detail below. 
Existing empirical research on Eastern European economies lends support to the view 
that location became increasingly determined by market forces following the transition. 
For instance, Hildebrandt and Woerz (2004) study determinants of geographical 
concentration of industries in 10 CEEC over the period 1993 to 2000. They  show that 
region’s trade (re-)orientation towards EU markets had a significant impact on 
geographical concentration of their respective manufacturing industries. In particular, 
relative concentration has increased over time and has been mainly driven by 
comparative advantages and location of demand while absolute concentration was 
crucially determined by differences in countries’ human capital endowments. More 
interestingly however is the fact that neither scale economies nor transportation costs 
have any explanatory power in their econometric specification.7
Longhi et al. (2005) use a finer scale of spatial aggregation, NUTS 3 classification level 
of European regions, and conclude that overall geographic concentration of 
manufacturing in 5 CEEC has not changed considerably  during the 1990s. In contrast  to 
the previous study however, industries reliant on scale economies are more concentrated 
than industries exhibiting low use of technology. Here again, factor endowments and 
market size have strong explanatory power as determinants of industry agglomeration.
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7  This finding is rather surprising and may potentially be attributed to the aggregation problems, with 
respect to both spatial units and industries considered. The issue has been frequently highlighted in the 
literature, see for instance Ottaviano and Thisse (2004).
Country studies, such as the one on Hungary (Iara and Traistaru, 2003), find that market 
integration has led to an increase in regional disparities over the course of the 1990s. 
Specifically, regions bordering the EU as well as the metropolitan regions exhibited 
highest levels of manufacturing concentration while lowest levels have been observed in 
regions bordering other, non-EU countries. Those findings may be directly related to a 
study by Altomonte and Resmini (2002), who study location decisions of foreign firms in 
transition countries and conclude that FDI plays a significant role in shaping industry 
concentration in transition economies while its location is biased towards EU border and 
metropolitan regions as well as those with strong industrial bases. 
In sum, from this concise literature review it appears that in the transition process there 
has been a major shift in industry location determinants, i.e. away  from politically 
motivated location towards industry-specific responses to market forces. In line with 
predictions from theoretical models, we would therefore expect the location patterns of 
CEEC manufacturers to be determined by  presence of comparative advantage, scale 
economies and linkages. Our first hypothesis can be summarised as follows: 
H1: Broadly speaking, CEEC manufacturing industries are expected to have become 
more geographically concentrated over time since firms are motivated to exploit 
comparative advantages, scale economies and linkages.
2.2.2 Regional Integration and Industry Location 
Economic integration is an integral part in nearly all streams of theoretical literature on 
location of production, often being the balancing force between agglomeration and 
dispersion phenomena. For instance, Venables (2003) considers elements from traditional 
trade theory  and shows that progressive regional integration can significantly contribute 
to industry concentration. He derives this conclusion by comparing first the intensities of 
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relative comparative advantages among countries forming a custom union (CU), and 
subsequently  those of the CU with the rest of the world. The most salient feature of the 
model relates to the prediction of unequal division of costs and benefits within the CU. In 
particular, it is the country with the “intermediate” comparative advantage that is 
expected to become net-exporter of skilled labour intensive good while the country with 
the “extreme” comparative advantage will specialise in exports of unskilled labour 
intensive good.8 As a result, the model implies that  there is a high likelihood of regional 
integration leading to growing economic disparities between the signatory countries. This 
is expected to be especially  pronounced in the case of so-called South-South agreements 
that exclusively feature low-income economies (Venables, 2003).9 
The emergence of regional inequalities following economic integration is examined in the 
context of NEG models as well. However, contrary to contributions from traditional and 
new trade theories, location of economic activity in NEG models is endogenous and 
described by a process in which distributional inequalities first rise and then fall with 
progressive market integration. A number of diverse mechanisms may explain theoretical 
agglomeration patterns though, in general, they all refer to the cumulative causation 
process first  described by Krugman (1991). In particular, Krugman sources established 
assumptions from the new trade theory, i.e. presence of increasing returns and trade costs, 
while additionally assuming existence of labour migration between the regions. The latter 
may be interpreted as the result of greater regional integration and turns out to be crucial 
in explaining the model’s dynamics. In particular, a rise in the number of local 
establishments in one of the regions increases demand for labour and results in higher 
wages, which in turn tend to attract  more workers to the region. This creates a demand 
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8  More formally, factor endowments in the model are formalised as availability of skilled labour. The 
definitions of comparative advantages are as follows: i) country with the “intermediate” comparative 
advantage in skilled labour has higher factor endowments compared to other CU members though still 
inferior to the rest of the world; ii) whereas the one with the “extreme” comparative advantage has 
comparatively lower factor endowments to everyone else within the CU as well as the rest of the world. 
9 Thus, South-South regional integration efforts may lack government commitment to implementation of 
provisions and as such may lead to abandonment. For instance, the East African Common Market collapsed 
in 1977 partly because of excessive concentration of manufacturing in a single country. In fact, Kenya 
produced more than 70 per cent of manufactures within the CU (Venables, 2003).
linkage through increased local spending on the one side, while it reduces competition in 
the labour market on the other. Attracted by  higher local profits, additional firms decide 
then to locate closer to the comparatively  larger market resulting in the cumulative 
causation process and ultimately  a core-periphery pattern of industry location. Venables 
(1996) considers the relationship between imperfectly  competitive upstream and 
downstream industries as an alternative to labour migration. Nevertheless, his framework 
provides results in line with Krugman’s core-periphery structure, whereby the differences 
in market size of initially identical regions are explained through the presence of strong 
vertical linkages between the different industries.
However, trade integration may equivalently result in greater industry dispersion. 
Krugman and Elizondo (1996) argue that a reduction in trade costs increases the 
influence of external markets at the expense of core locations. The dispersion process is 
thus primarily driven by  weakening cost and demand linkages which assign now greater 
value to exports and imports of products and input factors. As a result industry spreads to 
peripheral, often less developed regions. The tendency  to locate at greater distance from 
the core may be further intensified if, in addition, there are some immobile or non-
tradable factors which are particularly important for production (Ottaviano and Puga, 
1997). Puga (1999) proposes a framework that captures both inter-regional migration and 
input-output linkages as forces which may drive agglomeration, but also takes into 
consideration the impact of non-tradable factors, such as local wages, on clustering of 
firms and workers. In particular, he shows that when trade costs are high, firm location is 
equally distributed between otherwise identical regions in order to satisfy  the local 
demand. Interestingly however, the model also predicts a greater tendency for firms to 
disperse towards peripheral regions at lower trade costs. This holds only under the 
assumption of equilibrium wage differences not being eliminated by migration and thus 
firms facing higher production costs in locations with many  other firms. It follows that 
for low trade costs it is the price of non-tradable factors that determines location. Hence, 
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it is only  for intermediate trade costs that firms choose to agglomerate as cost and 
demand linkages dominate the other two cases. 
In sum, NEG models predict that high trade costs encourage firms to disperse and settle 
in different regions to be able to supply markets locally. For low values of trade costs, 
location is determined by the price of those factors that  are considered to be immobile, 
hence firms have an incentive to locate away from the core. Finally, agglomeration of 
economic activity is expected to take place only  at intermediate trade costs as demand 
and cost linkages take over. 
Nevertheless, most of the models reviewed so far illustrate fairly  dramatic pictures 
whereby whole manufacturing activity moves together into and out of regions. This 
clearly  does not correspond to observed location patterns in reality where industries 
geographically concentrate at a more disaggregated level than ‘overall manufacturing’. 
Krugman and Venables (1996) model that process by  highlighting the importance of 
differences in input-output linkages between different industries. In particular, they 
consider two imperfectly competitive industries characterised by higher ratios of intra-
industry trade in intermediate inputs, with comparatively  little inter-industry trade taking 
place. The prediction from the model can be summarised as follows: assuming that an 
additional firm locates in a particular region, the beneficial cost  and demand linkages 
affect more intensely firms in the same sector. At the same time, increased product and 
labour market  competition harms firms in both sectors equally. It  follows therefore that, 
all else equal, integration leads each region to become specialised in the production of 
one sector. Summarising the discussion above we are able to set up our second 
hypothesis:
H2a: Following trade integration, industries characterised by comparatively high or low 
trade costs are expected to be more dispersed than industries with intermediate trade 
costs. 
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H2b: Moreover, industry linkages are important factor in explaining industry 
agglomeration. In particular, we expect intra-industry linkages to dominate inter-industry 
ones. 
In the CEEC, clustering may have been further reinforced by strong FDI inflows 
following investment liberalisation and comprehensive privatisation programs. Relatively 
cheap and skilled labour force as well as the proximity to core EU markets allowed 
thereby foreign investors to benefit from the best utilisation of resources and 
endowments. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that FDI in the CEEC has followed a 
strategy of international vertical integration. Foreign investors have exploited differences 
in comparative advantage for different stages of production while their location has been 
concentrated around strong industrial bases (Altomonte and Resmini, 2002). 
However, Markusen and Venables (1999) show that foreign investments may facilitate 
geographical concentration even in the absence of already existing industrial areas. 
Specifically, location decision of FDI may trigger the cumulative causation process by 
creating demand for locally  produced intermediate inputs and as such improve efficiency 
of the whole industry. In turn, further entry is encouraged thereby intensifying the 
centripetal forces and encouraging agglomeration. Nevertheless, it needs to be 
highlighted that their results depend on the assumption that foreign entry is generally 
characterised by  positive externalities. Yet, as theory  and growing empirical evidence 
suggest, foreign firms may as well impose negative externalities on domestic firms and 
therefore weaken or eventually reverse the cumulative causation mechanism. For 
instance, occupational choice models conclude that FDI results in a decreasing number of 
local entrepreneurs as lower prices on the product market reduce the entrepreneurial 
income more than the wage income (e.g. Grossman, 1984). Though a number of studies 
confirm existence of the crowding-out effect in relation to FDI, empirical evidence with 
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respect to the effects of foreign investments on industry agglomeration patterns remains 
nevertheless inconclusive. 
2.2.3 (Vertical) Industrial Policies and Industry Location 
From the theoretical point of view and under the assumption of absent economic growth, 
agglomeration of firms in one region implies also re-location or closure of firms in 
another. All else equal, it is to be anticipated that economic actors in the region that loses 
firms will be faced with higher costs in addition to increasing unemployment and 
decreasing fiscal revenues. Hence, policy  makers may  impose rules that make re-location 
of firms between countries either costly  or impossible. For instance, Martin and Rogers 
(1995) point out that one common way  to restrict re-location of firms is through 
enforcement of stricter labour laws.10 Such measures certainly qualify as an example of 
horizontal, i.e. non-discriminatory  policies at the disposal of policy makers. Alternatively, 
vertical (or targeted) policies may be offered to a selected number of industries. Thus, it 
is expected that application of such policies will have an impact on location of economic 
activity as well. Studies for China, another transition economy, find that provincial 
governments have been increasingly providing protection to selected few local industries 
in order to increase provincial tax revenues and generate economic development [e.g. He 
et al. (2008); also Bai et  al. (2003)]. They conclude that  policy  induced protectionism 
through application of non-tariff barriers has also led to greater dispersion of protected 
industries. 
According to Neck et al. (2000) progressive institutional integration into the EU has 
lowered the CEEC tariffs on manufactures so that they are generally comparable to those 
in other EU member states. Deeper institutional integration has therefore limited the 
possibility for application of explicit protectionist measures. However, countries with 
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10 According to the authors, in the EU-15 member states it is Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece that have the 
most restrictive policies while UK, Ireland and Denmark are the most laissez-faire countries (Martin and 
Rogers, 1995).
comparative disadvantages might be still geared towards choosing an economic policy 
mix that can exert substantial influence on the location of economic activity without 
discretionary  restrictive practices (Wooton et al. 2004). For instance, there exist a number 
of viable policy tools at governments’ disposal that may not be necessarily  eliminated 
following deeper regional integration, among others: indirect  subsidies, credit guarantees 
and government procurement laws.11 
Brulhart and Trionfetti (2004) study the effect of government procurement on the 
likelihood and intensity of industrial agglomeration whereby national governments are 
characterised as being home-biased, i.e. they have a strong preference for domestic over 
foreign suppliers irrespective of cost and quality  considerations.12  They maintain that 
whether dispersion or agglomeration forces prevail is determined by the trade costs as 
well as the parameters of government procurement intensity. With respect to the latter, 
biased government procurement may  lead to emergence of the so-called “spread effect”, 
or industry  dispersion (Brulhart and Trionfetti, 2004).13  The authors find empirical 
support for the existence of the effect in a sample of European countries. Specifically, 
industries that are subject to a relatively large share of public expenditure tend also to be 
less concentrated (ibid).14  In general, it could be argued that any sort of targeted 
government spending, when conducted by  more than two agents at the same time, may 
intensify the centrifugal forces. For instance, governments may invoke explicit subsidies 
in form of cash payments to compete for new investments and foreign investors in 
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11 For a an excellent and exhaustive summary of existing policy tools see, for instance, Brewer and Young 
(1997).
12 Discrimination by public purchasers in favour of local suppliers is a pervasive phenomenon and has been 
extensively examined in the past [for an overview see, for instance, Mattoo (1996)].
13  In a nutshell, an increase of firms in one region, R1, reduces government expenditure on each variety 
produced in R1 and increases government spending on each variety produced in the other region, R2. This 
in turn discourages further entry of firms in R1 (while it encourages entry in R2) and therefore acts as a 
dispersion force (Brulhart and Trionfetti, 2004).
14  Mardas (2005) examines public procurement clauses (so called “Buy-national” clauses) in a set of 
Eastern European countries and finds evidence of targeted support for a selected number of industries. 
Though the range of industries and associated products varies across the countries, the industries prioritised 
tend to be either of strategic importance, e.g. textiles and automotive, or higher value added once, such as 
pharmaceuticals and engineered products. 
particular. Egger and Falkinger (2006) formally consider such a scenario and conclude 
that it is always beneficial for a government to provide some sort of financial incentives 
to foster entry  of foreign producers.15  Their model predicts that the country with the 
largest payment towards the fixed cost of setting up production facility, all else equal, 
will also be the one with the best prospects for generating industry concentration within 
its borders. However, such a conclusion may be overly simplistic if we consider the 
mechanism through which the “spread effect” operates. In other words, targeted FDI 
subsidies may reverse the cumulative causation process that has been present in a 
particular region towards those that offer larger lump sum payments as opposed to 
comparative advantages and similar. In addition, implicit subsidies may be used to create 
competitive advantage for firms in targeted industries. Besley et al. (2000) provide a 
thought experiment in which they show that  indirect subsidies often aim at inducing less 
aggressive behaviour on the part of more efficient competitors. Hence, they potentially 
act as a dispersion force by dissuading rivals from locating close to markets in which 
those government-favoured establishments operate. 
In fact, direct and indirect subsidies were widely used in CEEC prior to their transition to 
market economies as a way to systematically correct persistent enterprise losses caused 
by non-market determined prices for goods and resources. Reforms in the early  1990s 
significantly reduced the value of direct subsidies flows, however, large-scale changes in 
the economic environment and the associated adverse effects on domestic industries 
frequently forced governments to step in through different types of state aid (Mulas-
Granados et al. 2008). The existence of subsidies in form of debt relief programs, debt-
equity swaps and preferential credits has been documented for a number of transition 
economies (Torok, 2008). According to a number of authors, when compared to the old 
EU member states, transition economies showed a greater tendency to support certain 
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15  The authors assume that two small industrialised economies characterised by identical production 
technologies form a FTA. The idea that firms are located at some place implies that there are fixed costs 
which are incurred at a certain location and not at another.  Hence, the attractiveness of a country depends 
on the fixed costs requirements for setting up a firm. A higher level of public infrastructure (e.g. a lump 
sum payment) reduces the fixed cost of setting up a firm in this economy and therefore raises the 
attractiveness of a country. 
industries and use less transparent instruments to finance state aid [e.g. Holscher and 
Stephan (2009); also, Hashi et al. (2007); Cass (2007)]. In particular, Mulas-Grandos et 
al. (2008) conclude that over three quarters of total state aid in the CEEC was directed 
toward potentially more distorting sectoral aid. 
However, according to which criteria do national policy makers determine the industries 
to be supported? There is some evidence to suggest that selective vertical policies in 
transition and developing economies have favoured profitable industries. From the 
theoretical standpoint, profitable and cash rich firms have more bargaining power than 
firms in declining industries and hence are able to demand more protection and resources 
from national policy makers. This argument is in line with the private interest hypothesis 
which has been empirically confirmed for a number of developed and developing 
countries (see, e.g., Kroszner and Strahan, 1999). Moreover, protecting profitable 
industries is also consistent with the efficiency-maximising objective governments may 
have. Evidence from emerging economies suggests that once domestic industries are 
exposed to potentially  more efficient foreign competition, governments become more 
eager to protect the most profitable of them (Chari and Gupta, 2008). Studies on China, 
for instance, confirm that both national and provincial governments are more inclined to 
offer protection to industries that provide higher tax revenues and significantly contribute 
to economic development [e.g. Young (2000); He et al. (2008)]. 
Krugman (1993) on the other hand observes that  protection in traditional, labour-
intensive industries producing low externalities is still stronger than in technology-
intensive ones. Labour-intensive industries may be regarded as strategic from the policy 
makers’ perspective as it is in their very  own interest to avoid political consequences 
resulting from, for instance, large-scale unemployment. This argument especially  holds 
for countries undergoing significant structural changes such as the CEEC.  We would 
therefore expect labour-intensive industries to be more insulated from competition than 
other industries, therefore also more dispersed. 
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In sum, even though CEEC industries have increasingly integrated into the global 
production networks following the transition to market based economies, there seems to 
be evidence leading us to believe that targeted government intervention has potentially 
resulted in fragmentation of markets in industries that have been in receipt of state 
support. As a consequence, we would expect to observe increasing dispersion of 
industries favoured by such vertical policies. Our last hypothesis can therefore be defined 
as follows: 
H3: (Vertical) industrial policies in favour of profitable and/or strategically important 
domestic industries may have resulted in greater spatial dispersion of those industries. 
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2.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
2.3.1 Measurement and Data
We consider an industry to be geographically  concentrated if only a few spatial units hold 
a large share of that industry’s total gross output or value added. In order to account for 
industry specific spatial agglomeration we construct geographical concentration indices 
for the period 1995 to 2005. Several indices have been suggested in the literature, such as 
the Herfindahl Index, Krugman Specialisation Index and Balassa Index, etc. However, 
the choice of suitable measures tends to be ad hoc and largely dependent on individual 
researcher’s preferences (Combes and Overman, 2004).16
In this chapter, our focus is on computing industry-specific locational GINI coefficient, 
itself being one of the most widely  used indices in the literature (Krugman, 1991b). In 
simple terms, the locational GINI index measures the concentration pattern of a particular 
industry in a particular location as opposed to the same industry in other locations. 
Similarly  to the income inequality literature where it stems from, the locational GINI 
value can be treated as the summary  statistic of spatial dispersion derived from a spatial 
Lorenz curve. In constructing the concentration measures we choose the uniform 
reference distribution whereby spatial units are assumed to be of same size. In other 
words, we choose to operate with a measure of absolute instead of relative industry 
concentration.17  Formally, the locational GINI coefficient for an industry i can be 
expressed as follows:
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16 For a thorough explanation of computational methods as well as properties of some of these measures but 
also others see, for instance, Bickenbach and Bode (2008).
17 For a more extensive discussion on the choice between absolute and relative measures see, e.g., Haaland 
et al.  (1999) and Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000).
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iXk∑j∑              (1)
where µ is the average country share of manufacturing industry i, N is the number of 
countries, Xi is the total gross output (or value added) of industry i, while xij and xik are
the gross output (or value added) of industry i in countries j and k respectively. 
The interpretation of the coefficient is relatively simple: if an industry is equally 
represented in all spatial units under examination, then its locational GINI coefficient is 
equal to 0 (lower boundary). In other words, that industry  is thought to be dispersed 
across space. Instead, if the locational GINI coefficient approaches 1 (upper boundary) 
the industry is considered to be completely concentrated in a single spatial unit.18 
Our main data source for constructing spatial concentration indexes is the EU KLEMS 
database. This is a new source of industry-level data that is primarily aimed at facilitating 
productivity  analyses in the EU-25 member states.19  Its key advantage lies in the 
provision of official statistics from national statistical offices while covering a wide range 
of industries in an internationally comparable way. Nonetheless, it should be emphasised 
that the EU KLEMS database is still work in progress. The level of detail varies across 
countries, industries and variables, while data on most of CEEC is only  available from 
1995 onwards. The database covers 8 out of 10 CEEC with Bulgaria and Romania not 
being represented in the current version of the database. Thus, for those two countries we 
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18 More recently, generalised entropy indexes have been used in describing industry location patterns.  In 
order to test robustness of our results we have also computed the absolute Theil Index in addition to our 
preferred locational GINI coefficient (for a calculation see Bickenbach and Bode,  2008). However, given 
the high correlation coefficient between the two measures,  (0.95) based on gross output and (0.87) based on 
value added data, we continue the discussion by solely focusing on the properties of the locational GINI 
coefficient. 
19 The database is the result of a project carried out by a consortium of European research institutes that is 
also financially supported by the European Commission (for more information see http://
www.euklems.net).
have sourced most  of the data from the Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (SBS) 
database.20 
In sum, our data set includes 10 CEEC: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The sample includes all 
manufacturing activity  in the countries under consideration, represented by 23 industries 
classified according to NACE Revision 1.1, two digit level. The time span chosen 
considers the period from 1995 to 2005. We use data on industry specific gross output 
and value added for the construction of locational GINI coefficients which we examine in 
greater detail in subsequent sections.21 Hereby, we explicitly assume that changes in gross 
output and value added sufficiently  explain changes in location patterns of manufacturing 
industries. Following, we examine some of the salient features present in the data. 
2.3.2 Temporal Trends of Geographical Concentration
As shown in Figure 2.1, the average concentration of total manufacturing as measured by 
gross output data slightly increased during the second half of the 1990s and has been 
decreasing since early 2000s. A comparable trend could be observed in terms of value 
added.22  Overall, locational GINI coefficient based on gross output and value added 
decreased by 2.8 and 6.6 percent between 1995 and 2005 respectively. In other words, 
our preliminary analysis suggests that CEEC have been characterised by  a process of 
industrial dispersion during the period under examination. 
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20 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/european_business/data/database.
21  Gross output and value added data are expressed in constant prices and denominated in the common 
currency.
22  However, results in terms of value added may be affected by data limitations in the initial years, 
especially for Bulgaria and Romania; hence should be carefully interpreted.
Source: own calculation.
In the next step, we make full use of the panel structure as a means to account for any 
potential outliers associated with individual years. Thus, we regress the averaged GINI 
coefficient on a time trend.23 We report the results from pooled but also panel regressions 
featuring industry fixed effects in Table 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Average locational Gini coefficients of gross output and value added, 1995-2005
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23 See also Brulhart (2001) for a similar approach applied to a set of EU countries. 
Table 2.1: OLS estimation of changes in locational GINI coefficients over time, 1995-2005
OLS estimation
Dependent variable: log locational GINI coefficient (based on gross output and value added)
POOLED PANEL
Gross Output Value Added  Gross Output Value Added
Year -0.013** -0.018***  -0.013*** -0.019***
t-stat -2.89 -4.07  -4.91 -6.77
constant 26,19** 35.62*** 26.23*** 35.54***
t-stat 2.76 3.93 4.69 6.54
Industry fixed effects No No  Yes Yes
R-squared 0.03 0.06  0.13 0.21
Observations 253 253 253 253
Heteroskedasticity corrected t-statistic in italics.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Clearly, assuming identical intercepts across industries is too restrictive as indicated by 
significant improvement in the overall fit of the regression following our panel 
estimation. More importantly, we find statistically  significant evidence of a decreasing 
trend in locational GINI coefficients of gross output and value added. The negative and 
significant coefficient in front of the time trend indicates that, on average, industry 
concentration in terms of gross output and value added decreased by 1.3 and 1.8 per cent 
annually. 
In addition to exploring changes of industry concentration over the entire period, we are 
also interested in examining predictions associated with potential structural breaks that 
may be present in our time series. However, we do not make an attempt to statistically 
isolate such breaks in our data. Instead, we choose to impose them exogenously by 
establishing a link to significant changes in economic policy at a particular point in time. 
In particular, we consider the effects of EU accession announcement and full trade 
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liberalisation between CEEC and the EU as our reference point.24 We have therefore split 
our data set into two sub-periods, namely 1995 to 2000 and 2001 to 2005, according to 
the underlying process of wider regional integration. Table 2.2 summarises the results 
from our estimations featuring separate time trends for each interval.
Table 2.2: OLS estimation of changes in locational GINI coefficients prior and after EU 
accession announcement
OLS estimation
Dependent variable: log locational GINI coefficient (based on gross output and value added)
Gross output Value added
1995-2000 2001-2005 1995-2000 2001-2005
Year 0.004 -0.011*** -0.004 -0.011***
t-statistic 1.13 -4.86 -1.63 -3.08
constant -7.65 21.75*** 6.10 20.85**
t-statistic -1.22 4.72 1.51 2.99
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.01 0.23 0.02 0.12
Observations 138 115 138 115
Notes: heteroskedasticity corrected t-statistic in italics
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
There is strong evidence that industry  dispersion trends have accelerated in the first half 
of 2000s. For instance, the sign on parameter coefficient for gross output turns from 
being positive in the period prior to 2001 to negative and highly  significant in the period 
thereafter. Overall, annual percentage decreases in the average location GINI coefficients 
for gross output and value added following EU accession announcement and complete 
trade liberalisation strongly contrast the concentration pattern observed in the earlier 
years. Hence, similar to Brulhart (2001) finding for EU countries, there is to some extent 
conflicting evidence in our data set as well contrary to the predictions predictions that 
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24 At their June 2001 summit in Gothenburg (Sweden),  EU members stated that the “enlargement process is 
irreversible....the road map should make it possible to complete negotiations by the end of 2002 for those 
candidates that are ready. The objective is that they should participate in the European Parliament elections 
of 2004 as members.” (Archick, 2004, p.3). On May 1, 2004, the 8 CEEC became full members of the EU, 
increasing the EU’s population to roughly 450 million. Bulgaria and Romania followed in 2007.
continuous integration within the European borders will encourage formation of more 
clustered industrial geography. Nevertheless, we are aware that it might be misleading to 
attribute industry concentration tendencies, represented as averages across industries, to 
the impact of a single policy measure. Instead, the evolution of concentration patterns 
will be influenced by a multitude of other relevant factors with most of them expected to 
be industry  specific. We therefore proceed by describing industry-specific location 
patterns prior to examining their general determinants. 
2.3.3 Industry Trend of Geographical Concentration
In order to simplify  our analysis, we continue our discussion by focusing on location 
GINI coefficients based on gross output data solely.25 As a first step, we aim to highlight 
and contrast  industries that appear to be highly concentrated in the initial year of 
observations with those in the last year. The results are presented in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3: Changes in locational GINI coefficients in 1995 and 2005, by industry
Locational GINI coeff.
Industry code a TECH b NTB c 1995 2005 ∆
DA15 low high 0.55 0.56 0.01
DA16 low low 0.47 0.43 -0.04
DB17 low high 0.48 0.43 -0.05
DB18 low high 0.52 0.40 -0.12
DC19 low medium 0.50 0.46 -0.04
DD20 low low 0.50 0.44 -0.07
DE21 low low 0.54 0.54 0.00
DE22 low low 0.56 0.52 -0.04
DF23 medium-low low 0.50 0.51 0.01
DG24 medium-high medium 0.52 0.53 0.02
DH25 medium-low low 0.57 0.56 -0.02
DI26 medium-low medium 0.56 0.54 -0.02
DJ27 medium-low high 0.56 0.52 -0.04
DJ28 medium-low low 0.56 0.54 -0.02
DK29 medium-high medium 0.55 0.52 -0.03
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25  In fact, there is high and statistically significant correlation between gross output and value added 
locational GINI coefficients (0.82). As gross output data is more complete it is our preferred choice. 
However, for the sake of robustness we re-estimate all specification using value added data as well. In 
general, the results do not appear to differ to those of gross output and we chose not to report them here. 
They are nevertheless available upon request. 
DL30 high medium 0.50 0.72 0.22
DL31 medium-high medium 0.56 0.53 -0.03
DL32 high medium 0.51 0.65 0.14
DL33 high low 0.56 0.52 -0.04
DM34 medium-high high 0.59 0.61 0.03
DM35 medium-high high 0.63 0.56 -0.07
DN36 low low 0.59 0.55 -0.03
DN37 low low 0.63 0.52 -0.11
Notes:
a) See Table A2.1 in Appendix A for exact definition of industry codes.
b) Classification of industries according to the economies of scale intensity in the production (OECD, 2003).
c) Classification of industries according to applicable non-tariff barriers (Lee and Swagel, 1997).
Industries with the highest level of geographic concentration in 1995 were: DM35 - Other 
transport equipment (GINI: 0.63), DN37 - Recycling (0.63), DM34 - Motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-trailers (0.59), DN36 - Manufacturing n.e.c. (0.58) and DH25 - Rubber 
and plastic products (0.57). Interestingly, industries that belonged to the group of most 
dispersed industries in 1995, namely DL30 - Office machinery and computers and DL32 
Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus, ranked as the most 
concentrated once in 2005. Over the period under consideration, they  achieved significant 
increases in their locational GINI coefficients (from 0.50 to 0.72 and 0.51 to 0.65 
respectively) as they have increasingly came to concentrate in a limited number of 
countries. For instance, approximately 80 percent of total output in office machinery and 
computers (DL30) has been produced by  Czech Republic and Hungary alone, while 
Hungary  produced half of the total industry output for radio, television and 
communication equipment and apparatus (DL32) in 2005. Other spatially concentrated 
industries in 2005 included manufacturers of transport equipment (DM34 and DM35) as 
well as food and beverages producers (DA15). The striking difference between the two 
examination points in time is that increased geographical concentration in the latter is 
almost exclusively  associated with industries frequently referred to as medium- to high-
technology intensive. Overall, Krugman’s (1991) finding for the United States where 
traditional, labour-intensive industries dominate geographical concentration does not 
receive support in our data. In fact, traditional industries belong to the most dispersed 
manufacturing activities in our sample. In 2005, the five least concentrated industries are: 
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DB18 - Wearing apparel, dressing and dying of fur (0.40), DB17 - Textiles (0.43), DA16 
– Tobacco products (0.43), DD20 - Wood and products of wood and cork (0.44) and 
DC19 - Tanning, dressing of leather and footwear (0.47).  
In order to further examine the apparent differences in agglomeration patterns between 
technology and labour intensive industries, we proceed by grouping industries according 
to the OECD classification of technology intensity in the production (OECD, 2003). In 
particular, we compute group-wise average locational GINI coefficients for each of the 
industry groupings. In general, the use of such aggregated measures is not without 
problems as its interpretation may  be influenced by what Krugman (1991a) highlights as 
potentially obsolete merger of industries into statistical headings.26  In other words, 
relatively higher levels of industry aggregation potentially mask pronounced differences 
within and between defined industries. We still believe that useful insights can be derived 
from our approach though we restrain from broad generalisation of the results. Our 
envisaged analysis lends itself to graphical representation. In Figure 2.2 we compute and 
compare temporal trends of geographic concentration according to the degree of 
technology-intensity in the production process.
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26 In the best optimal case, one would prefer product-level instead of industry-level data. Yet, the nature of 
our inquiry as well as data limitations associated with such a low level of aggregation prevent us from 
doing so.
Source: own calculation. 
The strongest concentration appears in the non-traditional, high-technology industries. 
Those industries were increasingly  concentrating in the pre-2001 period, while their 
concentration levels remain constant thereafter. This finding is not particularly  surprising 
but rather in line with theoretical predictions that provide a rational for technology-
intensive industries to cluster following regional integration and market expansion. Low-
technology intensive or labour-intensive industries on the other hand experienced a 
process of continued dispersion throughout the period under consideration. The observed 
pattern might be partially  due to increased FDI inflows and technological upgrades that 
have been experienced in those industries across the CEEC. However, an alternative 
explanation may be related to the significant labour component these industries maintain , 
thus being of strategic importance to national policy makers. 
As previously outlined, already early in the transition process the CEEC industries have 
faced global competition for markets and resources while at the same time, introduction 
of market forces demanded restructuring of their inefficient organisational structures and 
production methods. They have been particularly affected by broad economic changes 
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Figure 2.2: Locational GINI coefficients of gross output by technology intensity in production, 1995-2005
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and have frequently resorted to demand greater protection from domestic policy makers 
[see, for instance, Torok (2007)]. While deeper institutional integration has limited scope 
for application of explicit measures, governments have frequently responded to industry 
demands by making use of distinct measures that qualify as non-tariff barriers (NTBs). 
In order to examine the effects such policies may have on geographical concentration of 
industries we categorise industries according to their specific level of experienced NTBs. 
In the absence of relevant data for CEEC our proxies are sourced from Lee and Swagel 
(1997) with the potentially  restricting assumption that NTB levels in CEECs’ industries 
have broadly followed global trends. The measure reports coverage ratios for core NTBs 
including all non-tariff restrictions applied at the border, such as the quantitative 
restrictions, voluntary export restraints and advanced payment requirements. The authors 
source the data from UNCTAD’s Trade Control Measures database (Lee and Swagel, 
1997). Figure 2.3 shows development of locational GINI coefficients according to the 
degree of industry-specific NTBs. 
Source: own calculation. 
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Figure 2.3: Locational GINI coefficients of gross output by experienced level of NTBs, 1995-2005
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Overall, industries frequently considered to feature high NTBs were significantly 
dispersed during the period under consideration. The decrease in geographical 
concentration is especially pronounced in the period preceding the first round of EU 
accession in 2004. Industries characterised by  intermediate trade costs were increasingly 
concentrated in the pre-2001 period, showing rather constant agglomeration patterns 
thereafter. Still, it  needs to be emphasised that the results for the latter group are to some 
extent driven by strong agglomeration in the two previously  mentioned high-tech 
industries (i.e., DL30 and DL32).27 Interestingly, industries facing low NTBs have been 
increasingly  dispersed over time, though the changes in their locational GINI coefficients 
were not as significant as in the two previous groups. In general, our observations are in 
line with the main predictions from the NEG models. We thus find preliminary support 
for our hypothesis (H2a) that industries characterised by high or low trade costs are more 
geographically dispersed than industries facing intermediate trade costs. Overall, location 
of manufacturing in CEEC appears to be industry specific with progressive regional 
integration exercising a significant impact on that process. To probe deeper into the 
effects of regional integration on industry location, we regress industry-specific locational 
GINI coefficients on a time trend as the indicator of progressive regional integration. The 
results are reported in Table 2.4. 
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27 The potential effects of the increases in locational GINI coefficients for these two industries need to be 
taken into account when analysing determinants of industry concentration in CEEC.
Table 2.4: Temporal changes in locational GINI coefficients between 1995 and 2005, by industry
OLS estimation d
Industry code a TECH b NTB c 1995-2005 1995-2000 2001-2005
DA15 low high -0.002 0.004* -0.007
DA16 low low -0.016*** -0.010** 0.001
DB17 low high -0.016*** -0.010** -0.005
DB18 low high -0.033*** -0.036*** -0.015
DC19 low medium -0.011* -0.022** 0.014***
DD20 low low -0.022*** -0.014** -0.019
DE21 low low -0.002 0.007*** -0.014
DE22 low low -0.009* 0.009** -0.035*
DF23 medium-low low 0.007 0.026* -0.006
DG24 medium-high medium 0.004** 0.010** -0.005
DH25 medium-low low -0.006 0.012** -0.022**
DI26 medium-low medium -0.005 0.010*** -0.024**
DJ27 medium-low high -0.012*** -0.006 0.000
DJ28 medium-low low -0.007* 0.004 -0.020**
DK29 medium-high medium -0.010*** -0.004 -0.014
DL30 high medium 0.019 0.076** -0.006
DL31 medium-high medium -0.004 0.011*** -0.025***
DL32 high medium 0.028*** 0.040*** 0.026
DL33 high low -0.011* 0.006 -0.033**
DM34 medium-high high 0.003 0.009*** -0.006
DM35 medium-high high -0.016*** -0.004 -0.021
DN36 low low -0.012** -0.003 -0.008
DN37 low low -0.021*** -0.035** -0.012**
Notes:
a) See Table A2.1 in the Appendix A for exact definition of industry codes.
b) Classification of industries according to the technology intensity in the production (OECD, 2003).
c) Classification of industries according to the applicable non-tariff barriers (Lee and Swagel, 1997).
d) Dependent variable: log locational GINI coefficient (based on gross output data). 
Reported coefficients relate to the time trend (independent variable: year). Heteroskedasticity corrected 
t-statistics not reported here. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Our particular interest applies to columns 5 and 6 that show results from log-linear OLS 
regressions on a pre- and post-2001 time trends. Overall, there seems to be a tendency 
towards industry dispersion as a consequence of advanced regional integration and trade 
liberalisation. In particular, we find evidence for a slowdown in geographical 
concentration of CEEC industries in the post-2001 period, as 12 out of 23 industries 
switch signs from positive to negative. Industries marked by dispersion in the pre-2001 
period continued, on average, to exhibit the same pattern in the post-2001 period 
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although at a less pronounced rate. These industries are mainly the labour-intensive ones 
as evident form column 2 of Table 2.4. A notable exception is the leather and leather 
products industry  (DC19) which experienced an estimated 2.2 per cent annual decrease in 
spatial concentration followed by an estimated 1.4 per cent annual increase in the 
post-2001 period.
Summarising, the results from our preliminary analysis are interesting in that they 
highlight some of the theoretical predictions described in the preceding section. While 
progressive regional integration has led to greater geographical dispersion of industries, 
the location patterns remain nevertheless industry-specific. Especially, technology 
intensity in the production appears to be one of the main distinguishing factors amongst 
different industry location patterns. In line with NEG models, industries characterised by 
higher technology intensity in the production also appear to be more spatially 
concentrated. In the next section, we intend to further test  this proposition. Following, we 
introduce the empirical model to be estimated. 
2.4. EMPIRICAL MODEL
2.4.1 Variables and Data
Our aim here is to further contribute to understanding of the variation in terms of spatial 
concentration across industries. Thereby, we perform a systematic test of the factors 
determining geographical concentration. The conducted analysis is based on a number of 
sources that will be acknowledged further below while discussing individual variables. 
To recall, the data set includes 10 CEEC and features all manufacturing activity in the 
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countries under consideration, that can be summarised under 23 industry  headings 
classified according to NACE Revision 1.1.28
We start with a description of explanatory  variables associated with the traditional trade 
theory  that highlight the role of factor intensities in impacting the extent of industries’ 
spatial concentration. Hereby, the level of concentration of individual industries is 
assumed to be directly  related to the intensity  of industry use of a certain production 
factor. For instance, it can be posited that raw material dependent producers will be 
drawn to locations rich in natural resources while those reliant on skilled labour force will 
be attracted to locations with comparatively larger pools of skilled work force. To further 
operationalise the concepts, we use industry-specific measures of intensity of energy 
consumption in the production, variable Energy, as well as skilled labour use in the 
production, variable Skill, as proxies for comparative advantages. The inputs for 
construction of these proxies are sourced from the EU KLEMS and Eurostat SBS 
databases respectively. In both instances, we would expect to observe a positive sign in 
front of the coefficient estimates. 
New trade theory maintains that the presence of economies of scale in the production 
positively correlates with the agglomeration of industries. In order to account for the 
impact of internal scale economies on industry  concentration, we use the engineering 
estimates of minimum efficient scale (MES) calculated by Pratten (1988) and converted 
into appropriate measures by Cawley and Davenport (1988).29 The variable Econ_scale 
therefore accounts for the size of internal scale economies being directly sourced from 
Haaland et al. (1999). In addition, a further related measure is considered in terms of 
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28  NACE (Nomenclature statistique des Activités économiques dans la Communauté Européenne) is the 
statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community. Statistics produced on the basis 
of NACE are comparable at European level and, in general, at world level in line with the United Nations' 
International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities (ISIC). In this paper we focus on 
examining manufacturing activities corresponding to NACE Rev 1.1., section D, 2-digit level (see Table 
A2.1 in the Appendix A). 
29  The latter transform the MES into “percentage reduction in average costs for a one percent increase in 
output” (see also Haaland et al., 1999).
technology-intensity  in the production as a potential indicator of industry-level scale 
economies. We make use of the OECD classification of technology-intensity in the 
production. The scaling indicator Technology has a value between 1 and 4, with the 
former indicating low-technology intensity in the production (OECD, 2003). The values 
in between indicate medium-low and medium-high technology deployment respectively. 
In general, both variables are expected to relate positively to greater spatial concentration. 
NEG models emphasise importance of intra- and inter-industry  linkages in stimulating 
spatial concentration of production. Following He et al. (2008), we construct proxy 
variables for both types of linkages, variables Intra_linkages and Inter_linkages 
respectively. Based on information provided in Input-Output matrices we construct the 
proxies as follows: 
Intra_ linkagesi = 100 * (xii xi )                      (2)
Inter _ linkages = 12 *100 xij / xi + xij / xij=1,≠ i∑i=1,≠ j∑
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
                               (3)
where xij  is the value flow from industry  i to industry  j, and xi  represents the total output 
and total input of industry i.30 
The latest available Input-Output matrices for CEEC refer to the year 2000 and are 
sourced from Eurostat. Due to data limitations we assume the linkages to remain constant 
over the period under consideration. Given the relatively short time series, this may not 
be necessarily  regarded as overly restrictive assumption as linkages seem to evolve rather 
slowly over time [see Maestad (1997)]. In general, we would expect positive signs in 
front of both variables. 
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30  Note that we only consider linkages within the manufacturing sector. 
As previously argued, deeper regional integration is expected to have impacted 
geographical concentration of industries. In the CEEC, increased economic and 
institutional integration with the EU has led to larger investment and trade flows 
(Resmini, 2007). To test for the effects of progressive regional integration, we construct a 
number of proxy variables. 
First, we account for industry  level FDI intensity by  assuming that industries with 
comparatively  higher shares of FDI are also more internationally integrated. The variable 
FDI_share is calculated as the ratio of industry-specific FDI stock to total manufacturing 
FDI stock. The data is partially sourced from the Vienna Institute for International 
Economics (WIIW, 2008) database on FDI including relatively complete information on 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, as well as from publicly available Central Bank data for 
Latvia and Slovenia.31 Evidently, data limitations with respect to this particular variable 
remain an issue as we have to make a number of restrictive assumptions. First, we have to 
assume equal industry-level FDI shares across countries as we have data available for 
only 4 out of 10 countries. Second, we have to use imputation methods for missing data 
to generate a more complete time series due to lower coverage of FDI data prior to 
2000.32  Obviously, these limitations should be kept in mind when analysing and 
interpreting the results. Second, to further account for the extent of industries’ integration 
with rest of the world we proxy for their degree of vertical integration into regional and 
global value chains. Industries sourcing higher shares of production components from 
non-domestic markets are expected to be more interrelated with the regional (global) 
economy. Thus, we use the ratio of industry-specific imported intermediate inputs to total 
intermediate inputs as a proxy for the described phenomenon. Similar to the preceding 
proxies, the variable Intermed_imports is also constructed using information from the 
Input-Output tables provided by Eurostat. Finally, we argue that export-orientated 
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31 http://www.wiiw.ac.at/e/statistics.html 
http://www.bank.lv/en/statistics/data-room/main-indicators/direct-investments 
http://www.bsi.si/en/financial-data.asp?MapaId=64
32 For this purpose, STATA 11 command impute for missing data is used. 
industries, i.e. industries with comparatively  higher shares of exports in their total gross 
output, tend to be more globally  integrated than industries producing for domestic 
markets only.33 The variable Export_intensity is constructed using two distinct resources: 
industry-specific values of exports are obtained from UNIDO’s INDSTAT-3 database 
while gross output data is sourced EU KLEMS and Eurostat SBS databases. 
In general, the expected signs on the three proxy variables cannot be determined a priori. 
For instance, theory  stipulates that FDI may imply presence of positive externalities for 
the recipient location in that it  can trigger the cumulative causation process and, thus, 
agglomeration (Markusen, 2002). However, as growing empirical evidence suggests, it 
may  also lead to negative externalities by crowding out domestic firms hence potentially 
reversing the agglomeration process (ibid). In addition, increasing regional integration 
may lead export-orientated industries to locate at greater distance from each other in 
order to enjoy benefits from locations with lower factor costs (Krugman and Elizondo, 
1996). Yet at the same time, empirical evidence for developed and developing countries 
indicates that trading establishments tend to locate close to each other [e.g. Shelburne and 
Bednarzik (1993); Sjoberg and Sjoholm (2004)]. 
Finally, a set of variable is included in the model to account for possible effects of 
vertical industrial policies. As a proxy for broader trade costs we consider including in 
the estimation of the aforementioned NTBs (Lee and Swagel, 1997). Thus, the variable 
NTB is expected to be positively  correlated with the likelihood of a certain industry being 
also a potential target of vertical industrial policies. The task of deriving vertical policy 
indicators is not an easy one in view of the fact that policy  makers are faced with a large 
menu of options that may qualify as restrictive policy tools. Thus, we are not in a position 
to consider all of them here, neither is this the aim of the exercise. Instead, we are 
concerned with providing an alternative or indirect way  to examining potential effects of 
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33  Industries considered to be export-oriented are those that export more than 2/3 of their overall gross 
output. 
government intervention.34  Our discussion above rested on the assumption that, all else 
equal, policy makers in transition economies chose to offer support to profitable 
industries as, hypothetically speaking, these industries are expected to commit more 
resources to lobby  for protection. Thus, we construct an indicator of industry-level 
profitability by computing the ratio of value-added to gross industrial output. The 
variable Policy_VA is sourced from EU KLEMS and Eurostat SBS datasets. At the same 
time, policy  makers might  be as well tempted to take the initiative and offer protection to 
what they consider to be industries of strategic importance. In CEEC, opening up of 
formerly protected markets to competition has threatened the hegemony of established 
domestic industries, therefore increasing the social costs as revenues declined and 
unemployment increased. Hence, we would anticipate that policy makers may be tempted 
to offer protection to labour-intensive industries in particular as a way to ease the 
negative effects associated with increased foreign competition and economic 
restructuring. Following, we provide a proxy of industries’ strategic importance by 
calculating the ratio of industries’ employment to total manufacturing employment. As 
with the preceding indicator, the variable Policy_EMP comes from the EU KLEMS and 
Eurostat SBS datasets. In sum, industries characterised by higher NTBs, higher value-
added or larger labour-intensity in the production are expected to be subject to 
comparatively  higher protection in the context of economic transition. As a result, we 
would expect to observe a negative sign in front of the coefficients on these three 
variables. Finally, based on the preceding discussion Table 2.5 summarises the variables 
deployed in the empirical model. 
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34 For a similar approach applied to the case of China see He et al. (2008). 
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Table 2.5: Summary of the variables used in the empirical model
Variable Definition Type Exp. sign Source
GINI
Locational GINI coefficients of gross output and value added as per
equation (1) (Dependent) EU KLEMS, Eurostat 
Energy Ratio of intermediate energy inputs Market forces + EU KLEMS, Eurostat
Skill Ratio of highly skilled labour compensation to total compensation Market forces + EU KLEMS, Eurostat 
Econ_scale Measure of industry-specific scale intensity in production Market forces + Haaland et al. (1999)
Technology Dummy variable for industry-specific technology intensity in production Market forces + OECD STAN
Intra_linkages Ratio of intermediate inputs from own industry as per equation (2) Market forces + Eurostat - IO Tables
Inter_linkages
Ratio of intermediate sale to and inputs from other industries as per 
equation (3) Market forces + Eurostat - IO Tables
FDI_share Ratio of industry FDI stock to total manufacturing FDI stock Integration + WIIW; Central Banks
Intermed_imports Ratio of imported intermediate inputs to total inputs Integration + Eurostat - IO Tables
Export_intensity Ratio of exports to gross output Integration + UNIDO, EU KLEMS, Eurostat
NTB Industry specific (production weighted) non-tariff barriers to trade Industrial policy (vert.) - Lee and Swagel (1997)
Policy_VA Ratio of value added to total gross output Industrial policy (vert.) - EU KLEMS, Eurostat 
Policy_EMP Ratio of total industry employment to total manufacturing employment Industrial policy (vert.) - EU KLEMS, Eurostat 
2.4.2 Estimation Approach
The variables in Table 2.5 are calculated for each industry as averages across 10 CEEC 
resulting in a balanced panel data set covering 22 industries over the period 1995 to 
2005.35 Note that due to data limitations, especially  in the period 1995 to 2000, we use 
interpolation methods for missing values. The dependent variable is the industry-specific 
locational GINI coefficient calculated using gross output data.36  Since our dependent 
variable ranges between 0 and 1, we subject it to a logistic transformation in order to 
avoid the truncated variable problem. Based on the above, following panel structure is 
assumed:
         ln GINIit1−GINIit
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= α + β1Μit + β2Ιit + β3Πit + λit +υt + εit                    (4)
 
where i denotes industry  and t denotes time. Μit is the vector of variables approximating 
effects of market forces, while Ιit and Πit summarise the regional integration and vertical 
industrial policies proxies respectively. We control for potential outliers, high-tech 
industries DL30 and DL32, by introducing a dummy variable λit . The industry invariant 
time trend that accounts for any time-specific effects not accounted for by the regression 
is represented by υt . Failing to account for those effects may result in a biased 
assessment of geographical concentration of industries. Lastly, εit can be classified as the 
remainder stochastic disturbance term. 
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35 Note that industry DN37 (recycling) has been excluded from the analysis due to largely missing data.
36 We have also estimated the same equation featuring value added. The results are qualitatively the same 
and hence not reported directly. 
Equation (4) is first estimated using OLS. Generally speaking, its parameter estimates 
will be consistent though inefficient in presence of both heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation (Greene, 2003). As a result, probability of a Type I error increases in 
estimations with inefficient estimators (ibid). Thus, we consider two alternative 
estimation methods that simultaneously correct for the presence of group-wise 
heteroskedasticity  and temporally  correlated error terms. The Parks-Kmenta feasible 
generalised least squares (FGLS) method is expected to yield unbiased and efficient 
parameter estimates (Beck and Katz, 1995). It performs the estimation by applying two 
sequential transformations on the estimated model, first removing the serial correlation 
and subsequently correcting for contemporaneous correlation and heteroskedasticity 
(Beck and Katz, 1996). Furthermore, Beck and Katz (1995, 1996) propose a less complex 
method, which retains OLS parameters estimates but replaces its standard errors by the 
so-called panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). For the sake of robustness, we 
subsequently  present the estimation results based on both methods (FGLS and OLS-
PCSE) including time-fixed effects.
Our estimation approach can be described as general-to-specific. Thus, we first estimate 
the full model in that we consider all location determinants at once. Next, we test down 
until only statistically  significant variables remain (at the standard 10% significance 
level). This is then our baseline model. According to Bellak et  al. (2010), such an 
estimation approach is beneficial in that it reduces likelihood of the estimation being 
plagued by the omitted variable bias. Moreover, it tests the robustness of underlying 
results subject to inclusion and exclusion of particular location factors. The empirical 
model is estimated in log-linear form whereby independent variables enter equation (4) in 
their one year lags.37 This is to consider the transitory time period it takes for explanatory 
variable to affect the level of spatial concentration. The lagged-variable approach is 
furthermore beneficial in that it reduces the likelihood of estimation being plagued by 
endogeneity issues (Wooldridge, 2002). 
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37 Note that we have also estimated the model in log-log form obtaining qualitatively similar results. 
Finally, to explore incidence of collinearity among the independent variables we present 
the correlation matrix in Table 2.6. Failure to account for its presence in a regression may 
result in inaccurate coefficient estimates, frequently  characterised by high standard errors, 
often changing variable signs or implausibly large magnitudes (Greene, 2003). From the 
Table 2.6, it is evident that there seems to be rather high correlation between proxies for 
technology and economies of scales. To avoid potential issues associated with high 
collinearity  among indicator variables we therefore decide to exclude the variable 
Technology from our initial estimations. Still, we re-estimate all empirical specifications 
separately featuring the proxy Technology.38 
As a final remark, the empirical analysis in this chapter, but also in those to follow, is 
performed using the statistical software package STATA.39
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38   However, the results do not qualitative differ from those presented here and we decide not to report 
them.
39 The corresponding programming files are available upon request. 
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Table 2.6: Correlation matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Energy 1.00
2 Skill 0.30 1.00
3 Econ_scale 0.36 0.45 1.00
4 Technology -0.21 0.17 0.60 1.00
5 Intra_linkages -0.32 0.04 0.03 -0.09 1.00
6 Inter_linkages -0.09 0.02 -0.18 -0.34 0.36 1.00
7 FDI_share 0.15 0.33 0.40 0.15 0.07 -0.12 1.00
8 Intermed_imports -0.07 0.21 0.34 0.62 -0.25 -0.38 0.13 1.00
9 Export_intensity 0.38 0.20 0.32 0.01 -0.12 -0.02 0.13 0.06 1.00
10 NTB -0.10 -0.48 -0.11 -0.10 0.13 -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.03 1.00
11 Policy_VA -0.35 -0.18 -0.45 -0.05 -0.24 0.01 -0.27 -0.08 -0.34 -0.04 1.00
12 Policy_EMP -0.17 -0.19 -0.26 -0.16 -0.08 -0.10 0.30 -0.14 -0.14 0.46 0.13 1.00
2.4.3 Results
In the first column of Table 2.7, we displays the results of the OLS estimation performed 
on our full model as specified in equation (4). The model has a satisfactory goodness of 
fit in that  it explains 63 percentage points of the total variation in locational GINI 
coefficient. Furthermore, we report the mean Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) as we are 
interested in detecting cases of (near) collinearity between pairs of regressors. Our mean 
VIF statistic is low (2.37), with the maximum VIF still below commonly accepted 
threshold level of 10 (Kutner et al., 2004). This suggests that collinearity  may  not present 
an eminent issue in our specification of the model. 
We briefly summarise underlying results of the full model specification using OLS. They 
appear to be broadly in line with at least some of the theoretical predictions. In line with 
the NEG literature, industries that are more reliant  on skilled labour force and economies 
of scale in the production appear to be geographically concentrated as indicated by 
positive and highly significant coefficient estimates. Moreover, FDI_share features the 
expected sign in addition to being statistically significant thus highlighting the effect of 
progressive regional integration on industry  concentration. As regards remaining 
integration proxies, both Intermed_inputs and Export_intensity fail the significance test 
while also featuring negative sings in front of their coefficient estimates. It  follows that 
industries exporting higher shares of their gross output seem to be locating at greater 
distance from each other. Thus, our finding lends some tentative support to the theoretical 
argument which states that deeper integration, characterised by  continuous reduction in 
transportation costs, fosters dispersion as it allows industries to serve core markets 
through exporting while exploiting comparative advantages of periphery regions (Puga, 
1998). Surprisingly, intra-industry linkages seem to act as centrifugal rather than 
expected centripetal force in our sample, whereas the results pertaining to the effects of 
vertical industrial policy on industry location largely correspond to our expectations.
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Table 2.7: Determinants of geographical concentration, fully specified model
Dependent variable: log locational GINI coefficient (gross output)
OLS PCSE FGLS
Variable (L-1) (1) (2) (3)
Energy -1.408*** -0.894*** -0.948***
[0.243] [0.259] [0.220]
Skills 0.022*** 0.009* 0.008*
[0.008] [0.005] [0.005]
Econ_scale 0.185*** 0.217*** 0.203***
[0.042] [0.043] [0.037]
Intra_linkages -1.830*** -0.967* -0.971**
[0.466] [0.531] [0.417]
Inter_linkages 0.202 0.428 0.468
[0.306] [0.332] [0.295]
FDI_share 1.592*** 1.080** 1.326***
[0.478] [0.452] [0.377]
Intermed_imports -0.068 -0.009 -0.182
[0.115] [0.142] [0.134]
Export_intensity -0.012 -0.010 -0.008
[0.014] [0.010] [0.009]
NTB -0.216** -0.309*** -0.324***
[0.094] [0.114] [0.092]
Policy_VA -1.350*** -0.474 -0.529*
[0.454] [0.346] [0.280]
Policy_EMP 0.109 0.752 0.433
[0.600] [0.629] [0.576]
Dummy a Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects (time) Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.63 0.46 -
Wald-chi-squared - 151.13*** 238.97***
Mean VIF 2.37 - -
Arellano-Bond (AR1) 8.32*** - -
RMSE 0.18 0.10 -
Observations 220 220 220
Note: All independent variables enter regression function in their one year lags (L-1). 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in square brackets.
a)  Dummy variable: industry codes DL30 and DL32.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Although we consider presence of group-wise heteroskedasticity in our initial estimation, 
the conclusions about the statistical significance of the parameter estimates will depend 
on the assumption of non-temporally correlated error terms. To test the assumption, we 
present results from further residual tests following OLS and report Arellano-Bond 
(1991) test for first-order autocorrelation (AR1).40  As evident, the null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation is soundly rejected suggesting use of alternative estimators instead of 
OLS. In columns (2) and (3), we present results of the full model estimation using OLS 
with PCSE and Parks-Kmenta FGLS techniques respectively.41  In general, the results 
obtained from these two different estimation approaches are qualitatively very similar, 
with rather minor variations in the magnitudes of their respective parameter coefficients. 
Without  further discussion we proceed to estimating the restricted version of the model 
and present the results in Table 2.8.
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40 In STATA 11, the test is implemented using abar command. 
41  Note that in STATA 11, we use the xtpcse and xtgls commands to estimate PCSE and FGLS models 
respectively. In addition we specify the (AR1) option in both models while simultaneously correcting for 
heteroskedasticity according to White by specifying robust option. 
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Table 2.8: Determinants of geographical concentration, restricted model
Dependent variable: log locational GINI coefficient (gross output)
OLS PCSE FGLS
Variable (L-1) (1) (2) (3)
Energy -1.434*** -0.988*** -0.968***
[0.185] [0.239] [0.204]
Skills 0.025*** 0.012** 0.010**
[0.006] [0.005] [0.004]
Econ_scale 0.162*** 0.195*** 0.173***
[0.035] [0.038] [0.033]
Intra_linkages -1.819*** -0.966* -0.863**
[0.401] [0.497] [0.378]
FDI_share 1.578*** 1.065** 1.271***
[0.455] [0.434] [0.351]
NTB -0.201** -0.242** -0.340***
[0.083] [0.096] [0.078]
Policy_VA -1.370*** -0.524 -0.470*
[0.387] [0.357] [0.281]
Dummy a Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects (time) Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.63 0.45 -
Wald-chi-squared - 134.40*** 226.82***
Mean VIF 1.92 - -
Arellano Bond (AR1) 8.34*** - -
RMSE 0.18 0.10 -
Observations 220 220 220
Note: All independent variables enter regression function in their one year lags (L-1). 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in square brackets.
a) Dummy variable: industry codes DL30 and DL32.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
As evident from the regressions in columns (1) to (3), we confirm the robustness of the 
preceding results as all the variables keep  their signs and significance levels. Thus, we 
proceed to a more detailed discussion of the underlying findings. Note that, as the OLS 
estimates may suffer from presence of serially  correlated error terms, we base our 
subsequent analysis on the PCSE and FGLS estimators respectively. Starting with the 
factor intensities, the results in columns (2) and (3) reveal an unexpected result in terms 
of factor endowment Energy. In particular, the variable features a negative sign in 
addition to being statistically significant. It therefore implies that the CEEC industries 
that are dependent on primary  input factors display a tendency towards spatial dispersion. 
Thus, the transition process and progressive opening up of the economies to trade and 
investment may  have encouraged more resource dependent industries to follow those less 
mobile resources. In contrast, the variable Skills has the expected positive sign and is 
highly  significant in all specification. Given the assumption of a lumpy distribution of the 
input factor, industries reliant on skilled work force show a tendency towards 
agglomeration. Our findings are thus in line with previous studies on the region, e.g. 
Hildebrandt and Woerz (2004), who find that industries characterised by  higher ratios of 
skilled labour have been also marked by a comparatively stronger trend towards spatial 
agglomeration. In a similar vein, Dumais et al. (1997) have shown that manufacturing 
establishments in the United States have displayed higher propensity to locate near 
similar firms on the grounds of requiring the same type of labour. 
Moreover, we find positive and statistically significant impact of economies of scale, 
variable Econ_scale, on location of manufacturing industries. Hence, all else equal, 
manufacturing industries reliant on internal economies of scale in the production are 
more geographically concentrated. Our finding lends therefore firm support to the NEG 
models which highlight that in the process of progressive regional integration, economies 
of scale intensive industries may  choose a smaller number of locations from which to 
supply larger number of markets. 
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In addition, NEG models assign particular value to pecuniary  externalities in explaining 
observed agglomeration patterns. As previously  outlined, one of our proxies for industry 
linkages is a measure of intermediate goods flows within the same industry 
(Intra_linkages). Contrary  to our expectations, the variable Intra_linkages features a 
negative sign in front of its point estimate while being also highly significant. The result 
therefore suggests that stronger dependence on intra-industry linkages leads industries to 
locate at greater distance from each other. After all, this may not be surprising: for 
instance, Krugman and Elizondo (1996) show that the importance of industry linkages 
might be weakened by the opening up of a closed economy to international trade. When 
the economy is closed, firms located in industrial cores have the best  access to both 
domestically produced inputs and the domestic market. It follows that opening up the 
economy weakens the linkage advantages of those core areas as it allows firms to source 
inputs and sell outputs abroad. This notion holds particularly  well in the context of the 
CEEC: as domestic producers started trading higher proportions of intermediate inputs 
and finished goods with the rest  of the world it would be rather natural to expect a 
weakening of both types of linkages. 
The evidence on the impact of greater regional integration on spatial concentration of 
manufacturing industries is rather mixed. While industry  trading patterns do not appear to 
have any significant explanatory  power in the model, the role of FDI in explaining spatial 
concentration patterns turns out to be of immense importance. In fact, the variable 
FDI_share is positive and highly significant having also the largest magnitude on its 
coefficient estimate. Thus, our results hint towards presence of positive externalities 
associated with location of foreign investors, i.e. FDI inflows appear to trigger increased 
agglomeration of industrial activities in CEEC [for a similar result see, Resmini (2000); 
Altomonte and Resmini (2002)]. 
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Turning to the vertical industrial policy variables, it  seems that industries faced with 
higher non-tariff barriers, as indicated by the variable NTB, also chose to locate at a 
greater distance from each other. Hence, higher trade costs appear to discourage 
industries from co-locating and might therefore imply significant efficiency losses due to 
the presence of imposed policy barriers. It follows that, theoretical predictions from NEG 
models find support in our sample of CEEC transition economies. Interestingly, our 
exploratory proxy for likelihood of an industry being favoured by vertical industrial 
policies (Policy_VA) holds the expected sign while also being statistically  significant in 
two out of three model specifications. Put it simply, industries characterised by  higher 
value added appear to be locating at farther distance from each other. When taken 
together with the previous finding on the role of NTBs in determining location outcomes, 
these results may be cautiously perceived as a confirmation of the hypothesis that  vertical 
industrial policies might indeed exercise an impact on industry location patterns in 
CEEC. 
Finally, the consideration of a dummy for industry  codes DL30 and DL32 as well as the 
time fixed effects prove to hold significant explanatory power in our model specification. 
With respect to the latter, a previous study by Hildebrandt and Woerz (2004) comes to the 
same conclusion. In particular, they find that spatial agglomeration of these two 
industries is mainly  due to FDI inflows that have been biased towards only two locations 
in our sample, namely Hungary and Czech Republic.42  Besides, the time fixed effect 
further confirm the findings from the preliminary analysis that  a trend towards a 
continuos process of industry  dispersion has accompanied CEEC transition to market-
based economies. 
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42  In order to ensure that our results are not affected by influential observations related to these two 
industries we re-estimated all equations presented in Table 2.8 by excluding DL30 and DL32 from our data 
set. However, this alternation does not change the overall quality of our results; hence, we do not report 
them here. 
As a further robustness check we re-estimate the restricted specification of equation (4) 
using a two year lag on the right hand side variables. The results are firmly  in line with 
those discussed above and will not be subject to further discussion at this point in time.43 
In Table 2.9, we further scrutinise the effects of progressive regional integration with the 
EU and its consequences for industry location patterns. In particular, we split the entire 
period under consideration into two corresponding sub-periods. This split is not arbitrary 
but rather in line with the announcement of EU’s first round of Eastern Enlargement. 
Specifically, in columns (1) and (3) we present the results for the pre-accession 
announcement period, i.e. 1995 to 2000, using PCSE and FGLS estimators respectively. 
The results for the post-accession announcement period, i.e. 2001 to 2005, are displayed 
in columns (2) and (4). 
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43 They are nevertheless available upon request. 
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Table 2.9: Determinants of geographical concentration, prior and after EU accession announcement 
Dependent variable: log locational GINI coefficient (gross output)
PCSE FGLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable (L-1) Pre-2001 Post-2001 Pre-2001 Post-2001
Energy -1.276*** -1.568*** -0.717*** -1.175***
[0.387] [0.319] [0.238] [0.274]
Skills 0.030*** 0.004 0.028*** -0.001
[0.009] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
Econ_scale 0.028 0.276*** -0.039 0.174***
[0.051] [0.061] [0.041] [0.054]
Intra_linkages -1.618** -1.120* -0.419 -0.878*
[0.785] [0.650] [0.474] [0.511]
FDI_share 3.220*** 0.606 3.854*** 1.431**
[63.060] [0.693] [54.404] [0.620]
NTB 0.065 -0.522*** -0.061 -0.619***
[0.124] [0.121] [0.090] [0.097]
Policy_VA -1.628*** -1.978*** -1.095*** -1.422***
[0.547] [0.577] [0.314] [0.481]
Dummy a Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.52 0.51 - -
Wald-chi-squared 93.07*** 173.45*** 275.89*** 216.63***
Observations 110 110 110 110
Note: All independent variables enter regression function in their one year lags (L-1). 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in square brackets.
a) Dummy variable: industry codes DL30 and DL32.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
The findings are indeed interesting as they point towards diverging location dynamics 
between these two distinct time periods. Whereas factor endowments proxies retain their 
signs and significance levels, they nevertheless influence industry  location patterns in 
very different ways. In particular, industries dependent on immobile resources seem to 
have experienced increased dispersion in the post-2001 period. Thus, natural resources 
induced comparative advantages seem to gain in importance in an integrating region as 
firms find it  now easier to locate closer to sources of those advantages. At the same time, 
market and institutional integration make the pools of skilled labour more mobile and 
thus ease the pressure on firms to follow them. Another interesting finding pertains to the 
effect of economies of scale on the location of industrial production. In line with 
theoretical predictions, progressive market integration is expected to lead scale intensive 
industries to agglomerate as it enables an easier supply of the markets from only a few 
locations. This argument seems to be nicely  born out in our sample as variable 
Econ_scale turns out  to be positive and highly  significant  following the accession 
announcement. As previously outlined, the effect of intra-industry linkages remains 
negative and significant throughout the period under consideration. It therefore 
underlines the structural changes that have affected most of the CEEC industries. The 
fundamental trade re-orientation of the countries towards foreign markets is also expected 
to have decreased their reliance on former, mainly  domestic, linkages. In line with 
previous findings, FDI remains a significant explanatory factor in terms of industry 
location even though its effect appears to somehow weaken in the post-2001 period. 
Thus, the announcement of the first round of enlargement might have raised investors’ 
expectations for other parts of Eastern Europe, e.g. some of the South-East European 
countries, to join the EU in due course as well; thus shifting focus away from the core 
CEEC towards those countries at the periphery. Finally, we re-confirm the negative effect 
exercised by potentially  implicit vertical policies as industries experiencing higher NTBs 
and those more likely  to be attended to seem to be increasingly dispersed in the post-
announcement period. We therefore find support for our stated hypothesis (H3) in that 
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industries facing higher barriers to trade and those of potentially strategic importance to 
policy makers tend to be also more dispersed in place. 
2.5 CONCLUSION
Our analysis gives an account of changes in geographical location patterns in 
manufacturing industries across 10 CEEC, covering the period 1995 to 2005. The work 
undertaken in this chapter expands the existing stock of knowledge on a number of 
relevant issues that are worth highlighting. 
First, our study is geared towards a better understanding of changes in spatial location 
patterns by considering a longer time period and more disaggregated levels of industry 
classification. Previous studies placed in a similar context have been confined to the early 
years of transition, a period that is regarded as volatile and marked by severe transitional 
shocks. Among others, Hildebrandt and Woerz (2004) examine the transition period 1993 
to 2000, while Longhi et al. (2005) focus on the time span including the years 1990 to 
1999. Besides, the relevant studies are also restricted to highly  aggregate industry 
classifications which may  have further distorted their analytical conclusions. An 
additional advantage of using an extended time series is that we are able to impose 
structural breaks on our data, thereby highlighting changes in speed of CEEC’ EU 
integration process. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to launch this type 
of inquiry into the subject matter. Second, most of the existing studies have used a 
restricted number of explanatory variables in examining spatial location patterns which 
limited the analytical power of their inquires. Longhi et al. (2005), for instance, focus on 
characteristics limited to market potential, R&D intensity  and labour abundance only. 
Clearly, part of the issue can be attributed to the lack of reliable and comparable cross-
country  data. In this respect, our study makes use of a new data set that enables us to 
construct somewhat more elaborate measures of spatial concentration as well as proxies 
for various theoretical concepts that have been put forward in the literature. Third, to the 
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best of our knowledge this is the first study in the context of transition economies to 
account for the potential impact of industrial policies on geographical location. In a 
sense, our analysis therefore provides a basis for a new field of inquiry  as we take a novel 
approach in providing arguments for a more formal examination of the effects of vertical 
policies on industry location in transition and developing countries context. 
The main results coming out of the analysis can be summarised as follows. Spatial 
concentration of manufacturing appears to have been decreasing over the period under 
consideration. Additionally, we find strong evidence that industry dispersion trends have 
accelerated in the post-2001 period and following the announcement of the first round of 
EU’s Eastern Enlargement. This finding is contrary  to the predictions coming out of 
theoretical literature whereby the process of deepening market integration, and with it 
associated efficient division of labour, is expected to result in a more concentrated 
production landscape. Besides, our finding is also in contrast to some of the previous 
empirical research concerned with this specific region. In particular, the evidence 
presented by Hildebrandt and Woerz (2004) describes a landscape of increasing 
concentration for the period 1993 to 2000. However, in their concluding remarks the 
authors predict a turning point in the concentration trends due to a deepening of 
institutional and economic integration. In fact, by extending the time period under 
examination we are able to confirm their prediction in that we indeed observe a decline in 
industry concentration patterns. 
As regards specific location determinants, and in line with existing research such as 
Resmini (2000) and Altomonte and Resmini (2002), we confirm the role and importance 
of regional integration factors such as FDI in contributing towards increased industry 
clustering. However, alternative regional integration proxies tentatively indicate that 
industries with more extensive links to international value chains might have experienced 
a process of spatial dispersion over the course of time. Thus, it appears that  the choice of 
61
proxies operationalised in the models has a significant impact on the results one obtains. 
Therefore, caution is called for when devising and interpreting such variables. 
Finally, we also find some preliminary support for our hypothesis that vertical industrial 
policies might lead to increased spatial dispersion of productive activities. Indeed, 
industries facing higher trade costs also tend to locate at greater distance from each other, 
while those with a higher value added component in the production exhibit the same 
location patterns. Hence, given the assumption that CEEC policy  makers have continued 
providing implicit support to certain industries throughout the transition process, we rate 
this finding as tentative evidence for adverse effects which targeted policy measures can 
have on industry concentration as they erode potential benefits stemming from more 
efficient division of labour and increased intra-industry trade. 
Although informative, our present inquiry remains limited in several ways. First of all, 
the spatial level of analysis is highly aggregate and prevents us from reaching more 
nuanced conclusion on where the actual agglomerations take place within countries. As 
industry location is unlikely  to be evenly spread across space our focus on countries as 
spatial units of examination has therefore left an important  question unanswered: in 
particular, what is the effect of changes in industry concentration patterns on the ongoing 
process of structural change affecting CEEC regions? In other words, do changing 
industry location patterns increase the extent of regional divergence within the countries 
or do they actually contribute to regional convergence and, hence, more balanced 
growth? Second, our initial research highlights the relevance of certain agglomeration 
factors, most notably  the FDI. However, given the scope of the inquiry we fail to provide 
a more detailed indication on what are its actual location determinants. This is an 
especially relevant question given the perceived importance of FDI in the context of 
economic transition and with it  associated technological progress and economic growth. 
In the following two essays we make an attempt at deriving some answers to the 
questions raised here.
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APPENDIX A
Table A2.1: The Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European 
Community, NACE Rev 1.1.44 
NACE DESCRIPTION
D Manufacturing
DA Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages
16 Manufacture of tobacco products
DB Manufacture of textiles and textile products
17 Manufacture of textiles
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
DC Manufacture of leather and leather products
19
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and 
footwear
DD Manufacture of wood and wood products
20
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles 
of straw and plaiting materials
DE Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
DF Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
DG Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
DH Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
DI Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
DJ Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products
27 Manufacture of basic metals
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
DK Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
DL Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment
30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
DM Manufacture of transport equipment
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment
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44 NACE: Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté européenne.
DN Manufacturing n.e.c.
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.
37 Recycling
G
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household 
goods
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods
H Hotels and restaurants
55 Hotels and restaurants
I Transport, storage and communication
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines
61 Water transport
62 Air transport
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies
64 Post and telecommunications
J Financial intermediation
65 Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
66 Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
67 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation
K Real estate, renting and business activities
70 Real estate activities
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household goods
72 Computer and related activities
73 Research and development
74 Other business activities
Source: http://www.fifoost.org/database/nace/nace-en_2002c.php
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Chapter 3
Border Effects and the Location of Industry at the Sub-
national Level 
3.1 INTRODUCTION
We have concluded the preceding chapter noting that distribution of industry location is 
unlikely to be evenly spread across space. This notion has been previously formalised in 
the basic core-periphery models building on a more general observation that productive 
activities have a tendency to agglomerate in space, as a means to benefit from a range of 
positive spillovers, such as knowledge, skills, infrastructure, among others (Marshal, 
1920). However, in contrast to the market-based economies the production landscape of 
the CEEC has been over time significantly  transformed by the state apparatus. Hereby, 
industry location has been primarily driven by  geo-political considerations resulting in a 
skewed distribution of production, away from unstable Western border regions towards 
internal and Eastern border regions. 
Following the start of the transition process, the role of national borders radically 
changed as international mobility of goods and factors of production gained in 
importance. As a result  of progressive integration with the EU, CEECs’ Western borders 
effectively disappeared thereby  potentially increasing the attractiveness of these regions 
as locations of production. At the same time, integration also implied that most of the 
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CEEC’s Eastern regions would become EU’s external frontiers, thus getting potentially 
even more closed than before. Policies at the national and supra-national level have been 
designed to tackle the structural challenges facing border regions. They were primarily 
aimed at raising the attractiveness of those regions for investment as a means to tackle the 
issue of diverging growth patterns. In view of the above, it follows that  the implied 
asymmetry stemming from the broad based geo-political and policy  changes may have 
had a significant impact on the spatial distribution of economic activity  within the CEEC. 
Our aim in this chapter is therefore to investigate the implications national borders have 
on location of industry  in the context of economic transition and progressive regional 
integration.  
While examination of the effects of national borders on various economic outcomes has 
recently  featured prominently in the economic literature, relatively little attention has 
been paid so far to examining their role in determining location outcomes.45  In the 
context of transition economies, only a handful of studies exist even though confined to 
the analysis of only  a few explanatory factors, countries and industries. This chapter 
therefore aims at  expanding the exisiting stock of knowledge in several ways. First, we 
provide a comprehensive account on the changes in spatial location patterns for a large 
number of the CEEC manufacturing and services industries at the sub-national (regional) 
level of spatial aggregation. Previous studies have been confined to an analysis of a 
limited number of manufacturing industries only  and have not considered location of 
services at all. Besides, the time span under consideration refers to the second half of the 
transition phase whereas previous studies have largely  focused on the intial period, i.e. 
1990s. The latter has been marked by severe transitional shocks that may have 
significantly affected the findings of exisiting research. Second, we empirically 
operationalise some of the theoretical concepts associated with different streams of 
relevant literature and hence allow for a more comprehensive analysis of location factors 
at  the regional level. Previous studies have been constrained in that respect as they 
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45  See, for instance, Helliwell and McCallum (1995); Engel and Rogers (1996); Nitsch (2000); Evans 
(2003).
focused on a very limited number of explanatory factors. Third, we take into 
consideration wider effects of the CEEC progressive integration into the EU. Our 
intention in this respect is to focus on certain characteristics of the integration process 
such as the application of region-specifc policies and strucutural development funds 
aimed at advancing the position of the CEEC’s border regions in particular. The policies’ 
primary purpose has been to upgrade the infrastructure, enable cross-border cooperation 
and thus positively  affect  regional attractiveness for investment and growth. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first paper to inquire into the effects of regional policy on 
location of economic activity in the context of the CEEC. Fourth, in contrast to previous 
studies we take into consideration the relative position of regions as well as the distance 
between them by calculating statistics of spatial autocorrelation in addition to standard 
spatial concentration measures. This is useful in that our study is not unidimensional in 
terms of industry  concentration but also explicitly considers spatial autocorrelation 
among regions, thereby presenting a more robust picture of indutry location patterns. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical 
literature based on which we derive the hypothesis to be tested in the empirical part of the 
paper. Section 3 summarises some of existing empirical research that is deemed of 
relevance to our cause here. Section 4 introduces the data and presents some descriptive 
statistics. Section 5 discusses the estimation methodology  and results. Section 6 
concludes and highlights some policy implications.  
3.2 ECONOMIC THEORY
We start  the review of relevant theoretical literature with a short discussion of traditional 
location theory. Following, we outline some of the salient predictions associated with the 
international trade theory. We then proceed to a discussion of contemporary theoretical 
models as described by the NEG literature. Finally, we conclude this section with a brief 
summary  of stylised facts based on which we develop hypotheses to be tested in the 
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empirical part  of the paper. The literature review presented here is by no means 
exhaustive. It is nevertheless worth highlighting that Houtum (2000), Niebuhr and Stiller 
(2004) and more recently Brulhart (2010) provide excellent and comprehensive 
summaries of existing knowledge in the field. 
One of the first contributions to the traditional location theory is von Thunen’s (1875) 
original work on optimal location of (agricultural) production. Central to his theory is the 
concept of transportation cost which is to be incurred in moving the finished product to a 
central market place. The basic insight from this rather simple analytical framework is 
that the profits associated with the production of a good are a decreasing function of 
increasing distance from the centre.46 Von Thuenen thus developed the very first type of a 
"core-periphery" model describing a production space in which the degree of 
agglomeration declines in stages, starting from the core to the periphery to total 
wilderness where no production is worthwhile.
In a similar fashion to von Thunen’s theory, the following generation of location theorists 
placed the transportation costs at the forefront of their analysis. For instance, in Weber’s 
(1922) least cost approach firms choose their location so as to minimise the cost of 
transportation between raw material sites and markets. Thereby, the optimum location is 
thought to be closer to the resource extraction sites the higher the raw material content in 
the final product. Still, a common issue to the first generation of location studies is that 
they have largely abstracted from considerations of political boundaries of space. 
Giersch (1949) was one of the first to develop a model for the explicit purpose of 
analysing the location patterns in presence of political boundaries.47  In the model, the 
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46 He makes a number of simplifying assumptions by stating that the economy under investigation is a flat 
and homogeneous surface, isolated from the rest of the world. However, his subsequent thinking has been 
less restrictive in that it takes into consideration the transportation costs for intermediate products, 
differences in terrains, etc.
47 It is nevertheless a highly stylised model described by a plain in which all incurred transportation costs 
can be considered as proportional to physical distance. The plain is assumed to be entirely surrounded by a 
desert (border) which is a synonym to a natural barrier to international trade and factor movements. 
actual size of emerging market areas is a function of transportation costs and internal 
scale economies. It posits that lower transportation costs along with greater internal scale 
economies result in larger market areas which can be served by fewer firms. 
Consequently, the networks of markets for every product would tend to become denser in 
the centre than at  the periphery. Thus, the emergence of agglomeration advantages in the 
centre of the plain would ultimately  lead to a polarised distribution of economic activities 
in space. The resulting ‘border effect’ therefore implies that peripheral regions are less 
attractive for location of productive activities.48 
Reversing these arguments has been the task of trade theorists. Although location aspects 
have received comparatively  little attention in international trade theory, its contribution 
has nevertheless been instrumental in advancing our understanding of spatial dynamics.49 
The main insight coming out of this literature stream is related to trade liberalisation and 
its potential impact on the location of productive activities. In general, it is expected that 
the integration process lowers the costs of access to foreign markets while it increases the 
size of the accessible market area. It follows then that, all else equal, regions bordering 
foreign markets will qualify as preferred locations for investment and production. 
Rauch (1991) formalises this notion in a model following a common observation that 
within a particular country, certain localities have a more favourable access to foreign 
markets than others. The outstanding feature of his model is the assumption of a specific 
landscape featuring an internal geography and transportation costs, the latter assuming 
standard iceberg structure. The results can be summarised as follows. In autarky, there is 
no difference in the size of the cities given the assumption of uniform internal trade costs. 
It is only following progressively  more liberalised trade, along with the reduction in trade 
cost, that cities closer to the border partly specialise and engage in international trade. As 
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48 For a similar argument see Hover (1963).
49 Among the main reasons for this deficiency is the tendency of trade economists to model highly abstract 
spatial structures. For instance, basic trade models assume presence of a homogenous and featureless intra-
national space that does not allow for a more nuanced examination of location patterns (e.g. Krugman and 
Helpman, 1984).
a result of favourable market access conditions, cities closer to the border will also be 
bigger in size. Finally, at low trade costs even the most internal cities specialise and trade; 
however, considering existing presence of transportation costs, city sizes continue to 
decrease with growing distance from the border. The implication of Rauch’s model for 
our present analysis is easy to understand: progressive regional integration and opening 
of an economy to trade is associated with an implied concentration bias towards locations 
with more favourable access to foreign markets. 
The explicit consideration of spatial heterogeneity has been one of the main features of 
the core-periphery type of models in the NEG literature. Alonso-Villar (1999), for 
instance, constructs a model that describes a home country consisting of three regions 
that are lined up on a straight line facing to the left and right an identical foreign trade 
partner. By proposing such a set up she assumes the presence of an internal and two 
border regions, the latter thought to benefit from less costly  access to foreign markets. 
Thus, in presence of trade costs, the author concludes that equilibrium location of 
productive sectors cannot be in the internal region and therefore border regions must have 
a location advantage in open economies frameworks. This result holds as long as foreign 
markets are profitable and trade costs are non-prohibitive. 
Crozet and Koenig (2004) further expand on this approach by allowing external trade 
costs to gradually decline. They find that theoretical frameworks based on heterogeneous 
structure of space cannot provide a clear cut indication on location of production in the 
presence of progressive market integration. At first, regional integration induces a re-
location of domestic producers towards a border region due to its physical proximity  to 
export markets. However, they also show that this process can invoke exactly  the 
opposite effect as well by inducing re-location of domestic producers towards interior 
regions in their search for higher protection from outside competition. Given the 
locational dynamics inherited in the theoretical model, the answer as to the direction and 
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magnitude of industry concentration patterns in the context of progressive regional 
integration therefore becomes an empirical one. 
The analysis so far has been mainly  concerned with issues of (regional) market access. 
However, as Brulhart (2010) rightly  notes, real-world regions differ in more aspects than 
access to markets. We are therefore interested in reviewing some of the theoretical 
concepts that highlight the role of other location factors, in particular infrastructure 
endowments and policy measures. 
Starting with the former, the role of infrastructure has been already examined in  the NEG 
type of models. In a seminal paper, Martin and Rogers (1995) show that regions endowed 
with better infrastructure have on average lower intra-regional transaction costs. This in 
turn reduces the production costs and contributes to the development of a cumulative 
causation process. In particular, a fall in relative prices of goods produced in a region 
with better infrastructure results in higher demand for goods produced there and thus 
attracts other producers to the locality. To put it differently, a lowering of transaction 
costs expands the effective size of the market thereby attracting more firms to it. It 
follows that higher industry concentration levels are to be expected in regions with better 
infrastructure.
The cumulative causation process might be stimulated by more endogenous factors as 
well. Policy instruments that focus on the creation of enabling business environment 
might possibly  influence decision processes of firms and industries on where to locate.50 
Dupont and Martin (2006) conceptualise this in a model on subsidies (investment 
incentives) that builds on the “footloose capital” model developed by Martin and Rogers 
(1995) and further analysed in Baldwin et al. (2003). Several insights emerge from their 
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50  According to Hirschman (1958), presence of development bottlenecks, e.g. lack of infrastructure, 
legislation, etc., needs to be tackled by policy prescriptions. He outlines two development options. First, the 
stakeholders can exercise political pressure on policy makers to adapt to their needs (“development via 
shortage”). Second, policy makers might be forward looking and play an active role in regional 
development by attending to stakeholders future development needs (“development via excess”). 
study that we only  briefly  summarise here. In general, it appears that subsidies as a policy 
instrument are a potent tool for attracting firms to poorer (peripheral) regions. Their 
impact is greater the higher the level of regional integration, as it is assumed that lower 
trade costs guide the footloose firms to locations with less competition and on average 
higher subsidies provision. Thus, progressive regional integration in presence of targeted 
policy instruments might benefit  border regions in particular. However, their remain 
certain caveats associated with the notion of subsidies being one of the determining 
location factors. From the theoretical point  of view, if we assume existence of sufficiently 
mobile firms the model predictions become more ambiguous. In particular, subsidies to 
firms in peripheral region will then inevitably lead to higher operating profits in all 
regions. As firms relocate to a border region that provides/receives the subsidies, 
competition becomes weaker in the central region so that profits increase there too.51 In 
addition, Tavares and Young (2005) cite evidence from a number of empirical studies and 
conclude that investment incentives are “a crude, discriminatory and expensive tool for 
the attraction of inward FDI” (Tavares and Young, 2005, p.4). In view of the contrasting 
predictions there is no clear cut answer on the subject matter implying that it is most 
likely to be context specific - hence it is necessary to revert to the empirics.  
3.2.1 Hypothesis
In the preceding paragraphs we have investigated how integration might affect regions 
located along the national borders. Location theory implies that market potential is low in 
border regions thus making it less likely  for this type of regions to host any significant 
agglomerations of economic activity. However, explicit consideration of market 
integration may completely alter the picture. In particular, the relative geographical 
position of regions changes as strategically  well positioned border regions transform into 
central locations while others remain a periphery, possibly further falling behind. Indeed, 
72
51 In theory, this is still a positive outcome provided that costs incurred to provide the subsidies outweigh 
possible negative externalities,  e.g. increase in competitive pressure in peripheral region that might trigger a 
downsizing process in terms of employment and output. 
central border regions should have a geographic advantage within an integrating bloc. 
Economies of scale intensive industries in particular are expected to be drawn to such 
locations given their strategic position within the common market. We can therefore 
derive our first set of hypotheses by stating that: 
Hypothesis 1a: In general, progressive regional integration and openness will contribute 
to increased industry concentration in regions with better access to relevant foreign 
markets. These regions are expected to be the central border regions positioned in-
between integrating partners. 
Hypothesis 1b: All else equal, economies of scale intensive industries in particular will 
exhibit higher levels of geographical concentration and exhibit tendency to locate in the 
central border regions. 
The importance of proximity to relevant markets remains nevertheless conditional on the 
assumption that a region is in a possession of suitable (transportation) infrastructure to 
reach the external markets. Theoretical models indicate that  availability of high quality 
infrastructure can significantly impact the location decision of firms by expanding the 
market potential of a locality. This effect is expected to be further intensified in the course 
of economic integration. It follows then:
Hypothesis 2: Progressive regional integration and openness intensify the tendency of 
industries to concentrate in regions with comparatively better stock of (transportation) 
infrastructure. 
Finally, recent theoretical inquiries attribute a decisive role to regional policy  instruments 
in impacting industry  location outcomes. Especially, economies of scale intensive 
industries are assumed to be influenced by targeted policy instruments as they  are faced 
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with the choice of selecting a single production facility to supply a number of distant 
locations. Our final hypothesis can be stated as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Regional policy instruments, that explicitly aim at advancing a region’s 
attractiveness for production purposes, are an effective tool for generating higher levels 
of industry concentration: in particular, regional policy tools are expected to have a 
positive effect on location of industry in the central border regions and, in particular, 
location of economies of scale intensive industries within this type of regions. 
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3.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Despite growing number of theoretical models that aim at explaining spatial dynamics of 
industry location, there is still surprisingly little empirical evidence to allow for more 
robust conclusions on the competing theories. As initially stated, in this chapter we 
propose to empirically explore some of the underlying predictions of theoretical models. 
Following, we review a number of relevant studies that describe industry  location 
dynamics in the context of heterogeneous geographical space. Among others, we review 
Hanson’s (1998) seminal work on the Mexican economy in the context of deeper 
economic integration within NAFTA. We also examine in greater detail Resmini’s (2007) 
analysis of industry location patterns in the CEEC following their transition to market 
based economies. 
Hanson’s (1998) seminal paper explores changes in the industry location patterns in 
Mexico following that  country’s accession to the NAFTA. Hereby, the author bases his 
empirical inquiry on the underlying theoretical framework rooted in the NEG literature 
[Krugman and Livas(1992); Venables (1996)]. The theoretical framework thereby 
provides a basis for an estimation of changes in regional distribution of labour demand: 
itself a function of changes in trade costs, existing industry concentration and a series of 
control variables. Broadly speaking, his findings are largely consistent with standard 
NEG propositions: i.e., stimulated by  progressive economic integration, economic 
activity in Mexico tends to shift towards regions with better access to foreign markets (in 
particular, the United States). It follows that regions at closer distance to the target market 
are expected to disproportionally benefit from NAFTA. Moreover, the author presents 
evidence that NAFTA has accentuated the transportation-cost effect  and, hence, directly 
contributed to a decline of urban primacy of Mexico City and its manufacturing belt. In a 
similar vein, Faber (2007) arrives to the same conclusion stating that sectors that  have 
exhibited higher degrees of regional integration have tended to grow faster in border 
regions. He measures the trade integration of Mexican sectors by  focusing on changes in 
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their exporting patterns (to the US) over time. The author concludes that progressive 
economic integration weakens the agglomeration economies related to existing demand 
and cost linkages, resulting in industry dispersion away from primary production centres. 
Faber’s (2007) finding is clearly of relevance to the CEEC as it  points towards spatial 
dynamics that might be expected in the European context  of integration as well. Similar 
to Mexico, the CEEC have relied for a significant period of time on capital regions as 
their main economic centres. Transition process and opening of border to trade and 
investment have shifted the focus towards external markets and, in particular, the EU 
[see, e.g., Bruelhart and Koenig, (2006)]. Thus, increased economic activity in the 
formerly peripheral Western border regions of the CEEC may be indeed a realistic 
expectation. 
Martincus and Sanguinetti (2009) do not explicitly consider the effects of trade 
liberalisation but chose instead to exploit cross-sectional patterns in tariff protection as a 
means to establish the link between trade policy and industry agglomeration in Argentina. 
Their working hypothesis implies that lower barriers to trade, as measured by lower 
industry tariffs, will increase the tendency of particularly  economies of scale intensive 
industries to locate away from main economic centres and at closer distance to regions 
bordering relevant foreign markets.52  Their estimation strategy is based on the 
assumption that the observed economic landscape is a result of multivariate interactions 
between region- and industry-specific characteristics [for a similar approach see also 
Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000)]. This ‘matching’ is then conducted for 125 
manufacturing industries and 24 regions in the period 1985 to 1994. The principal result 
coming out of their analysis is that trade policy has some explanatory  power as it appears 
to affect location patterns of manufacturing industries. In line with Hanson’s (1998) 
findings, they  find evidence of declining importance of the capital region. Besides, there 
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52  In the case of Argentina, the economic centre is the capital region in and around Buenos Aires which 
accounted for approximately 60 per cent of national GDP over the period under examination (Sanguinetti 
and Martincus, 2009). 
appears to be an increasing tendency of more trade dependent industries to locate at 
larger distance from the domestic economic core.53
In a similar vein, Henderson and Kuncoro (1996) examine the changes in location 
patterns of firms in Indonesia, following internally  driven liberalisation policies in the 
period 1980 to 1985.54 The value added of their study is the explicit focus on the impact 
of historical location patterns on those currently  observed. Thus, the authors posit that 
path-dependency of industry location matters as it makes it more difficult for policy 
makers to alter the degree of agglomeration away  from the core towards periphery. More 
precisely, location of new plants in Indonesia is biased towards regions that offer a 
readily available stock of assets, characterised by “local trade secrets concerning market 
conditions, local institutions and politics, and technology” (ibid, p.536). The authors 
venture beyond the Indonesian context to conclude that, all else equal, path-dependency 
may be a crucial factor in explaining why, on average, peripheral regions find it  difficult 
to attract economic activity even in presence of strong policy driven support frameworks. 
The case of East  German regions is indicative. For instance, Engel (1999) finds that 
targeted policies along with the substantive institutional and economic integration did not 
result in an increased number of firm start-ups in East German border regions (see also 
Sander and Schmidt, 1998). As an explanation, he points towards persistently  weak 
economic potential of those border regions as the main reason for their poor economic 
performance. Studies on the CEEC that directly examine industry location patterns on a 
cross-country basis and consider progressive European integration remain rare. To the 
best of our knowledge, there are only two such inquiries currently existing.55 
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53  Volpe-Martincus (2010) derives similar results for Brazil suggesting that trade liberalisation favoured 
locations in states closer to the largest neighbouring trading partner and that this effect increased 
throughout the period under examinations, i.e. 1990s. 
54 The policy changes have followed the process of economic decentralisation of the national economy.
55  Nevertheless,  there are a number of studies dealing with related issues that may provide additional 
insight into the topic. For instance, Egger et al. (2005) conduct an empirical inquiry into the effects of trade 
openness on regional disparities within 8 CEEC. They find evidence that economic integration tends to 
foster regional divergence in terms of wage disparities within the region. 
We start with the paper by Traistaru, Nijkamp and Longhi (2002) that is geared towards 
explaining patterns of relative regional specialisation and geographical concentration in 5 
CEEC over the period 1990 to 1999. The CEEC featured in their study include Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia. Hence, with the exception of Hungary and 
Romania, their sample of countries differs from the one used in this paper. The authors 
use Krugman’s (1991a) dissimilarity index, based on industry employment data, to 
estimate a range of country-specific empirical models. The chosen OLS estimator 
features a regression equation populated by the joint effects that are associated with 
region- and industry-specific characteristics (see Midelfart-Knarvik et al., 2000). Their 
obtained results indicate that progressive regional integration might have favoured 
industry concentration in regions bordering the EU and other accession countries. In 
other words, regions located at closer distance to the core European markets, all else 
equal, are thought to have higher market potential and might therefore have benefited 
from increased industry  concentration. Besides, industry  location appears to be at least to 
a certain extent determined by the availability  of input factors. Thereby, labour intensive 
industries tend to locate in regions that can be labelled as labour abundant, while 
technology intensive industries seem to settle in regions with higher relative endowment 
of skilled work force.56 Hence, arguments based on the concept of comparative advantage 
appear to have some explanatory power in terms of industry location in CEEC. We would 
therefore want to control for this effect in our empirical model as well. 
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56 Similar conclusion is derived by Chidlow et al.  (2009) who explore regional location patterns of foreign 
investors in particular and in the context of an individual transition economy. Using survey data from 
online questionnaires they find that regional characteristics indeed matter for location of production in 
Poland. Thus, investors that may be characterised as low-technology intensive in the production prefer to 
locate in regions further away from main economic centres and close to locations endowed with relatively 
low cost factor inputs. The opposite appears to hold true for more technology-intensive investors who on 
average rely more on knowledge intensive input factors and proximity to markets. 
Resmini (2007) takes a similar research approach which is of little surprise given that her 
study uses the same database as the preceding one to answer very similar questions.57 In 
particular, she places emphasis on measuring a region’s accessibility in terms of its 
physical distance to European core markets, former Soviet Bloc countries and other 
accession (candidate) countries. The author posits that firm location in the context of 
Eastern European transition economies has been significantly affected by the incoming 
FDI inflows which she treats as a proxy of progressive regional integration. Thereby, it is 
expected that the accumulation of capital, technology and tacit knowledge which is 
frequently associated with the presence of multinationals, potentially also impact 
centrifugal and centripetal forces that determine levels of industry concentration in host 
countries and their regions. The time period under analysis spans over 8 years in total to 
include the initial period of transition, i.e. 1992 to 1999. The CEEC featured in her study 
include Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and Romania. Their respective regions are classified 
according to NUTS-3 classification of European regions and subsequently their 
geographical position, i.e. border or internal. The former is then further disaggregated 
into regions bordering EU (BEU), other candidate countries (BAC) and countries not 
presently involved in the enlargement process, also former Soviet Bloc partners (BEX). 
The measure of industry  concentration is the location quotient (LQ), as used in this 
chapter and explained further below. 
As regards her results, simple descriptive statistics based on the calculation of LQs for 7 
manufacturing branches reveal changing patterns of industry  concentration. In particular, 
economies of scale intensive industries seem to have expanded their presence in both 
Hungary and Estonia while contracting in Romania. At the same time there has been an 
apparent shift towards border regions, with pronounced industry  concentration in BEU 
regions in Hungary, BEX regions in Romania and BAC regions in Estonia. Some salient 
features emerge from the preliminary analysis of location of FDI as well. In particular, 
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57  The database REGSPEC has been generated in the framework of the PHARE ACE Programme 1998 
with the financial support of the EU. It covers 5 candidate countries and includes several variables at the 
regional level such as employment, GDP, number of domestic and foreign firms, etc. (see the paper for 
further reference). To the best of our knowledge it is currently not freely accessible.
capital regions appear to be the main recipients of incoming FDI closely  followed by 
regions bordering the core European markets. She therefore concludes that changes in 
industry location patterns have positively  affected affected Western border regions in 
particular. Following a more formal inquiry and using least square dummy variable 
(LSDV) estimation approach, she concludes that economic integration has not  been able 
to generate a catching up process among the CEEC regions. As a result, economic 
disparities between capital and Western border regions on the one side and Eastern border 
regions on the other have been growing over time. 
Though insightful, we refrain from broad generalisation of existing studies on the CEEC 
due to a number of perceived limitations in their research design. First, their chosen time 
period under examination has been marked by severe transitional shocks that have 
significantly affected economic performance of the region and might have therefore been 
the driving force behind observed industry  concentration patterns (Coricelli and 
Ianchovichina, 2004). Moreover, the definition of statistical regions has been subject to 
several revisions during that  period of time; this may have further contaminated the data. 
Second, the studies do not consider that  relative position of regions matters in 
determining the extent of agglomeration. Thus, by only taking into account 
unidimensional measures of industry concentration they neglect potential spatial 
autocorrelation. In other words, by doing so they neglect the fact that industry 
concentration, especially at the sub-national level, may span beyond borders of a 
particular region. Third, the high level of industry aggregation derived by  pooling 
manufacturing sector into only 7 branches limits the interpretation of results. Specifically, 
it does not allow for a more nuanced examination of location determinants across 
different industry  types. Fourth, several estimation issues remain un-tackled in both 
studies. In particular, the estimation equation in Resmini (2007) is to some extent 
restrictive in that it  features a relatively narrow focus on only two determining factors: 
physical distances among regions and the FDI-intensity indicator. Omitted variable bias 
may be a potential issue here even though the author considers additive control dummy 
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variables in her estimation. Nonetheless, her approach of treating some of the standard 
location determinants as time-invariant fixed effects should be questioned and especially 
so in the context of economic transition whereby deep structural changes during the 
1990s have significantly affected operations of national economies. Finally, both studies 
refrain from explicitly  testing for possible issues related to endogeneity of explanatory 
variables despite the fact that both market potential and FDI take a leading role in their 
empirical model design. 
In view of the above, we take the previous studies as a reference point  with the intention 
to improve and expand on them. Specifically, we focus on a time period that starts in the 
early 2000s and may be regarded as economically more stable for the countries under 
examination. Moreover, we perform a more thorough spatial analysis by taking into 
consideration the level of spatial autocorrelation among regions in addition to measuring 
the level of industry concentration. We are therefore in a position to sketch a more 
complete picture of industry agglomeration patterns in transition economies. Besides, we 
significantly expand the set of industries under examination to include a total of 31 
manufacturing and services industries in addition to considering some novel location 
factors, such as the policy instruments. 
3.4 EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS
3.4.1 Data
We proceed to explore posed research questions by applying a purely  quantitative 
approach that  makes use of industry  and regional level data for 5 CEEC, namely Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.58 In order to obtain a balanced view 
on industry location patterns in transition economies we take into consideration 
developments in both secondary and tertiary sectors. The classification of industrial 
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58 Other CEEC could not be considered due to lack of available data. 
structures is according to the NACE classification of economic activity, while the 
definition of territorial units follows the NUTS classification of statistical regions.59 More 
specifically, the sample features 23 manufacturing (NACE code: D) and 8 services 
(NACE code: G, H, K) industries that  are located in a total of 43 NUTS-2 regions across 
5 CEEC. The data is collected from two primary  sources. First, we make use of the 
Eurostat’s REGIO database, August 2010 version. In particular, we source industry 
specific data from its Structural Business Statistics (SBS) directory. Second, as a means 
to construct additional proxies of relevance to the econometric model we make use of a 
newly developed ESPON database, August 2010 version. Due to data availability  and 
reliability issues, we limit our empirical inquiry to the period 2002 to 2007.
For the sake of comparability with existing research we chose to classify regions 
according to their actual geo-political position that is in line with the approach taken 
initially by  Traistaru et al. (2002) and Resmini (2007). Thus, we take indirectly into 
consideration the spatial implications of the transition process triggered by the demise of 
the Soviet  Bloc and the integration of CEEC into the EU. Accordingly, border regions 
(BORDER) are defined as those NUTS-2 regions that share their physical border with at 
least one region from a neighbouring state(s). They  can be further disaggregated into 
three distinct sub-groups. The first two groups include regions bordering EU countries 
(BEU) and those bordering other accession (candidate) countries (BAC). The third group 
considers Eastern border regions (BEE), i.e. regions adjacent to non-EU and non-
accession countries. Moreover, we take into account regions that do not share their 
physical borders with any  foreign entity (INTERNAL). Finally, we highlight the role of 
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59 In this chapter we are focused on manufacturing and services corresponding to NACE Rev 1.1. sections: 
D, G, H, K. For more details see Table A2.1 in Appendix A.
NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) is a geographical code standard for referencing the 
subdivisions of countries for statistical purposes. It is hierarchical classification at five levels (three 
regional and two local), extensively used for comparative statistics among European countries. The 
classification does not build only on administrative boundaries, but follows maximum and minimum 
population thresholds for the size of the region and analytical criteria. The threshold population levels for 
determining NUTS-2 regions, as used in this paper, are a minimum of 800.000 and a maximum of 3 
million. They are regarded as basic regions for application of regional policies (European Commission, 
2011).
capital regions (CAPITAL) irrespective of their geographical coordinates, owning to the 
fact that they are principal centres of economic and political influence in their respective 
countries (Crozet and Koenig-Soubeyran, 2002). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that any 
potential changes to the primacy of capital regions may have a direct impact on 
specialisation patterns of all the other regions. A summary  of all the regions according to 
specified classification is provided in Table B3.1 in the Appendix B.
3.4.2 Measurement 
For the purpose of subsequent analysis, we intend to measure the degree of spatial 
concentration of a particular industry  by using a synthetic index that  is able to capture the 
degree of that industry’s deviation from an even distribution over the entire geographical 
space under consideration. The statistical toolbox for conducting such an exercise is 
varied and has grown significantly over the past couple of years. More recently, the trend 
has been to examine firm or plant level data directly  rather than operating on higher 
levels of industry  aggregation. Ellison-Glaeser index, for instance, has been frequently 
used for that purpose and is often cited in the literature [Ellison and Glaeser (1997); see 
also Maurel and Sedillot (1999) and Duranton and Overman (2005)]. Its main advantage 
is that it takes into consideration the actual number of establishments in an industry  and is 
therefore able to correct for the actual plant size. This in turns allows one to distinguish 
between real industry concentration as opposed to concentration of employment in a few 
relatively large establishments (Dominicis et al., 2007). Though desirable, comprehensive 
plant level data are not available for our present set of industries and regions. Instead, we 
choose to follow past  influential studies, such as Brulhart (2001), Holmes and Stevenson 
(2002), Kim (1995) and Resmini (2007), that have used the Hoover-Ballasa Index as the 
preferred indicator for measuring changes in spatial location of productive activities. The 
index is more commonly referred to as the Location Quotient (LQ). The index is 
calculated as follows: 
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                                     (5)
 
where, Eij is employment in industry j in region i. The individual components read as 
follows:
 equals total employment of region i 
 equals total employment in industry j
equals total employment at the higher level of spatial aggregation
As evident, LQij  is a relative measure of spatial distribution that allows comparison to be 
made across industries. In particular, a value of  LQij  > 1 indicates that industry j has a 
share of employment in location i larger than is the case in the reference area. The 
opposite is true when LQij  < 1. 
Although intuitive and fairly easy to interpret, the proposed methodology poses two main 
issues that need to be tackled. First, LQ lacks a scientifically  defined specification of 
what constitutes a significant degree of agglomeration (or clustering) in space. While 
values greater than unity indicate increased presence of a particular economic activity in 
a geographically defined area, this may still not be evidence for presence of a significant 
industry cluster in that locality. Several cut-off regions to define agglomeration have been 
proposed in the literature so far, however, all of them have been rather arbitrary in nature 
[see, for instance, Malmbert and Maskell (2002)]. Second, calculation of the LQ is unit 
specific and, hence, assumed to be independent of other spatial units (Feser and Sweeney, 
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2002). This is problematic when spatial autocorrelation is present in the underlying 
distribution of measured variable. In other words, interpreting the findings by solely 
focusing on LQ values does not suffice to properly delimit agglomerations of economic 
activity. 
To overcome these drawbacks, we consider additional exploratory spatial measures and 
tools that may  help us identify  ‘significant’ agglomerations. First, Moran’s I coefficients 
of spatial autocorrelation are obtained by using the LQ as the basis for computations.60 
Thereby, the statistic compares the value of a continuous variable at any location with the 
value of the same variable at surrounding locations (Dominicis et al., 2007). To allow 
comparisons between different regions, the Moran’s I coefficients are expressed in 
standardised scores. They are formally derived using the following function: 
                           (6)
 
where N is the total number of observations, and xi  and xk  are the observed values of the 
LQ as defined in (5) for the regions i and k (and the mean x  ). The spatial structure of the 
data can be more formally  summarised in a spatial weight matrix W with generic 
elements wik where i ≠ k (Anselin, 1995). Generally, W can be either binary or distance-
based. The former assigns a value of 1 if any two units present in the data share a 
geographical border while 0 indicates otherwise. The latter calculates the weights based 
on actual distances between units. From an applied researcher’s perspective, there is no 
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60 Geary’s c (Geary, 1954) and Getis and Ord’s G (Getis and Ord, 1992) provide alternate statistics that we 
do not consider at this point in time due to better analytical properties of Moran’s I and Moran’s Scatterplot 
(Upton and Fingleton, 1985).
standard procedure or rule in choosing a spatial weight matrix W. Thus, we chose to work 
with a distance-based matrix.61
Although Moran’s I is useful as a measure of the overall spatial pattern in the sample, it  is 
nevertheless incapable of distinguishing significant autocorrelation among different 
subsets of regions and heterogeneous spatial structures, e.g. high-value and low-value 
clustering (Zhang and Lin, 2007). LISA statistic (Local Indicators of Spatial Association) 
is capable of doing just that as it  assesses a null hypothesis of spatial randomness by 
comparing the values in each specific location with values of its neighbouring regions. 
According to Anselin (1996), LISA can be described by any  statistic as long as it satisfies 
two basic criteria. First, the chosen statistic needs to be able to indicate significant spatial 
clustering of similar values for each individual observation. Second, the sum of the 
statistic for all observations needs to be proportional to a global indicator of spatial 
association (e.g. global Moran I). In combination with Moran’s Scatterplot, the statistic is 
useful in that  it highlights local spatial associations such as high-value clusters, low-value 
clusters, and negative autocorrelations [see Zhang and Lin (2007); also Arbia (2006)]. 
The local Moran statistic for an observation i is defined as (Anselin, 1995): 
                               (7)                  
where zi is the attribute value of a region in relation to mean standardised attribute values 
of its neighbouring regions zk . As before, the spatial ordering is identified using a 
distance-based matrix while local Moran’s I coefficients are obtained by  using the LQ as 
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61  We consider distances between regions’ centroids (i.e. regional capitals or administrative centres). To 
determine distances, we first collect data on the exact geographical position of the centroid as implied by 
their geographical coordinates, i.e. longitude and latitude. Based on the minimum and maximum values 
present in the sample, we then calculate the greatest Euclidean distance we might measure between any two 
centroids present in our dataset. Each off the diagonal entries (i, k) in the matrix is then equal to 1/(distance 
between centroid i and centroid k).  Thus, the matrix entries for pairs of centroids that are close together are 
higher than for pairs of centroids that are far apart. The matrix is calculated using the spatwmat command 
in STATA 11. For further references and instructions on how to calculate W see: http://www.ats.ucla.edu/
stat/stata/faq/morans_i.htm
the basis for computations. We use both Moran Scatterplots and (cartographic) Moran 
Significance Maps to visualise the results. The structure of the former is presented in 
Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1: Moran Scatterplot: basic structure 
High - LowLow - Low
High - HighLow - High
z
Wz
< 0                                  0                                   0 > 
< 0               0                0 > 
Source: Anselin (1996).
where z is the attribute value of a region in relation to mean standardised attribute values 
of its neighbouring regions Wz. 
The High-High and Low-Low quadrants imply positive spatial autocorrelation (i.e. spatial 
clustering) in which regions with high (low) LQ values tend to be surrounded by regions 
with equally high (low) values respectively. By contrast, negative spatial autocorrelation 
(i.e. spatial dispersion) is evident when a region with high LQ values is surrounded by 
neighbouring regions featuring low values and vice versa. These can be labelled as spatial 
outliers. The corresponding quadrants are found in the upper left and lower right corner, 
Low-High and High-Low respectively. To enable an easier interpretation of the findings 
we transform the results from Moran Scatterplots into cartographic or Moran’s 
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Significance maps. We will discuss both further below. In sum, and to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study on transition economies to apply such an approach in 
identifying spatial patterns of agglomeration.
3.4.2.1 Qualifications
Prior to proceeding, a number of qualifications related to the structure of the sample need 
to be highlighted as it may be anticipated that  choices we make with respect to 
classification of industrial and regional units will invariably  have an effect on our results 
and hence any subsequent interpretation of the same.
First, our results depend to a certain extent on the classification of industries at  hand. 
Generally speaking, finer classification is to be preferred to more aggregate statistics as 
the latter tends to hide a lot of useful information under “potentially  obsolete 
headings” (see Krugman, 1991). In view of our research design, there is currently 
sufficient data available only at  the two-digit NACE Rev 1.1. Still, our approach remains 
on a much finer scale of industry aggregation when compared to existing studies on 
CEEC (e.g., Resmini 2007). Second, similar to most of the other macro-economic studies 
with micro-economic foundations, the present inquiry  suffers from the Modifiable Area 
Unit Problem (MAUP). The problem arises as a result of trying to convert a 
heterogeneous continuous variable into a discrete one (Arbia, 1986). More specifically, 
MAUP relates to two particular issues. First, results are sensitive to the scale of 
aggregation of space. Second, the boundaries between the discrete spatial units may be 
misplaced, and hence potentially irrelevant, which presents us with the so called arbitrary 
boundary problem. We have to acknowledge these issues in our research design even 
though we are not able to tackle them directly. Following, we proceed with descriptive 
statistics providing some basic evidence on structural changes that have occurred in the 
countries under consideration.
88
3.4.3 Descriptive Statistics
In this section we examine temporal, sectoral and spatial aspects of industry  location with 
the aim to derive some preliminary  conclusions on the spatial dynamics in the context of 
economic transition and progressive regional integration. In particular, we start our 
discussion by examining temporal changes in employment growth patterns across the 
three broad sectors of an economy. For such an aggregate scale sufficient data is available 
to extend the time period under consideration to a total of 9 years, thus the relevant 
period extends from 1999 to 2007. However, it should be reiterated that we limit all 
successive empirical analysis to the period 2002 to 2007 due to considerable amount of 
missing values at lower levels of industry classification. 
We do not regard this necessarily  as a drawback. The first decade of the transition process 
has been marked by severe economic shocks that have affected nearly all CEEC and have 
led to erratic movements in many  of the variables that we intend to deploy in our 
empirical model. Such volatile movements could therefore prevent us from detecting true 
relationships among chosen indicators. Moreover, statistical systems in the transition 
economies needed time to adapt to the new data collection methodologies put forward by 
the EU. Statistical methodologies used in the pre-transition periods were structured in a 
way to monitor social planning and were mainly  concerned with aggregate measures 
(Botric et  al., 2004). Thus, reliable regional indicators were not widely available in the 
initial stages in addition to being subject to subsequent revisions. Finally, the introduction 
of NUTS classification has been a time intensive process that included several major 
revisions, the last one in 2002. Taken together, these facts lend further support to our 
intention of focusing on a shorter, though potentially more complete and 
methodologically sound period of time. 
89
3.4.3.1 Temporal Aspects 
Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of employment in the mining, manufacturing and services 
sectors in the CEEC for the period 1999-2007 and controlling for the geo-political 
position of regions. It  is evident that  most pronounced changes in employment growth 
patterns have occurred in the core, i.e. capital regions. In particular, these regions have 
witnessed decreasing employment rates in both primary and secondary sectors over the 
period under consideration. However, significant increases in tertiary sector employment 
appear to have offset these negative developments. This finding is of little surprise, 
especially in view of increasing demand for services along with major FDI inflows into 
those regions following the transition process (Stare, 2007). 
In general, it  appears that non-capital regions have experienced very similar employment 
growth patterns over time. Regions bordering EU member states (BEU) and other 
accession countries (BAC) show pronounced differences in growth rates between tertiary 
sector on the one side and primary and secondary sectors on the other. It appears that 
positive employment growth rates have been present  throughout the period under 
examination in the services sector only. Employment in the extractive and manufacturing 
industries picked up  only following the first round of EU Eastern Enlargement process. In 
contrast, BEE regions experienced pronounced growth rates in both manufacturing and 
service sectors throughout the period although from a very low base. Overall, this simple 
analysis already  reveals some intersting findings and hints towards preliminary  evidence 
of an ongoing process of polarisation across production space. In particular, there appear 
to be underlying differences in sector location patterns between capital region on the one 
side and non-capital regions on the other. We intend to scrutinise these observations in the 
following two sections.
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Figure 3.2: Changes in employment shares in Mining, Manufacturing and Services
3.4.3.2 Sectoral Aspects
Table 3.1 records the values of LQ for 17 industrial sectors in accordance with individual 
countries and regional groupings.62 Following, we discuss the findings on a country by 
country basis.
Starting with the Czech Republic, its industrial landscape shows a clear tendency towards 
increased polarisation whereby capital region specialises in services sector while 
manufacturing appears to be concentrated in non-capital regions. More specifically, the 
manufacturing activities seem to favour border- over internal regions with a tendency 
towards agglomeration in regions bordering other accession countries (BAC). Labour 
intensive industries, such as textiles or wood products, are found there along with 
manufacturers of more technology intensive products, e.g. technical and optical 
equipment. Overall, BAC regions seem to represent a counter-pole to the primacy of the 
capital region being most likely endowed with a diverse array of production factors that 
enables them to attract such different types of industries.
A trend towards polarisation of production space can be observed in Hungary as well. 
Increased investments in the services sector have been driving the agglomeration process 
in capital region while labour intensive industries, including producers of textiles, leather 
and wood products have preferred to locate in regions closer to the European core 
markets (BEU). 
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62  Note that we do not focus on extractive industries in our subsequent analysis as their location will be 
mainly dependent on the distribution of primary factors. 
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Table 3.1: Evolution of Locational Quotient over time: by country, regional grouping and industry
Country Year Regional group DA DB DC DD DE DF DG DH DI DJ DK DL DM DN G H K
Czech Republic 2002 capital 0.55 0.26 0.20 0.61 1.56 0.09 0.75 0.30 0.22 0.26 0.38 0.60 0.60 0.67 1.78 2.07 3.06
... 2007 capital 0.52 0.31 0.12 0.41 1.76 ... ... ... 0.34 0.24 0.30 0.54 0.57 0.56 1.68 2.06 2.84
...
... 2002 internal 1.18 0.50 0.26 1.51 1.26 ... ... 0.90 1.36 1.04 0.97 1.03 ... 1.42 1.65 1.44 1.16
... 2007 internal ... 0.46 0.24 1.34 1.33 ... 1.42 0.94 1.22 1.03 0.85 0.85 1.99 1.16 1.40 1.04 1.18
...
... 2002 border 1.06 1.41 1.34 1.79 1.09 ... ... 1.23 1.26 1.38 1.20 1.13 0.93 1.27 1.37 1.37 1.17
... 2007 border 1.06 1.41 1.02 1.73 1.05 ... 1.22 1.32 1.22 1.42 1.26 1.20 0.98 1.28 1.22 1.20 0.95
...
... 2002 beu 1.08 1.31 1.16 1.91 1.07 ... ... 0.97 1.39 1.05 1.08 1.03 0.82 1.31 1.34 1.37 1.21
... 2007 beu 1.20 1.28 0.84 1.81 1.03 ... 1.22 1.15 1.35 1.06 1.20 1.05 0.76 1.31 1.21 1.31 0.94
...
... 2002 bac 1.04 1.51 1.53 1.67 1.10 ... ... 1.49 1.13 1.70 1.32 1.26 1.05 1.23 1.41 1.37 1.15
... 2007 bac 0.93 1.55 1.20 1.65 1.07 ... ... 1.43 1.08 1.77 1.31 1.38 1.20 1.25 1.23 1.10 0.96
...
... 2002 bee -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Czech Republic 2007 bee -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Hungary 2002 capital 0.60 0.57 0.25 0.67 1.49 1.15 1.31 0.83 0.54 0.70 0.72 0.86 1.06 0.97 1.56 1.33 2.37
... 2007 capital ... 0.58 ... 0.56 1.38 1.39 1.28 0.62 0.66 0.57 0.59 0.95 0.85 1.02 1.48 1.25 2.37
...
... 2002 internal -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
... 2007 internal -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
...
... 2002 border 1.13 1.29 1.36 1.40 0.81 0.78 0.81 1.09 1.30 1.23 1.18 1.08 0.98 1.29 1.00 1.27 0.81
... 2007 border 1.09 1.23 1.26 1.29 0.72 0.66 0.72 1.10 1.11 1.16 1.16 0.97 0.98 1.14 0.86 1.05 0.77
...
... 2002 beu 1.07 1.90 1.55 1.99 0.73 0.58 0.37 1.30 1.27 0.66 1.15 1.28 1.66 1.76 0.93 1.51 0.78
... 2007 beu 0.98 1.58 2.07 2.11 0.47 0.56 0.45 1.21 1.11 0.65 1.13 1.05 1.73 1.99 0.92 1.29 0.91
...
... 2002 bac 1.21 1.08 1.12 1.16 0.93 0.81 1.07 1.16 1.39 1.50 1.33 1.07 0.98 1.31 1.00 1.19 0.78
... 2007 bac 1.12 1.10 1.05 1.05 0.86 0.82 0.91 1.19 1.18 1.41 1.26 0.99 0.99 1.03 0.80 1.00 0.73
...
... 2002 bee 0.85 1.51 2.09 1.77 0.40 0.83 0.21 0.59 0.97 0.74 0.63 0.91 0.29 0.73 1.06 1.35 0.91
Hungary 2007 bee ... 1.39 ... 1.40 0.38 0.14 0.22 0.61 0.84 0.66 0.79 0.83 0.21 0.75 1.05 1.04 0.81
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Table 3.1 continued
Country Year Regional group DA DB DC DD DE DF DG DH DI DJ DK DL DM DN G H K
Poland 2002 capital 1.39 0.63 1.36 0.66 2.83 ... 2.13 1.12 0.73 0.69 0.69 2.52 0.51 0.76 2.38 2.68 3.68
... 2007 capital 0.98 0.57 ... 0.45 1.93 ... 1.44 0.77 0.68 0.51 0.62 1.35 0.40 0.72 1.81 1.36 2.64
... 2002 internal 1.14 1.66 1.26 1.31 1.36 0.01 0.83 1.22 1.22 1.01 1.09 1.26 1.25 1.31 1.68 1.65 1.41
... 2007 internal 1.16 1.61 0.98 1.27 1.32 0.10 0.88 1.14 1.25 0.99 1.09 1.10 1.47 1.20 1.41 1.33 1.27
... 2002 border 0.99 0.95 1.56 1.83 0.88 0.88 0.83 1.13 1.10 1.10 1.12 0.87 1.09 1.33 1.61 1.97 1.41
... 2007 border 1.02 0.81 1.25 1.59 0.81 0.71 0.83 1.03 1.12 1.06 1.15 0.90 1.14 1.17 1.28 1.52 1.21
... 2002 beu 1.06 0.96 1.65 3.28 1.29 0.11 0.96 1.10 0.83 0.79 0.66 0.99 1.23 1.32 1.74 2.75 1.43
... 2007 beu 1.04 0.93 0.42 2.51 1.21 0.32 0.95 0.90 1.04 0.83 0.71 1.65 1.58 1.36 1.39 2.35 1.20
... 2002 bac 0.91 1.09 2.01 1.06 0.96 1.26 0.98 1.04 1.43 1.81 1.47 1.23 1.01 1.67 1.80 2.26 1.79
... 2007 bac 0.88 0.87 2.08 0.95 0.86 1.20 1.04 0.97 1.29 1.67 1.52 1.26 1.03 1.28 1.43 1.66 1.64
... 2002 bee 1.04 0.80 0.45 1.88 0.60 0.89 0.55 1.24 0.91 0.54 0.99 0.47 1.09 1.00 1.36 1.30 1.03
... 2007 bee 1.15 0.68 0.42 1.78 0.56 0.42 0.56 1.14 0.98 0.55 1.02 0.35 1.00 0.95 1.07 0.96 0.78
Romania 2002 capital 1.91 1.20 1.47 0.50 3.51 0.14 1.72 2.34 1.35 1.14 1.02 4.39 0.90 1.08 2.70 1.89 5.20
... 2007 capital 1.40 0.84 1.11 0.37 3.01 1.30 1.79 1.61 1.60 0.89 1.01 2.10 0.61 0.89 2.41 1.92 4.62
... 2002 internal ... 1.52 1.64 2.08 1.02 ... 1.98 1.33 2.05 1.31 2.22 0.62 1.65 1.60 1.29 1.44 0.83
... 2007 internal 1.33 1.57 1.71 2.58 1.03 0.25 1.69 0.98 1.91 1.07 1.50 0.82 1.34 1.50 1.20 1.47 0.81
... 2002 border 1.02 0.91 1.00 0.94 0.79 2.88 0.77 0.91 0.86 0.99 0.81 0.72 1.24 1.03 1.02 1.00 0.70
... 2007 border 0.89 0.97 1.02 0.89 0.73 1.64 0.76 0.99 0.85 1.07 0.96 1.04 1.10 1.02 0.89 0.91 0.60
... 2002 beu -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
... 2007 beu -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
... 2002 bac 1.02 0.85 0.91 0.79 0.86 4.32 0.94 1.10 1.06 0.86 0.83 0.58 1.58 0.97 1.00 0.81 0.61
... 2007 bac 0.89 0.93 0.95 0.78 0.79 2.11 0.99 1.12 0.98 1.02 1.00 0.75 0.89 0.94 0.86 0.83 0.56
... 2002 bee ... 0.98 1.09 1.10 0.71 ... 0.60 0.73 0.66 1.25 0.78 0.93 0.89 1.08 1.04 1.18 0.79
Romania 2007 bee 0.89 1.01 1.09 1.00 0.67 1.16 0.52 0.87 0.72 1.13 0.92 1.33 1.31 1.10 0.91 0.99 0.64
Slovakia 2002 capital 0.84 0.33 0.26 0.16 1.75 ... 0.67 0.79 0.75 0.33 0.52 1.27 0.44 0.55 2.17 2.14 2.61
... 2007 capital 0.50 0.12 ... 0.39 1.45 ... 0.52 0.49 1.07 0.21 0.48 0.96 ... ... 1.55 1.63 2.38
... 2002 internal -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
... 2007 internal -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
... 2002 border 1.03 1.14 1.09 1.29 0.88 ... 1.00 0.96 1.08 1.12 1.11 0.96 0.88 1.13 0.75 0.77 0.67
... 2007 border 1.09 1.18 ... 1.19 0.98 ... 1.02 1.03 0.88 1.23 1.14 1.06 0.90 1.32 0.89 0.90 0.71
... 2002 beu -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
... 2007 beu -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
... 2002 bac 1.03 1.14 1.09 1.29 0.88 ... 1.00 0.96 1.08 1.12 1.11 0.96 0.88 1.13 0.75 0.77 0.67
... 2007 bac 1.09 1.18 ... 1.19 0.98 ... 1.02 1.03 0.88 1.23 1.14 1.06 0.90 1.32 0.89 0.90 0.71
... 2002 bee -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Slovakia 2007 bee -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Note: For a more detailed explanation of industry codes see Table 2.1 in the Appendix A. 
In Poland, industry location has been concentrated in internal regions as well as BAC 
regions. The latter are characterised by the abundance of natural resources that has 
significantly contributed to the establishment of large-scale industrial complexes during 
the socialist regime.63  Indeed, it appears that resource intensive industries, such as the 
leather, coke and basic metals manufacturers remain concentrated in those regions. In 
contrast, industries with a higher technological content in the production displayed a 
higher propensity  to locate in regions bordering the EU. Besides, both manufacturing and 
services seem to shun BEE regions. Finally, a peculiarity in the Polish case is the fact  that 
the primacy of the capital region is not as pronounced as in other countries. We speculate 
that this may  be potentially  due to the existence of a number of relatively large and 
developed urban centres with a strong industrial legacy, such as the cities of Wroclaw, 
Krakow or Gdansk. 
In Romania, a number of interesting observations can be made. In general, the country 
appears to display  the strongest level of polarisation in our sample with a clear core-
periphery pattern of industry  location. The capital region around Bucharest not only 
appears to be preferred location for service and technology  intensive industries, but for 
some basic labour intensive industries as well. Border regions appear to be disadvantaged 
as indicated by  LQ values below unity  for most of the industries. This stands in strong 
contrast to comparatively higher index values for internal regions, which further 
emphasises the peripheral nature of Romanian border regions.
Finally, developments in the Slovakian regions closely  resemble those of other CEEC 
economies, bar Romania. The services sector is highly concentrated in and around 
Bratislava with most of the manufacturing industries showing a preference to locate in 
non-capital regions. The magnitude of service industry concentration and, hence its 
importance outside the capital region, has been low and limited as evident from the LQ 
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63 See, for instance, Gorzelak and Szul (1989). 
values that  are below unity. Nevertheless, as in most  of the other countries, it  has been 
gradually increasing over time. 
3.4.3.3 Spatial Aspects
Table 3.2 first summarises the LQs of individual industries averaged and grouped into 
broader industry clusters according to OECD classification of technology intensity in the 
production (OECD, 2003). Services are considered separately. 
Table 3.2: Evolution of the Locational Quotient over time: by technology-intensity in the 
production
Regions Borders
Year Technology Capital Internal Border BEU BAC BEE
2002 high 2.54 1.10 0.83 0.90 0.98 0.56
2003 high 2.16 0.99 0.87 1.03 1.00 0.61
2004 high 2.02 0.96 0.85 0.93 1.01 0.49
2005 high 1.83 1.04 0.91 0.97 1.02 0.62
2006 high 1.77 0.99 0.93 0.91 1.09 0.62
2007 high 1.60 0.91 0.94 1.10 1.07 0.68
2002 medium-high 0.90 1.23 1.04 1.14 1.16 0.77
2003 medium-high 0.88 1.27 1.04 1.16 1.14 0.79
2004 medium-high 0.80 1.38 1.02 1.12 1.11 0.80
2005 medium-high 0.77 1.36 1.03 1.13 1.12 0.79
2006 medium-high 0.73 1.37 1.05 1.25 1.11 0.81
2007 medium-high 0.72 1.31 1.07 1.24 1.14 0.80
2002 medium-low 0.75 1.07 1.17 0.85 1.44 0.80
2003 medium-low 0.75 1.06 1.18 0.87 1.47 0.75
2004 medium-low 0.71 1.09 1.13 0.86 1.37 0.76
2005 medium-low 0.70 1.00 1.08 0.83 1.35 0.83
2006 medium-low 0.67 1.00 1.06 0.81 1.33 0.82
2007 medium-low 0.73 0.97 1.05 0.83 1.32 0.77
2002 low 1.14 1.32 1.15 1.42 1.17 0.97
2003 low 1.05 1.32 1.16 1.39 1.18 0.98
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2004 low 0.99 1.30 1.11 1.30 1.13 0.94
2005 low 0.96 1.27 1.09 1.29 1.10 0.94
2006 low 0.95 1.31 1.09 1.30 1.09 0.92
2007 low 0.99 1.28 1.08 1.28 1.09 0.89
2002 services 2.93 1.36 1.18 1.40 1.27 1.07
2003 services 2.76 1.36 1.17 1.37 1.30 1.00
2004 services 2.52 1.31 1.06 1.25 1.16 0.90
2005 services 2.48 1.26 1.04 1.23 1.13 0.89
2006 services 2.41 1.31 1.05 1.25 1.15 0.89
2007 services 2.44 1.23 1.02 1.22 1.11 0.87
Note: Technology intensity in the production according to the OECD classification (OECD, 2003).
In general, capital regions remain preferred locations for services and high-technology 
industries. On the contrary, internal regions appear to be preferred locations for industries 
associated with higher labour intensity  in the production. In particular, low-technology 
and medium-high technology industries seem to locate there. Industry  location patterns 
associated with border regions in particular appear to be equally dynamic but somehow 
more complex. BEU regions show a growing tendency towards specialisation in high-
technology and medium high-technology industries. In BAC regions most pronounced 
concentration trends are associated with medium-low technology industries. In contrast, 
BEE regions appear to be disadvantaged in terms of industry  concentration as indicated 
by LQ values that are below unity for every  industry  grouping. Thus, our preliminary 
analysis further strengthens the assumption that industry location patterns are skewed 
towards regions enjoying comparatively better access to European core markets, i.e. 
regions forming the Western part of the CEEC. 
To further examine spatial interdependencies we calculate the LISA statistic (Moran’s I) 
for each of the 5 industry groupings separately.64 As previously indicated, we present  the 
results in corresponding Moran Significance Maps that are based on the results derived 
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64  The OECD classification does not assign technology-intensity values for services sector. We calculate 
with a mean value to balance the diverging patterns of individual services industries.  
from the Moran Scatterplots (see Appendix B).65 We start with the Map 3.1 in which we 
display the results from Moran Scatterplots for high-technology intensive industries.   
Map 3.1: Regional clustering of high-technology intensive industries
High-High
High-Low
Low-High
Low-Low
Source: own calculation. 
It is immediately apparent that high-technology  intensive industries exhibit strong 
tendency towards agglomeration as their clustering takes place in only  a limited number 
of regions.66  High-High clusters are contagious as they  stretch throughout the Czech 
Republic, western parts of Slovakia and most of Hungary. This is in line with some of the 
previous studies, and further confirms the findings from the analysis conducted in chapter 
2 of this thesis, highlighting the role of Czech Republic and Hungary in particular as 
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65 The underlying map templates are based on EU classification of NUTS-2 regions and are sourced from 
Eurostat. 
66 The results are robust as indicated by global Moran I that is statistically significant at 1 percent level (see 
Appendix B). 
major hubs for more technically sophisticated production in the CEEC. The proximity  of 
those regions to European core markets is indicative as it implies that location patterns of 
high-technology  industries seem to be primarily influenced by market potential 
considerations. In other countries, notably Poland and Romania, we observe presence of a 
limited number of outliers (e.g. High-Low) regions that signal strong agglomerations in 
mainly capital regions. 
The results for medium-high technology intensive industries are presented in Map 3.2. 
Once again, there is a clear tendency for this type of industries to locate in the western 
part of the CEEC and closer to the EU markets. That the geographical concentration of 
those industries is not random may be further supported by statistically significant 
Moran’s I at 1 percent level of significance (see Appendix B).
Map 3.2: Regional clustering of medium-high technology intensive industries
High-High
High-Low
Low-High
Low-Low
Source: own calculation. 
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The agglomeration effects are especially pronounced in the Czech Republic which is also 
the most strategically and centrally located country among the CEEC sample. A salient 
feature that can be distilled from the map is the apparent existence of a medium-high 
technology cross-border cluster that includes Czech Republic, south-western parts of 
Poland, as well as westerns parts of Slovakia and Hungary. The industries forming this 
grouping include, among others, manufacturers of i) chemicals and chemical products, ii) 
machinery  and equipment and iii) motor vehicles and other transport  equipment. It  should 
be noted that these are the industries that have made significant progress in terms of 
integration into global value chains.67  In Map 3.3, we further explore spatial location 
patterns of medium low-technology intensive industries. 
Map 3.3: Regional clustering of medium-low technology intensive industries
High-High
High-Low
Low-High
Low-Low
Source: own calculation. 
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67 See Radosevic and Rozeik (2005) for evidence related to the automotive industry in CEEC.
In general, their location pattern appears to differ from previous two industry groupings.68 
Although spatially correlated clustering seems to be limited to the regions of the Czech 
Republic and some of the adjacent regions in Poland and Slovakia, there are still pockets 
of highly agglomerated regions (High-Low) spread throughout the production landscape. 
Interestingly, there is a slightly  higher propensity  for these pockets to be found in eastern 
parts of Poland, Hungary and Romania. Taking into consideration that industries 
belonging to this grouping largely  depend on the availability  of natural resource for 
production purposes we might assume that the outliers might be the once endowed with 
required input factors.69  Next, we focus on examining LQs for industries with low-
technology requirements in the production process. The results are displayed in Map 3.4. 
Map 3.4: Regional clustering of low technology intensive industries
High-High
High-Low
Low-High
Low-Low
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68 It is nevertheless significant in terms of spatial autocorrelation (Moran’s I significant at 1 percent level).
69 Medium-low technology industries include producers of: i) coke and petroleum products, ii) rubber and 
plastic products, iii) non-metallic mineral products, iv) basic metals and v) fabricated metals.
Source: own calculation. 
From the regional perspective, industries relying on low technology intensity in the 
production process appear to be dispersed in space. The test statistic is not significantly 
different from zero, implying that their location pattern is random and probably  less 
influenced by the specific geographical position of a region (see Appendix B). For 
instance, in the Czech Republic those industries tend to locate in border regions while in 
Poland they appear to favour internal regions and those closer to the EU. There is no 
significant clustering of low technology type of production in Hungary and Slovakia. In 
contrast, Romania appears to be an interesting case where the High-High clusters seem to 
be contagious and skewed towards northern part  of the country. In other words, its low 
technology manufacturers appear to prefer locations at closer distance to foreign markets. 
Another peculiarity  in the Romanian case are the high LQ values for the capital region, 
Bucharest; the result being in contrast to other CEEC capital regions that  do not display a 
tendency towards hosting low-technology intensive industries. Finally, in Map 3.5 we 
show the results for the services sector. 
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Map 3.5: Regional clustering of services sector
High-High
High-Low
Low-High
Low-Low
Source: own calculation. 
It seems that most of the High-High clusters are to be found in BEU regions. Strong 
polarisation is especially evident in Hungary with high concentration of service providers 
in western part of the country. Once again, Romania is an interesting case whereby only 
the capital region features significant agglomeration of services activities with the rest of 
the country being close to a services desert. In Poland, it  is the major urban centres that 
host significant agglomerations of services such as the capital region Warsaw, but also 
regions featuring other well-known cities: Gdansk, Krakow and Wroclaw. 
Summarising, the transition process has produced inter-sectoral changes in employment 
that have also led to changes in the distribution of industrial activities across space. The 
industry groupings reviewed here display to some extent diverse location patterns. Thus, 
high-technology  intensive industries seem to depend on central locations that are close to 
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the core markets but possibly also endowed with qualified work force. In contrast, 
medium-low technology intensive industries appear to be linked to regions that are 
endowed with natural resources. Finally, location patterns of services sector are likely to 
be market-seeking, i.e. proximity to the European core markets and domestic urban 
centres matters for the location of this type of industry. We will therefore pay close 
attention to industry-characteristics when analysing their location patterns. 
The next section aims at uncovering some of the underlying mechanisms that have 
contributed to the emergence of described industry concentration patterns. Following, we 
first discuss the estimation model and corresponding variables. 
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3.5 EMPIRICAL INQUIRY
3.5.1 Model and Variables
The empirical model that we test in this section may  be depicted as follows. In our 
baseline equation, we aim at regressing our industry-specific indicator of spatial 
concentration against region-specific explanatory  variables that qualify as proxies for i) 
market potential and ii) availability  of transport infrastructure. In the following step then, 
we also test for the role of iii) regional policy measures and instruments while generally 
controlling for iv) other factor endowments. In our research design we also have to 
consider country, industry  and time fixed effects as means to account for any remaining 
unobserved factors.70 
The baseline equation reads as follows:
                    (8)
where, Mit and Tit are vectors for market potential and transportation infrastructure 
variables of region i at  time t, while cntk , ind j  and yeart control for country, industry  and 
time fixed-effect respectively. Sufficient data are available for 43 NUTS-2 regions and 31 
industries over the period 2002 to 2007 resulting in total sample that features a maximum 
of 7998 observations, missing values included.71
Our dependent variable is the relative industry concentration index as measured by the 
LQ in equation (5). In order to avoid spurious correlations we use the normalised shares 
instead of absolute values (see Bruelhart  and Trionfetti, 2004). We follow other related 
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70 For instance, varying levels of privatisation or extent of industry linkages might affect our results. As we 
are not able to directly operationalise these variables in our model we therefore include fixed effects. 
71 31 industries x 43 NUTS-2 regions x 6 years.
studies, e.g. Hanson (1998) and Resmini (2007), by building our analysis on employment 
data rather than production or value added figures. It  is therefore explicitly assumed that 
changes in relative employment shares are representative of changes in relative industry 
location across space. 
As previously  outlined, our primary  independent variables include measures of i) market 
potential and ii) regional transport infrastructure. In line with the established empirical 
literature we use a proxy for the market potential of a region that is loosely based on the 
concept initially developed by Harris (1954). He measures the market potential of a 
locality i in terms of its access to other markets, i.e. a distance-weighted sum of economic 
activity in all other locations: 
                  (9)
 
where xk is a measure of economic activity in locality k and dij  is the distance between 
locations i and k (see, e.g. Combes and Overman, 2003). 
Our measure of a region’s market potential takes into consideration its multimodal 
potential accessibility. The variable Market Potential is to be regarded as a construct of 
two functions: the activity function representing the activities or opportunities to be 
reached and the impedance function representing the effort, time, distance or cost needed 
to reach those (Wegener et al., 2002).72 Higher values of the index imply higher market 
accessibility and hence higher market potential. All else equal, we expect to observe a 
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72  The variable as used here is readily available in the ESPON data base at NUTS-3 level of regional 
aggregation. We therefore have to aggregate the NUTS-3 into corresponding NUTS-2 classification. For 
that purpose we use Eurostat correspondence tables. The calculation of the variable itself is as follows. The 
accessibility model uses centroids (capitals) of NUTS-3 regions as origins and destinations. It calculates the 
minimum paths to be travelled using multimodal transportation networks (car,  rail, air), i.e. minimum travel 
times between the centroids of the NUTS-3 regions. For each NUTS-3 region the value of the potential 
accessibility indicator is calculated by summing up the population in all other regions including those 
outside ESPON space and then weighted by the travel time to go there (for further detail, see Spiekermann 
and Wegener, 1996). 
positive sign in front of its estimation coefficient. However, one potential caveat remains 
when using this particular proxy as it confines us to a limiting assumption of the term 
being time-invariant. That is due to only a single year calculation featured in the original 
dataset (ESPON, 2010). Nevertheless, assuming that relative changes in both population 
and transportation infrastructure evolve rather slowly  over time, we still find it to be an 
appropriate proxy to be include in our model. Yet, as a means to further support the 
robustness of our results, we consider an additional proxy for market potential. 
Specifically, we account for the purchasing power of a region and assume that relative 
GDP per capita serves as an appropriate substitute for measuring the relative market size 
of a locality, variable Relative GDP.73  Here again, we expect the coefficient on the 
indicator variable to feature a positive sign. 
Next, we turn to describing variables that relate to availability  and presence of 
transportation infrastructure in a region. The variable Sea connectivity provides 
information on the proximity of a region to commercial seaports.74 It is our proxy  for the 
level of transportation costs faced in particular region. Hereby, we assume that farther 
distance from access points to global export markets translates into higher production and 
trade costs in that locality. Thus, we expect to observe a negative sign in front of the 
variable coefficient. Still, we acknowledge the fact that  pure focus on the proximity to a 
seaport might limit the explanatory power of our model; even more so when considering 
that the bulk of the CEEC trade is expected to take place via road and railway networks. 
To account for this aspect, we consider two additional proxy variables. The variable 
Railway networks measures the total length of railway networks in a region as a share of 
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73  We source the relevant data directly from Eurostat’s database that is publicly available (http://
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home). The reference tables are to be found under the 
subsections: Regional statistics - GDP indicators ESA 95.  For further reference, see Eurostat Regional 
Yearbooks.
74 It is calculated in terms of time (in hours) it takes from the centroid of a NUTS-3 region to reach the next 
commercial seaport via road (ESPON). We aggregate the averaged data from NUTS-3 into NUTS-2 regions 
using NUTS correspondence tables.
total length at the national level (in kilometres).75 Additionally, we use a dichotomous 
variable, labelled Transport corridors, to indicate whether a region is directly  connected 
to one of the 10 Pan-European Transport Corridors.76 We assign a value of 1 if at  least 
one of the 10 corridors passes through a region and 0 otherwise. Hereby, we posit that 
more extensive railway systems and privileged connectivity to major road networks 
reduce costs of production and, all else equal, enhance the competitiveness of a region. 
We therefore expect to observe a positive signs in front of the coefficients on both 
variables. 
Next, we augment our baseline specification in equation (8) to include two additional sets 
of explanatory  variables. In particular, we account for the role of regional policy 
instruments in determining spatial location outcomes while at the same time controlling 
for relative factor endowments. The baseline can therefore be expanded to read as 
follows: 
     LQijt = α + β1(Mit ) + β2 (Tit ) + β4 (Πit ) + β3(Pit ) + β5cntk + β6ind j + β7yeart + µijt    
                    (10)
where, Mit and Tit and additive dummy variables are as before, while Πit and Pit are 
vectors representing relative policy measures and other resource endowments 
respectively.
As regards regional policy, our specific focus is towards assessing the impact of EU’s 
Eastern Enlargement along with associated regional development funds, such as PHARE, 
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75 The variable is directly sourced from Eurostat’s database and available on an annual basis. The reference 
tables are to be found under the subsections: Regional statistics - Regional Transport Statistics.  For further 
reference, see Eurostat Regional Yearbooks (various years).
76  It is assumed that major transportation networks play a crucial role in achieving closer market 
integration. All else equal,  regions hosting them should have a comparative advantage and thus are more 
likely to qualify as production locations.   The corridors variously encompass road, rail and waterway routes 
though we focus here only on the road networks as defined by TEM Master Plans (Trans-European 
Network for Motorways). The information is taken from cartographic maps provided by United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE: http://www.unece.org/trans/main/temtermp/news.html). 
SAPARD and ISPA, on the location of economic activity.77  Those funds have 
predominantly targeted border regions with the intention to also prepare them to be 
included in the EU’s INTERREG programme.78
The variable Regional aid is the percentage of total pre-accession aid, pooled across 
PHARE, PHARE CBS and ISPA programmes, that is received by a region on a grant 
basis and allocated to address issues related to its geographical position. In particular, the 
funds received aim at improving: i) business related infrastructure and ii) accessibility to 
the EU agglomerations (IRS, 2005). We posit that through allocation of the overall aid 
budget to a menu of possible thematic fields, policy  makers also signal additional 
information of relevance to economic agents.79  In other words, a higher share of 
budgetary spending on advancing a region’s geographic position is to be regarded as a 
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77  PHARE  programme started in 1997 and is one of the three pre-accession instruments financed by the 
EU to assist the CEEC in their preparations for joining the EU. It has as objectives the financing of projects 
related to institutional development and strengthening, promoting convergence with EU legislation and 
promoting economic and social cohesion. The Phare CBC (Cross-Border-Cooperation) was introduced in 
1994 to assist border regions in the applicant countries overcome their specific development problems and 
integrate more closely with the European Union, with other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and 
within their own national economies. The long term aim of CBC was thus to accelerate the economic 
convergence of applicant countries with the EU and to prepare candidate countries for future participation 
in the INTERREG programme.
SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development) was introduced in 1999 
with the aim to help the CEEC deal with the problems of the structural adjustment in their agricultural 
sectors and rural areas, as well as in the implementation of the acquis communautaire concerning the CAP 
(Common Agricultural Policy) and related legislation. It is designed to address priorities identified in the 
countries’ Accession Partnerships.
ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policy for Pre-Accession) was launched in 2000 to assist the CEEC 
candidate countries in the preparation for accession. It is based on the principles that govern the Cohesion 
Fund and provides assistance for infrastructure projects in the EU priority fields of environment and 
transport.  Its objectives are the following: familiarising the candidate countries with the policies, 
procedures and the funding principles of the EU helping,  them catch up with EU environmental standards, 
upgrading and expanding links with the trans-European transport networks.
For more information on PHARE, SAPARD and ISPA programs consult European Commission websites: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index_en.htm
78 The objective of INTERREG programme, that is financed through the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF), is to strengthen economic and social cohesion in the EU by promoting cross-border, 
transnational and interregional co-operation and balanced development of the territory (EC, 2010: http://
ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/interreg3/foire/faq1_en.htm#1).
79  The thematic fields subject to pre-accession aid include: capital-supply, environmental quality, 
innovation, labour market potential, urbanisation advantages, among others (ESPON, 2010). 
positive externality, especially in the long-run, as the location is expected to benefit from 
improved market access. Yet, we have to acknowledge that the effect  might not be going 
only in the one direction, especially so in the short run, as increased transfers may be 
regarded as an indirect indicator of deficient geographical position of a region. In sum, it 
is not possible to determine the coefficient sign a priori.
To place Regional aid into a broader context, we want to consider an additional factor 
that might influence how economic actors perceive the regional policy instrument. To do 
so, we have first to consider the level of regional disparities per programme between 
bordering regions. The variable Regional disparities indicates the level of those 
disparities on a scale between 1 and 4, with 1 being ‘very low disparities’ and 4 indicating 
‘very high disparities’ between bordering regions.80  It follows that the resulting 
interaction term Regional aid*disparities places into perspective the level of aid spending 
and the broader development context in which it takes place. As a thought experiment, 
consider higher aid spending in presence of relatively  higher disparities among various 
types of border regions. The BEU regions bordering more developed EU border regions 
might have on average a location advantage over other CEEC regions. Higher economic 
disparities between the two sets of regions are expected to translate into lower production 
costs in the former. Hence, higher aid spending in view of closer proximity to core 
markets and the presence of lower production costs might therefore trigger the pull effect 
and attract production to the BEU regions at the expense of others. We intend to test for 
this effect further below. Finally, due to the lack of data, we have to restrict our 
examination related to the policy aspect  to the border regions only. As our interest is 
dedicated to those regions in the first place we do not perceive the restriction as a 
limitation per se. We will therefore discuss regional policy aspects towards the end of this 
section.
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80  Regional disparities is provided at NUTS-3 level in ESPON database. As previously described,  we 
average and aggregate the individual scores into corresponding NUTS-2 classification using NUTS 
correspondence tables.   
Lastly, to further reduce the omitted variable bias we control for relative factor 
endowments. First, we take into consideration a region’s relative endowment with skilled 
workers. The variable Education is calculated as the ratio of students in upper secondary 
and post-secondary non-tertiary education to total population.81 It  follows that a region 
endowed with relatively  larger share of skilled workforce should also, all else equal, 
feature higher shares of concentration in industries in need of matching type of skills. We 
would therefore anticipate a positive sign on the coefficient of the variable. Still, negative 
signs might be expected as well, especially for those industry  groupings where 
production functions feature a higher content of unskilled labour. They might therefore 
prefer to locate in regions having a smaller proportion of skilled workforce and therefore 
a lower wage structure. Second, we control for a region’s relative endowment with 
natural resources. The variable Natural resources is an absolute measure of availability of 
mineral resources in a given region.82 In line with the preceding argument, industries that 
intensively  use raw materials in their production process are expected, all else equal, to 
concentrate in regions that are comparatively more endowed with required input factors.
3.5.2 Estimation Approach
As some of the variables vary across regions but not across industries, or alternatively 
have very  little variation over time, we are therefore not in a position to fully exploit the 
panel structure of the dataset. Using fixed effect models would have eliminated these 
variables while random effect models are identical to OLS when independent variables 
do not vary within each group  of observations (Greene, 2003). Our initial approach is 
therefore as follows: we consider a two sided log-linear equation that is to be estimated 
using two sets of estimators, namely ordinary  least  squares (OLS) and least-square 
dummy variable (LSDV) technique. Thereby, the log-transformation allows us to 
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81 The shares are directly sourced from Eurostat’s database (see the link above). They are available on an 
annual basis. The reference tables are to be found under the subsections: Regional statistics - Regional 
Education Statistics. For further reference, see Eurostat Regional Yearbooks.
82  In particular, we use data provided in ESPON Database. The variable considered measures the 
availability of mineral resources in hectares of land for each of the NUTS-2 regions (see, ESPON). 
consider potential non-linearity  of all partial effects while by including additive dummy 
variables we explicitly assume that the chosen specification controls for any unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
Besides, there is a possible issue of endogeneity in our specification of the model that 
may be due to explicit consideration of the market potential variables. As stipulated by 
the NEG literature, the causality flow may run from the changes in industry  concentration 
patterns to market potential and not the other way around.83  To address the potential 
endogeneity  problem, we use the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator whereby we 
instrument the Market potential variable using the proxies: i) Population density and ii) 
Border crossings. As regards the former, we assume that regions more densely populated 
also feature higher market potential.84 From a purely spatial perspective, and assuming all 
else equal, market potential is expected to be higher in better connected border regions.85 
Further below we test the validity  of our chosen instruments and assume for the time 
being that  they  are correlated to our measures of market  accessibility though uncorrelated 
to the error term. Table 3.3 summarises all the variables deployed in the model. 
112
83  See, e.g., Krugman (1991) on the cumulative causation process and interaction between firm location, 
wages and worker migration. 
84 The variable is directly sourced from Eurostat’s database.  The data are available on an annual basis. The 
reference tables are to be found under the subsections: Regional statistics - Regional Demographic 
Statistics. For further reference, see Eurostat Regional Yearbooks.
85  The variable accounts for the number of road and rail crossings per 100 kilometres approximated by 
NUTS 3 regions.  Once again we average and aggregate the results into corresponding NUTS-2 
classification using NUTS correspondence tables. The data is obtained from the ESPON database. 
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Table 3.3: Summary of variables used in the empirical model
Variable Definition Type Expected sign Source
LQ Location Quotient as per equation (5); based on employment data (Dependent) Eurostat
Market potential Market potential as a distance-weighted sum of access to other markets Market potential + ESPON
Relative GDP Relative GDP per capita at purchasing price parities (in EUR) Market potential + Eurostat
Sea connectivity Time in hours it take to reach a commercial seaport via road Transportation - ESPON
Rail networks Length of railways at regional level as a share of total railways length (in kilometers) Transportation + Eurostat
Transport corridors
Dummy: 1 if at least one Transportation Corridor passes through the region and 0 
otherwise Transportation + UNECE
Education
Share of pupils and students in upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 
education (ISCED 3-4) - as % of total working population at regional level Resource endowments +/- Eurostat
Natural resources Availability of mineral resources in hectares of land Resource endowments +/- ESPON
Regional aid Share of total pre-accession aid allocated to improving geographical position of a region Regional policy instruments +/- ESPON
Regional disparities Regional disparities between border regions on a scale from 0 very low to 4 very high Regional policy instruments +/- ESPON
Regional aid*disparities Interaction term of Regional aid and Regional disparities Interaction variable +/-
Population density Population density Instrumental variable Eurostat
Border crossings Road and rail border crossings per 100 km (approximated) Instrumental variable ESPON
3.5.3 Results
We start with a brief analysis of potential interdependencies among specified variables in 
Table 3.4. It  is immediately apparent that there exists high correlation among proxies for 
market potential, i.e. variables Market potential and Relative GDP. In order to avoid 
possible issues of multicollinearity, we only  consider the former in our preferred 
specification of the model. However, as a means of testing the robustness of obtained 
results we re-estimate the basic model by  replacing Market potential with the variable 
Relative GDP. In addition, to check for the presence of potential multicollinearity among 
any other pair of variables we report relevant  coefficients from the mean VIF following 
each estimation. 
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Table 3.4: Correlation matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 VIF
1 Market potential 1.00 2.75
2 Relative GDP 0.74 1.00 3.16
3 Sea connectivity -0.41 -0.32 1.00 1.17
4 Rail networks -0.29 -0.38 0.14 1.00 1.40
5 Transport corridors 0.27 0.26 -0.20 0.12 1.00 1.23
6 Education 0.34 0.54 -0.22 -0.32 0.19 1.00 1.50
7 Natural resources -0.07 -0.18 -0.04 0.27 -0.13 -0.17 1.00 1.21
8 Regional aid 0.33 0.21 -0.07 -0.16 0.22 0.09 -0.29 1.00 1.22
Table 3.5 presents results from our basic specification of the model that focuses on 
market potential and transport infrastructure variables only. Equation (8) was first 
estimated using the OLS method in column (1). Following, in column (2) we report 
results after controlling for fixed-effects while in column (3) we make use of the 2SLS 
estimator. The latter aims at assessing the robustness of our findings and, in particular, 
tackles the possible issue of endogeneity that may be associated with market potential 
proxy. Finally, in columns (4) to (6) we take into account time-invariant nature of 
variable Market potential by replacing it with Relative GDP. This is to be considered as a 
further robustness check for our underlying results.
Starting with the baseline equation in column (1) it is evident that  all coefficients turn out 
to be highly significant and their signs are in line with the theoretical predictions. In 
particular, regions with higher market potential host on average larger industry 
concentrations within their respective borders. Besides, availability  of transportation 
infrastructure matters as regions endowed with a relatively  more extensive rail systems 
and better connections to main transportation corridors host on average larger industry 
agglomerations. In contrast, regions at larger distance from commercial seaports are on 
average less marked by  industry concentration, though the magnitude of the effect 
remains rather low. The estimation results in column (2) corroborate our initial findings. 
In other words, the LSDV model is fully  parallel to the OLS version in terms of signs, 
significance levels and magnitude of the coefficients. Both specifications can be therefore 
assumed to control for unobserved heterogeneity to almost the same extent. Moreover, 
our estimations do not appear to be plagued by  multicollinearity  issues as indicated by the 
mean VIF values that are well below commonly accepted threshold level of 10. 
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Table 3.5: Basic specification of the model, full sample
Dependent variable: log LQ (employment)
OLS LSDV 2SLS OLS LSDV 2SLS
Variable (log) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market potential 0.487*** 0.602*** 0.382 - - -
[0.038] [0.043] [0.286]
Relative GDP - - - 0.264*** 0.568*** 0.130
[0.025] [0.035] [0.081]
Sea connectivity -0.029*** -0.039*** -0.034 -0.060*** -0.067*** -0.065***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.033] [0.007] [0.007] [0.010]
Rail networks 0.255*** 0.239*** 0.198*** 0.267*** 0.315*** 0.176***
[0.020] [0.019] [0.054] [0.021] [0.020] [0.034]
Transport corridors 0.121*** 0.083*** 0.119* 0.172*** 0.092*** 0.177***
[0.019] [0.020] [0.066] [0.017] [0.018] [0.025]
Constant -4.019*** -4.305*** -3.181** -2.699*** -3.579*** -1.760***
[0.224] [0.249] [1.529] [0.172] [0.187] [0.401]
Fixed effects* No Yes No No Yes No
Instruments* No No Yes No No Yes
Mean VIF 1.48 2.27 - 1.29 2.32 -
Hansen J statistic (p-val) - - 0.15 - - 0.20
DWH (p-val) - - 0.76 - - 0.11
F-stat 172.74 52.47 78.21 151.25 56.09 77.83
Adj. R-squared 0.06 0.20 0.05 0.06 0.20 0.05
Observations 7484 7484 7020 7484 7484 7020
*Fixed effects: country, industry and time. Instrumental variables: population density and length of border crossings.
Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in square brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
To test whether our results may be affected by potential endogeneity issues we re-
estimate the baseline equation (8) using 2SLS estimator. The results are reported in 
column (3). We specify  the Hansen J test as a means to examine our choice of 
instrumental variables, namely  Population density and Border crossings. As the test 
statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis of instruments validity, we posit that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and can be included in the model. The 
central insight from the estimation is the fact that all coefficients remain consistent and in 
line with theoretical predictions, except for Market potential variable that  keeps the sign 
though now appears to be insignificant. As a means to determine whether Market 
potential is indeed to be treated as endogenous in our specification of the model, we run a 
post-estimation test by using the Durbin-Watson-Hu statistic (DWH). The null hypothesis 
of the statistic states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent 
estimates and is to be preferred to 2SLS (Baum, 2009). As evident, we are not  able to 
reject the null hypothesis and conclude that OLS estimator is indeed consistent  and 
efficient. Columns (4) to (6) report the results from estimations with an alternative proxy 
for market potential, Relative GDP. In general, OLS and LSDV estimators remain 
consistent and in line with those represented in columns (1) and (2).86 We are therefore 
able to confirm our initial findings and find preliminary  evidence that lends support to 
our stated hypothesis H1a and H2. It  appears that industry  concentration is, on average, 
skewed towards regions with higher market potential but also those endowed with 
comparatively  better transportation infrastructure that guarantees easier access to relevant 
markets.  
Next, we proceed to estimate our baseline model for internal and border regions 
separately. Their respective results are discussed in Table 3.6. 
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86  We have also estimated corresponding models by excluding services. The results were nevertheless 
broadly in line with those presented here. We therefore consider services in all our subsequent estimations. 
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Table 3.6: Basic specification of the model, internal versus border regions
Dependent variable: log LQ (employment)
INTERNAL BORDER
OLS OLS LSDV OLS OLS LSDV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market potential 0.213*** 0.358*** 0.587*** 0.683*** 0.781*** 0.730***
[0.072] [0.092] [0.151] [0.046] [0.048] [0.060]
Sea connectivity 0.072*** 0.107*** 0.092*** -0.007 0.002 -0.011
[0.025] [0.030] [0.027] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Rail networks 0.239*** 0.182*** 0.088 0.317*** 0.251*** 0.259***
[0.046] [0.052] [0.055] [0.025] [0.027] [0.028]
Transport corridors 0.517*** 0.562*** 0.623*** 0.009 0.006 -0.004
[0.088] [0.091] [0.079] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
Capital -0.063** -0.118*** -0.131*** -0.050
[0.030] [0.035] [0.032] [0.034]
Constant -3.082*** -3.329*** -3.858*** -5.227*** -5.159*** -4.818***
[0.392] [0.403] [0.573] [0.277] [0.278] [0.296]
Fixed effects* No No  Yes No No Yes
Mean VIF 2.6 3.54 2.99 1.47 1.89 2.5
F stat 35.28 28.63 24.55 149.56 121.59 43.19
Adj R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.36 0.08 0.08 0.22
Observations 1582 1582 1582 5716 5716 5716
* Fixed effects: country, industry and time.
Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in square brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Columns (1) and (4) report coefficients from simple OLS regression for internal and 
border regions separately. Starting with internal regions, the signs and significance levels 
on variables’ coefficients are broadly in line with our previous results. Contrary to 
previous findings, however, is the fact that stronger effect on industry  concentration is 
exercised by transportation rather than market potential factors. Moreover, the sign on the 
variable Sea connectivity turns from previously negative to positive, being also 
statistically  significant. It follows that, all else equal, industry tends to concentrate in 
internal regions that are at larger distance from the commercial seaports. As the 
commercial seaports are mainly situated in the northern and eastern parts of the CEEC, 
our finding can be interpreted as evidence that  industry location has been skewed towards 
internal regions at closer distance to the export markets in the continental west.87
The border regions feature signs in front of the estimation coefficients that are in line 
with theoretical predictions. Therein, market potential is the single strongest determinant 
of industry location. According to the OLS estimator, a 1 percent increase in the market 
potential of a border region has on average led to a 0.68 percent increase in industry 
concentration, as measured by the LQ. This is in rather strong contrast  to the magnitude 
of the coefficient found for internal regions, where a 1 percent increase in the same 
indicator has led on average to only 0.21 percent increase in industry concentration. 
Besides, it is still more than double the effect recorded on the only other significant 
variable in column (4), i.e. Rail networks. The remaining two transportation variables, 
Sea connectivity and Transport corridors, feature the expected signs although remain 
insignificant. 
To test to what extent our initial findings might be affected by the urban primacy of 
capital regions we re-estimate our baseline model after considering the inclusion of a 
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87  In fact, waterways may not be the most relevant transportation mode in the context of CEEC. Instead, 
transportation via rail and road are expected to be the dominant forms of moving goods around,  especially 
following CEEC’s trade re-orientation towards core European markets (see, e.g., Crespo and Fontoura, 
2001). 
dummy variable for capital regions. The results are reported in columns (2) and (4) 
respectively. Explicit consideration of capital regions does not add significantly to the 
explanatory power of the model. The dummy variable nevertheless enters the 
specification with a negative sign suggesting that the agglomeration process frequently 
associated with capital regions has actually reversed. Thus, industry concentration 
appears to have decreased in capital regions during the period under examination. Finally, 
the estimations in columns (3) and (6) consider fixed effects in addition to the above 
discussed variables. The explanatory power of the model increases significantly as 
indicated by higher coefficient of determination R2 . The results are nonetheless similar. 
In general, our findings are broadly in line with Resmini (2007) who argues that already 
during the 1990s, industry  has moved from autarkic industry location centres, i.e. capital 
regions, towards new locations. In fact, the opening of formerly  inward oriented 
economies appears to have changed the internal dynamics of industry location. In 
particular, progressive regional integration with the EU is expected to have further 
stimulated centrifugal forces that have contributed to a process of industry dispersion. We 
intend to examine the effect in greater detail below. 
So far, we have pooled the different industries and thereby explicitly assumed the 
location factors to be industry-invariant. However, our preliminary conclusions from the 
spatial analysis in the descriptive statistics section indicate that this might not be possibly 
the case. As a matter of fact, industry location patterns vary greatly across industry 
groupings and point towards existence of industry-specific spatial clusters. To better 
understand the observed phenomenon we split  the industries into groupings and 
according to their technology-intensity (OECD, 2003). Following, we estimate the 
baseline equation (8) and enrich it with the vector Ρ it that features the resource 
endowments factors. Additionally, and as a means to further explore spatial aspects of 
industry concentration in border regions in particular, we include border regions type 
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dummies BEU, BAC and BEE. We estimate augmented baseline model for each of the 
five industry groupings separately.88 The results are reported in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7: Determinants of spatial concentration, by technology-intensity in the production
Dependent variable: log LQ (employment)
Variable (log) High Medium-High Medium-Low Low Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Market potential 1.625*** 0.785*** 0.167 -0.416*** 0.582***
[0.281] [0.170] [0.204] [0.095] [0.069]
Rail networks 0.941*** 0.141** 0.261*** 0.407*** 0.191***
[0.101] [0.062] [0.082] [0.037] [0.027]
Sea connectivity 0.081*** 0.075*** -0.007 0.008 0.032***
[0.031] [0.019] [0.024] [0.015] [0.008]
Transport corridors 0.070 0.177** 0.186** 0.054* 0.041
[0.091] [0.070] [0.078] [0.032] [0.029]
Education 0.417 -0.372 -0.697*** 0.285* 0.434***
[0.386] [0.257] [0.265] [0.148] [0.115]
Natural resources -0.103** 0.046* 0.135*** -0.025* -0.018
[0.042] [0.025] [0.031] [0.014] [0.012]
BEU 0.031 0.157** 0.180** -0.002 0.090**
[0.111] [0.074] [0.087] [0.043] [0.035]
BAC 0.065 0.222*** 0.429*** -0.173*** 0.037
[0.095] [0.065] [0.079] [0.034] [0.028]
BEE -0.101 -0.239*** -0.000 -0.393*** -0.055
[0.131] [0.086] [0.109] [0.042] [0.038]
Capital 0.033 -0.300*** -0.167** -0.090** 0.291***
[0.086] [0.063] [0.070] [0.038] [0.024]
Constant -14.755*** -3.787*** -1.346 -1.733** -5.238***
[2.338] [1.427] [1.693] [0.780] [0.621]
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean VIF 4.36 3.75 3.76 3.59 3.50
F-stat 19.27 13.55 14.64 18.45 103.27
Adj. R-squared 0.24 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.36
Observations 699 1164 1080 2126 2229
Fixed effects: country and time. Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in square brackets.
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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88  We present here the LSDV version of the model with country and year fixed-effects. We have also 
estimated simple OLS models without fixed-effects. The results are consistent, hence, we only report the 
LSDV model. 
When looking across columns (1) to (5) we note that coefficients on most of the 
explanatory  variables display diverging signs and significance levels. We therefore 
confirm our proposition that industry location in terms of major industry characteristics is 
indeed idiosyncratic. Column (1) presents results related to industries that deploy 
sophisticated technology in their production process.89  The most salient feature of the 
model is the positive and highly significant coefficient on the variable Market potential. 
Accordingly, a 1 percent increase in the market potential of a region has on average led to 
a 1.68 percent increase in spatial concentration of high-technology industries, as 
measured by the LQ. We therefore find support for our stated Hypothesis 1a: industries 
characterised by  increasing economies of scale in the production tend to locate in regions 
with comparatively larger market potential. That this type of industries is primarily 
market-seeking is further supported by observed tendency to locate at  greater distance 
from the Eastern regions, thus closer proximity  to the European core market. Indicative 
evidence is provided by negative sign on the regional dummy BEE and positive signs on 
dummies BEU and BAC even though none of them appears to be statistically significant.
The results for medium-high technology industries are displayed in column (2) of Table 
3.7.90  As expected, they appear to be largely in line with preceding findings on high 
technology intensive industries. Hence, technology intensive production is market 
orientated as the single largest location factor appears to be associated with the market 
potential variable. Nevertheless, we also find support for our stated Hypothesis 2 in that 
availability and proximity to relevant infrastructure are important factors for explaining 
industry concentration patterns. Once again, in line with the finding from the descriptive 
statistics, we find more formal support for this type of industries having the tendency to 
cluster in regions closer to the European core markets. The coefficients in front of the 
123
89  According to the OECD classification, the industries considered hereunder feature manufacturers of i) 
office machinery and computers, ii) communication equipment and iii) medical, precision and optical 
instruments. They can be also thought of as economies of scale intensive. The corresponding NACE 
classification codes are DL30, DL32 and DL33 respectively. 
90  The industries included under this category can still be considered as scale intensive given that they 
include manufacturers of i) chemicals and chemical products, ii) machinery and equipment n.e.c., iii) 
electrical machinery and apparatus, iv) motor vehicles and v) other transport equipment.
regional dummies, BEU and BAC, are positive and statistically significant at 1 percent 
level. At the same time, BEE but also capital regions have, on average, experienced 
decreasing concentration rates. In other words, geographical position of border regions 
matters as those closer to the European markets have been able to attract and keep 
production associated with economics of scale intensive industries. As previously 
outlined by Resmini (2007), among others, progressive integration process with the EU 
has potentially  played a major role in this respect. Thus, we find support for our stated 
Hypothesis 1b as higher degree of regional integration and openness has apparently 
contributed to increased spatial concentration of primarily economies of scale intensive 
industries. This has been especially the case in border regions that also enjoy a better 
access to relevant foreign markets. 
Column (3) displays the results related to medium-low technology industries.91 Market 
potential features the expected sign though appears to be insignificant in our specification 
of the model. This may not be surprising after all since the above mentioned industries 
mostly  qualify as intermediate good suppliers. Their location patterns are therefore more 
likely to be driven by the availability  of natural resources or location decision of 
downstream producers. With respect to the former, the variable Natural resources is 
positive and highly significant signalling this type of industries’ dependence on locating 
in regions endowed with natural resources. Taking into account the findings described in 
the descriptive statistics section, it appears that this type of industries concentrate in 
similar type of regions as medium-high technology  industries. This especially applies to 
BEU and BAC regions. We therefore have a reason to suspect that intermediate input 
suppliers tend to locate at closer distance to final good producers, and vice versa. In 
contrast, the variable Education features a negative sign that is statistically significant at 
1 percent level. This may be due to the fact that regions endowed with comparatively 
higher shares of educated (skilled) work force are more likely to feature higher labour-
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91 These include mainly producers of: i) coke and petroleum products, ii) rubber and plastic products,  iii) 
non-metallic mineral products, iv) basic metals and v) fabricated metals.
costs. Hence, more cost driven industries will on average favour regions with higher 
shares of unskilled labour and, thus, lower labour-costs. 
Interesting observations can also be made for low technology  industries that are presented 
in column (4).92  Contrary to our previous observations, there is a negative sign on the 
Market potential variable that is also statistically  significant at 1 percent level. More 
precisely, a 1 percent increase in market potential of a region has on average led to a 0.42 
percent decrease in spatial concentration of low-technology  production, as measured by 
the LQ. Several forces may be at work here. By definition, the market potential of a 
region is to a large extent determined by its purchasing power, i.e. income. Higher 
disposable income tends to be associated with higher skill composition of the workforce; 
hence, higher production costs may adversely affect the location patterns of this type of 
industries.93 In fact, there has been a significant outflow of labour-intensive production in 
BAC and BEE regions in particular, the latter experiencing the most pronounced changes. 
Lastly, an interesting observation can be made with respect  to resource endowment 
variables. Low-technology industries seem to be attracted to locations that are relatively 
more endowed with skilled work force, as proxied by variable Education, though the 
effect is only  weakly significant. At the same time, they appear to shun regions with 
higher shares of natural resources. 
Finally, in column (5) we consider industry  location patterns that are associated with the 
services sector.94 As it would be expected, services appear to be local market-seeking in 
that they feature positive and significant coefficient on Market potential variable. In fact, 
the magnitude of the coefficient is the highest among all considered variables in column 
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92 The industries included are: i) food products and beverages, ii) tobacco products, iii) textiles, iv) wearing 
apparel, v) leather and leather products, vi) wood and wood products, vii) pulp, paper and paper products, 
viii) publishing and printing, ix) furniture and manufacturing n.e.c. and x) recycling.
93 As a result labour-intensive industries might relocate to other, more peripheral, domestic regions or move 
to other countries/continents. Relocation of labour-intensive industries to emerging economies,  most 
notably Asian economies, is indicative here. 
94 Broadly, the services feature repair and trade of vehicles, retail trade, hotels and restaurants, real estate 
activities, renting of machinery and equipment, computer and related activities, R&D, other activities. 
(5) implying that a a 1 percent increase in the market potential of a region has on average 
led to a 0.58 percent increase in spatial concentration of services industry, as measured by 
the LQ. Other salient features of the model include a positive and significant  indicator 
associated with the availability  of skilled labour. Thus, regions endowed with skilled and 
educated work force have on average generated more services sector employment. This 
would be again in line with our a priori expectations. The transportation infrastructure on 
the other side is only of partial importance. All else equal, more extensive rail systems 
result in higher LQs even though no statistically significant effect can be detected for 
regions with better access to major European transportation corridors. The proximity to 
commercial seaports has a similar effect on the concentration of services to the one 
described for scale intensive industries. Thus, services tend to locate at greater distance 
from eastern parts of the CEEC and seemingly favour capital regions and those bordering 
the EU. 
As already evident from the discussion, the industry concentration patterns in CEEC are 
skewed towards primarily  Western border regions. Once Eastern regions are taken into 
consideration we might argue that there is evidence of an ongoing process of spatial 
polarisation in the CEEC, hence also pointing towards increasing regional divergence. 
The latter has been a concern for policy  makers for a long time. As a result, policy 
instruments have been put  in place to address broader location issues that peripheral 
regions are faced with. Programmes such as PHARE CBC have focused on border 
regions in particular, especially addressing the issues related to their geographical 
position, institutional capacity building, capital supply and infrastructure, among others. 
We have an interest in exploring the effects such policies may have on industry 
concentration patterns in the context of transition economies. Hereby, our particular 
interest is related to assessing of the effects certain policy  instruments might have on 
improving a region’s geographical position and, more broadly, its market potential. The 
variable Regional aid aims at capturing that effect by accounting for the share of overall 
aid budget being allocated to measures aimed at improving a region’s geographical 
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position. As argued previously, we also include an interaction term in our analysis so to 
consider the broader development context of border regions. The term Regional 
aid*disparities combines the share of budgetary allocation with the level of economic 
disparities between bordering regions that also participate in the programmes. The results 
are presented in Table 3.8 and consider Western (BEU and BAC) and Eastern (BEE) 
border regions respectively.95 
Table 3.8: Determinants of spatial concentration, Western versus Eastern border regions
Dependent variable: log LQ (employment)
Western Western Eastern Eastern
Variable (log) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Market potential 0.464*** 0.459*** -0.770 3.252***
[0.052] [0.054] [1.199] [0.338]
Rail network 0.327*** 0.366*** 0.636 -0.354**
[0.030] [0.034] [0.404] [0.143]
Sea connectivity 0.016* 0.014 -0.470 -4.546***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.426] [0.562]
Transport corridors -0.119*** -0.055** 0.189*** 0.138***
[0.024] [0.024] [0.054] [0.045]
Education 0.360*** 0.241*** -0.180 0.655**
[0.089] [0.088] [0.352] [0.263]
Natural resources 0.045*** 0.028*** 0.193*** -0.132**
[0.010] [0.010] [0.046] [0.067]
Regional aid 0.133*** - 0.407** -
[0.009] [0.161]
Regional aid*disparities - 0.014*** - -0.153***
[0.003] [0.025]
Constant -6.359*** -5.753*** -3.501 -6.838***
[0.390] [0.397] [2.362] [1.402]
Mean VIF 2.38 2.41 6.20 3.81
F-stat 21.67 18.61 28.15 28.42
Adj. R-squared 0.17 0.14 0.40 0.40
Observations 3803 3803 1219 1219
Fixed effects: industry and time. Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in square brackets.
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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95 Results pertaining to individual industry groupings may be provided upon request.
Starting with the former in columns (1) and (2), it can be noted that  the results remain 
largely consistent with our previous findings. More specifically, the proxies for market 
potential and resource endowments retain their explanatory power. In terms of the latter, 
availability of skilled workforce appears to have a stronger effect on industry 
concentration when compared to the magnitude of the coefficient that serves as a proxy 
for availability of natural resources. This is broadly in line with our expectations as we 
argued that Western border regions have on average hosted more economies of scale 
intensive industries than labour intensive ones. 
These results hold when considering the policy variable and its interaction term. In 
particular, the variable Regional aid is positive and significant even though the magnitude 
of its coefficient remains somewhat modest. In other words, a 1 percent increase in 
overall budgetary  spending has on average led to a 0.13 percent increase in industry 
concentration. Likewise, larger economic disparities between the CEEC border regions 
and their EU counterparts have a positive effect on industry concentration when coupled 
with increased budgetary spending on improving the geographical position of those 
regions. Although the magnitude remains rather modest, we nevertheless find support for 
our stated Hypothesis 3: in the context of Western border regions regional policy 
instruments appear to be an effective tool for generating higher industry concentration. 
In columns (3) and (4) we display results for Eastern border regions. Interestingly, they 
appear to be fundamentally different compared to their Western counterparts. Starting 
with the  third column, it appears that Regional aid is the strongest location factor if we 
are to rank the determinants according to the magnitude of their coefficients. Thus, a 1 
percent increase in the overall budgetary spending on improving the geographical 
position of a Eastern border region has on average led to a 0.41 percent increase in 
industry concentration. Besides, availability of natural resources and proximity to main 
transportation corridors seem to be of equal importance which may hints towards regional 
specialisation in extractive industries. However, more interesting results are reported in 
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column (4). First of all, larger economic disparities with neighbouring border regions 
further decrease industry concentration levels in Eastern border regions, irrespective of 
the share of aid spent on improving their geographic position. We seem to uncover 
evidence on the presence of a negative signalling effect associated with this type of 
border regions. This negative development is further reinforced by the distance of a 
region from the commercial seaports. In other words, a 1 percent increase in the travel 
time needed to reach the next seaport results in a 4.5 percent decrease in industry 
concentration, as measured by the LQ. The geographical position therefore matters, and it 
does so significantly. Still, proxies for market potential, connectivity to transport 
corridors and availability of skilled work force can exercise a positive effect on industry 
concentration in Eastern border regions which hints towards potential for active 
involvement of targeted policies addressing these issues. Nevertheless, the benefits 
associated with regional policy instruments appear to be context specific. Their positive 
effects may  be limited in the absence of perceived strategic potential of a region which 
appears to be significantly  determined by  its geo-political position. Thus, in the context 
of CEEC’s Eastern border regions, it appears that their fundamental deficiency remains 
their peripheral and isolated geographical location. 
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3.6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have probed deeper into industry location patterns by exploring a new 
source of industry-level data for a set of 5 CEEC and their respective NUTS-2 regions 
over the period 2002 to 2007. Our broader aim was to identify how transition and 
progressive regional integration might have affected industry agglomeration patterns 
across dichotomous types of regions. In order to do so, we have classified them according 
to their geo-political position by distinguishing between internal and border regions in 
particular. Especially  the latter has been subject to concern of national and supra-national 
policy makers in view of the fact  that significant changes in market operations may have 
come at the expense of structurally weaker border regions. As a consequence, already in 
the pre-accession period regional development programmes, largely funded through EU 
schemes, have been initiated to enhance ‘locational advantages’ of border regions. Thus, 
our intention in this chapter has been to assess, among others, the effectiveness of active 
policies in increasing industry concentration in different types of regions. 
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we extend and improve the analysis in 
several ways in regards to existing comparator studies. For instance, while Traistaru et al. 
(2002) and Resmini (2007) focus their line of inquiry on the period spanning the 1990s, 
our research provides complementary insights for the period thereafter. Extending the 
analysis to the post-2000 period is crucial in that it  accounts for changes induced by 
CEEC’s accelerated integration into the EU. In addition, by  using new sources of regional 
data that have been previously unavailable to researchers we are able to estimate 
augmented panel data models that feature larger number of manufacturing and services 
industries along with a significantly larger number of explanatory  variables. Besides, to 
the best of our knowledge our study is the first on transition economies to use 
complementary  tools in measuring the true extent of spatial agglomeration. Empirical 
studies reviewed in the previous sections of this chapter have been confined to 
unidimensional industry-specific measures of spatial concentration only. Hence, by 
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making use of spatial autocorrelation statistics, we are more likely  to reveal the true 
extent of industrial agglomeration along with more detailed picture on overall dynamics 
of industry location in the CEEC. In sum, when compared to existing research our 
analysis provides a fairly more comprehensive analysis of changes taking place on the 
ground. Second, the research presented in this chapter is pioneering in nature in that it 
considers the effects of active regional policies on industry  location patterns. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first paper on transition economies to formalise deployment 
of regional policies in an empirical model of industry location. Thus, our inquiry 
considerably expands the existing stock of knowledge on the subject matter. The findings 
can be summarised as follows. 
In broad terms, using Moran Scatterplots and significance maps our analysis reveals that 
transition and regional integration has produced inter-sectoral changes in employment 
that have also led to changes in the distribution of industrial activities across space. Such 
distributional changes are thought to have intensified regional divergence dynamics and 
affected development trajectories of CEEC regions. Indeed, the research points towards 
presence of an intensifying process of polarisation of economic space whereby  industry 
location is increasingly skewed towards Western regions with steadily declining 
concentration rates in Eastern regions. It follows that the proximity  to core EU markets 
matters for observed industry  concentration patterns in the CEEC. Thus, our findings 
further support some of the existing comparator literature limited to the 1990s, e.g. 
Resmini (2007), in concluding that the proximity to the EU markets has driven and 
shaped industry location patterns in post-socialist CEEC. As we extend the timeline of 
inquiry  we derive also further insights into development trajectories of regions. 
Specifically, we conclude that the process of spatial polarisation has gained pace in the 
post-2001 period despite accelerating and deepening regional integration with the EU. 
In line with the commonly accepted view, we are also able to confirm empirically  that 
industry location patterns in the CEEC are indeed industry (grouping) specific. First and 
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foremost, they appear to be largely influenced by  individual industries’ technology 
intensity in the production. In this respect, the research indicates that the low-technology 
intensive industries in particular are linked to regions that are assumed to be endowed 
with natural resources; in contrast, high-technology intensive industries and services 
appear to depend on central locations that  are close to core markets while also endowed 
with qualified work force. This is a significant finding that is in line with the theoretical 
predictions stemming from the NEG family of models. 
Further support  for the notion is derived in subsequent  estimations of panel data models. 
In line with the findings from the preceding chapter, regional market potential remains a 
significant factor determinant of the degree of industry concentration. Thus, more 
accessible regions appear to be characterised by a more extensive agglomeration process, 
especially so in technology-intensive industries and services. The paper has also provided 
robust evidence on the importance of availability  and proximity to transportation 
infrastructure as a crucial factor in reducing the incurred trade costs and achieving higher 
level of industry  concentration. As a matter of fact, transportation infrastructure seems to 
be of equal importance to both technology- and resource-intensive industries and thus 
qualifies as a potent policy tool at disposal of policy makers. To further account for 
policy related aspects of industry  location we have significantly expanded the boundary 
of empirical inquiry into the subject  matter by  introducing policy related proxies in our 
empirical model. This is the first study to launch such an approach and has been only 
possible by sourcing information from a newly developed ESPON database. The results 
are nevertheless interesting in that it can be claimed that under certain circumstances 
policies involving higher budgetary spending on advancing regions’ geographical 
position might help increase levels of industry concentration in border regions. However, 
when controlling for the extent of regional disparities between adjacent border regions, 
this effect remains positive only  for regions being at closer distance to European core 
markets. In contrast, higher regional disparities between Eastern border regions and their 
neighbours in non-EU and non-accession countries lead to less agglomeration in the 
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presence of higher budgetary spending. It follows then that higher spending in the latter 
may be interpreted as a transfer payment to compensate for apparent deficiencies, i.e. a 
negative signal. In contrast, higher budgetary spending in the Western border regions is 
likely to be perceived as a positive spillover, hence a positive signal. 
Our discussion thus raises the issue about a (regional) policy-maker’s role and ability in 
raising industry concentration levels within a specific region. In theory, there are a 
number of available options. For instance, the policy makers may  deploy  target measures 
that aim at increasing the market potential of their own regions by increasing the potential 
of their respective neighbouring regions. But how can this be achieved? As we have 
shown, market size (potential) is directly affected by the size of trade costs, thus, 
engaging in a bold reduction of overall trade costs at national and subnational levels may 
be a sensible approach. In view of the different layers of policy making that directly 
affect regions, what appears to be a pre-requisite for lowering the trade costs is the 
existence of comprehensive coordination mechanisms between the various stakeholders. 
In our view, this is where lies the real value of elaborate and comprehensive integration 
agreements, such as the EU, and with it associated development policies and support 
frameworks. In fact, regional development funds as considered in our framework 
explicitly aim at inducing coordinated action among otherwise independent actors. It 
follows that, coordinated action of policy makers coupled with targeted investments into 
hard and soft  infrastructure provision are crucial ingredients for a more balanced 
development path of peripheral regions. Nevertheless, a word of caution is deserved at 
this point as our approach does not capture the cost of such interventions and neglects 
existence of potential trade-offs when investing in infrastructure as opposed to creating 
direct location incentives for potential investors [see, e.g., Yamin and Sinkovics (2009)]. 
Besides, many  elements related to such policies elude the control of policy  maker and 
may potentially be completely exogenous. Thus, prudence is called for when deriving 
policy conclusions from reduced-form models such as the one estimated in this paper. 
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APPENDIX B
Table B3.1: Summary of NUTS-2 regions 
Code NUTS 2 Capital Internal BEU BAC BEE
10 CZ01 x
11 CZ02 x
12 CZ03 x
13 CZ04 x
14 CZ05
15 CZ06 x
16 CZ07 x
17 CZ08 x
30 HU10 x x
31 HU21 x
32 HU22 x
33 HU23 x
34 HU31 x
35 HU32 x
36 HU33 x
50 PL51 x
51 PL61 x
52 PL31 x
53 PL43 x
54 PL11 x
55 PL21 x
56 PL12 x
57 PL52 x
58 PL32 x
59 PL34 x
60 PL63 x
61 PL22 x
62 PL33 x
63 PL62 x
64 PL41 x
65 PL42 x
70 RO21 x
71 RO22 x
72 RO31 x
73 RO41 x
74 RO42 x
75 RO11 x
76 RO12 x
77 RO32 x
80 SK01 x
81 SK02 x
82 SK03 x
83 SK04 x
Note: CZ=Czech Republic; HU=Hungary; PL=Poland; RO=Romania; SK=Slovakia
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Moran Scatterplot 1: Concentration of high-tech industries across NUTS 2 regions; LQs 
averaged over time
Note: For further reference on coding of regions see Table B3.1.
Source: own calculation using STATA 11. 
Moran’s I: Concentration of high-tech industries across NUTS 2 regions; LQs averaged 
over time
Weights matrix
Name: weights
Type: Distance-based (inverse distance)
Distance band: 0.0 < d <= 19.0
Row-standardized: Yes
Moran's I I E(I) sd(I) z p-value*
High-tech industries 0.105 -0.024 0.023 5.693 0.000
*1-tail test
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Moran Scatterplot 2: Concentration of medium-high-tech industries across NUTS 2 
regions; LQs averaged over time
Note: For further reference on coding of regions see Table B3.1.
Source: own calculation using STATA 11.
Moran’s I: Concentration of medium-high-tech industries across NUTS 2 regions; LQs 
averaged over time
Weights matrix
Name: weights
Type: Distance-based (inverse distance)
Distance band: 0.0 < d <= 19.0
Row-standardized: Yes
Moran's I I E(I) sd(I) z p-value*
Medium-high-tech industries 0.097 -0.024 0.025 4.787 0.000
*1-tail test
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Moran Scatterplot 3: Concentration of medium-low-tech industries across NUTS 2 
regions; LQs averaged over time
Note: For further reference on coding of regions see Table B3.1.
Source: own calculation using STATA 11.
Moran’s I: Concentration of medium-low-tech industries across NUTS 2 regions; LQs 
averaged over time
Weights matrix
Name: weights
Type: Distance-based (inverse distance)
Distance band: 0.0 < d <= 19.0
Row-standardized: Yes
Moran's I I E(I) sd(I) z p-value*
Medium-low-tech industries 0.036 -0.024 0.024 2.428 0.008
*1-tail test
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Moran Scatterplot 4: Concentration of low-tech industries across NUTS 2 regions; LQs 
averaged over time
Note: For further reference on coding of regions see Table B3.1.
Source: own calculation using STATA 11.
Moran’s I: Concentration of low-tech industries across NUTS 2 regions; LQs averaged 
over time
Weights matrix
Name: weights
Type: Distance-based (inverse distance)
Distance band: 0.0 < d <= 19.0
Row-standardized: Yes
Moran's I I E(I) sd(I) z p-value*
Low-tech industries -0.007 -0.024 0.025 0.661 0.254
*1-tail test
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Moran Scatterplot 5: Concentration of services industries across NUTS 2 regions; LQs 
averaged over time
Note: For further reference on coding of regions see Table B3.1.
Source: own calculation using STATA 11.
Moran’s I: Concentration of services industries across NUTS 2 regions; LQs averaged 
over time
Weights matrix
Name: weights
Type: Distance-based (inverse distance)
Distance band: 0.0 < d <= 19.0
Row-standardized: Yes
Moran’s I I E(I) sd(I) z p-value*
Services industries -0.013 -0.024 0.024 0.434 0.332
*1-tail test
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Chapter 4
Structural Reforms, Institutional Quality and Location of 
FDI
4.1 INTRODUCTION
A number of recent empirical research papers provide evidence on the role of institutions 
for economic development. For instance, Rodrik et al. (2004) show that institutions 
outweigh the one of geography and integration in explaining cross country income levels. 
Easterly and Levine (1997) link development of institutions and capacity to growth in 
Africa, while Knack and Keefer (1995) describe a positive relationship between 
institutional development and economic growth. For transition economies in particular, 
Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (2003) conclude that reforms and institutional capacity 
building have contributed to economic growth. In sum, a large number of papers suggest 
that institutional aspects are important factors in explaining cross country  differences in 
economic performance [for a survey of the literature see, e.g., De Haan et al. (2006)]. 
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Until recently, institutional aspects have been largely  neglected in the literature on FDI 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008).96  From the theoretical point of view, location of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) has been almost exclusively examined in terms of 
economic factor determinants. As such, the role of natural resource endowments has been 
framed in numerous variations of basic Heckscher-Ohlin model, while more recently 
economic geographers have utilised NEG models to study the effects of agglomeration 
and linkages on location of MNEs in particular.97 
The empirical literature on institutions and their role in influencing FDI location patterns 
however remains surprisingly scarce (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002). In addition, there 
appears to be very little common ground on which institutional components truly  matter 
for explaining location patterns of FDI. This lack of insight might be potentially  due to a 
number of limiting factors that have been present in most of the empirical inquiries to 
date. 
First and foremost, in majority of the empirical specifications the number of institutional 
factors considered is often limited to one or just a few rather vaguely defined indicators, 
such as business customs or types of governing regimes. These indicators are clearly not 
able to capture the institutional dynamics; in fact, most of the time they are considered in 
estimations as an inexpensive means to capture an additional share of the unexplained 
factor. Second, most of the analyses so far have been conducted at  highly aggregate 
levels, thus explicitly assuming institutional factors to affect FDI inflows to the same 
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96  As opposed to other capital flows, FDI is an “investment involving a long-term relationship and 
reflecting a lasting interest of a resident entity in one economy (direct investor) in an entity in an economy 
other than that of the investor” (UNCTAD, 2004).  According to the IMF, FDI is “a category of 
international investment that reflects the objective of a resident in one economy (the direct investor) 
obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy” (IMF, 2005). 
However, note that we do not distinguish between the type of investment which is a limitation of our study. 
This is to say, that we would expect different location determinants related to, e.g., mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) as compared to greenfield investments.
97  An excellent review of theoretical work is provided in Navaretti and Venables (2004). For empirical 
surveys examining primarily economic determinants of FDI see, Bloningen (2005) but also Chakrabarti 
(2001). 
extent across different sectors of an economy. Yet, from existing research we know that 
FDI is less country but rather industry specific (Buigues and Jacquemin, 1994), while at 
the same time some industries appear to be more institution-sensitive than others 
(Levchenko, 2004). Thus, understanding how institutional reform and perceived quality 
affect investments in different industries and sectors is crucial in terms of advancing our 
knowledge of FDI factor determinants. Finally, the results appear to vary  depending on 
chosen estimation approach and methodology. For instance, Gastanaga et al. (1998) 
highlight apparent differences in results derived from panel and pure cross-section 
analysis. Most of the existing studies consider either one or the other estimation 
approach. Therefore, combining them in a single analytical framework is important  if we 
are to determine the robustness of the underlying results. 
In this essay, we intend to tackle the highlighted issues by applying a more nuanced 
approach to analysis of institutions and their role in determining location of FDI. For that 
purpose we use the quasi experimental setting as provided by the context of economic 
transition in 10 CEEC economies.98  In particular, our goal is to examine the role of 
institutional factors, i.e. structural reforms and institutional quality, in attracting FDI to 
the countries of the region.99  We do so by clearly distinguishing those factors in 
institutional efforts, i.e. structural reforms, and institutional outcomes, i.e. perceived 
institutional quality. Our thinking is thereby stimulated by a recent contribution of 
Campos and Kinoshita (2008) who relate financial reform efforts and outcomes to FDI 
inflows for a set  of Latin American and Eastern European economies. The time period 
chosen for our study is 1995 to 2005. Thus, we exclude early  transitional shocks from the 
analysis while we consider almost the entire period of CEEC’ EU integration process. 
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98 Recall that the CEEC sample includes following countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia.
99 Note that, whenever we refer to the term institutional factors in the text this is meant as a joint reference 
to these two otherwise distinct concepts, i.e. structural reforms and institutional quality.
Our paper makes several contributions to the relevant literature. First, by  using a number 
of defined indicators we aim to more formally decouple structural reform process from 
perceived institutional quality. In other words, we aim at isolating the factors that matter 
for FDI, especially those related to the reforms and hence might be of direct  relevance to 
policy makers. Second, we translate this approach into a systematic investigation of FDI 
determinants at the sectoral level. In other words, we are able to subject the institutional 
factors to sectoral dynamics associated with manufacturing and services FDI. So far, 
there has been very  little inquiry  into sectoral determinants of FDI and even less so on 
specific institutional components. Third, we estimate static as well as dynamic panel 
models while also making use of cross sectional analysis as a means to test robustness of 
our underlying findings. Fourth, we also consider a longer and more recent time period 
than most other available studies. Thus, our study explores the determinants of inward 
FDI to CEEC over the entire course of EU integration process. Previous studies have 
been limited either to initial years of transition or have considered very limited time 
periods. Finally, our study explicitly  compares the institutional factor determinants of 
FDI in CEEC with an alternative sample of non-CEEC economies. This comparison adds 
a potentially  important perspective on whether and how the basic institutional 
components differ between various Eastern European sub-regions. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a concise review of theoretical 
concepts and empirical literature related to FDI and institutions in particular. Section 3 
introduces the variables of interest, estimation approaches and discusses the results. 
Section 4 presents some basic findings related to the role of institutional factors in 
attracting FDI across sectors and other non-CEEC transition economies. Section 5 
concludes with reference to overall policy implications for transition economies.
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4.2 THEORY AND EMPIRICS
As a departing point, in this section we provide a targeted summary  of the existing 
literature on location determinants of FDI. Our survey is therefore by no means 
exhaustive. The sheer size of the body of theoretical and empirical literature on FDI that 
has accumulated over the past decades limits our efforts to a rather compact and selective 
review of previous works.100  Therefore, in the first part of the section we provide a 
concise overview of the theoretical frameworks that forms the basis for our empirical 
inquiry. The second part is then devoted to a discussion of previous empirical studies, 
again tailored to the topic at hand. 
4.2.1 Theoretical Framework
The development of theoretical thought on MNE activities occurred in three distinct 
stages. The initial efforts were based on Heckscher-Ohlin type of trade models, under the 
assumption of constant returns, which promoted the view of a polarised production space 
(Iversen, 1935). Accordingly, the models predicted a landscape where MNEs’ HQ 
activities would exclusively locate in capital-abundant countries with their subsidiaries 
populating capital-scarce countries instead. A typical conclusion coming out of these 
early analytical efforts is that there is no incentive for FDI to occur between countries that 
exhibit equivalent levels of economic development. Yet, that  view contrasted strongly 
with real world observations: the bulk of FDI activity  occurred primarily between 
developed countries, especially among those with very similar levels of economic 
development (UNCTAD, 2007).
In the second stage, a more sophisticated range of models emerged to include increasing 
returns to scale and imperfect competition as standard technical tools of analysis. The 
new trade theory therefore allowed for a more detailed distinction of multinational 
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100 For a state of the art summary of existing knowledge on FDI the interested reader may refer to Dunning 
and Lundan (2008).
activity. Following the pioneering work of Helpman (1984) and Helpman and Krugman 
(1985) the concept of vertical FDI was mainstreamed into the literature. Their starting 
point is based on a simple observation which states that the different stages of production 
vary in terms of requirements of different production factors. Therefore, MNEs could 
geographically fragment their production by shifting some, alternatively all, of their 
operations to a location featuring lower factor costs whereas the output could be then re-
exported or sold to either home or third country destinations. Nevertheless, the authors 
noted that vertical FDI would be a viable option only in presence of real differences in 
factor endowments (factor prices) across countries. Moreover, an important assumption 
of the model would require the trade and transportation costs to be non-prohibitive. Thus, 
the predictions from the theory appeared to be of relevance especially to regional 
integration agreements between unequal partners, i.e. North-South agreements.
In contrast to vertical investments, the concept of horizontal FDI suggests that MNEs aim 
to replicate, as opposed to dis-integrate, their operations in the host country. In other 
words, foreign investors driven by horizontal investment motives are concerned with the 
production of the same products in several different markets, thereby foregoing the option 
of exporting as an alternative method of supplying the markets. The concept has been 
also formalised in a more sophisticated manner based on basic NEG frameworks.101 In a 
nutshell, the trade offs between the transportation costs on the one side and benefits 
pertaining to economies of scale on the other apply to MNEs activities as well, thus 
giving rise to horizontal FDI. In particular, the theory states that  we are likely to observe 
horizontal FDI where home markets are large with similarly large trade costs [for a 
seminal contribution, see Brainard (1993)]. 
In the final stage, Markusen et al. (1996) and Markusen (1997) combined the two 
frameworks into a unifying theoretical model, the so called “Knowledge Capital” model. 
It considers, in addition to horizontal and vertical FDI, exporters from the home country 
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101 See, for instance, Markusen (1984); Markusen and Venables (2000); Helpman et al (2004). 
which gives rise to a number of outcomes that depend, in the first  instance, on the relative 
country  characteristics. From the model, it follows that vertical FDI will prevail if the 
differences in terms of countries’ factor endowments and prices are large enough. On the 
contrary, horizontal FDI type is likely to dominate the production landscape if 
comparatively  large countries are located far away from home markets and trade costs are 
not insignificant (the so called ‘tariff jumping motive’). As it can be anticipated, the 
model predicts that between both extremes, the firms’ landscape remains mixed. 
Summarising, whereas vertical FDI is conducted between countries that substantially 
differ in factor endowments (prices), horizontal FDI is associated with cross border 
investments involving countries that are comparable in size and development levels.102 
Although the theories allow for a clear delineation of the general concepts there is 
nevertheless rather little scope for clear-cut prediction as to which type of FDI will 
prevail in the market. To be able to do so, and purely from the empirical point of view, 
one would require detailed data on firm-level inputs and outputs, production and sales 
structures, etc. This type of empirical inquiry is far beyond the scope of this paper. 
Instead, given the information at hand we only aim at deriving an approximation of 
motives for MNEs to invest in the CEEC.  
As the most detailed unit  of analysis available to us is at the sectoral level, we already 
note that the idiosyncratic nature of services and manufacturing allows for some 
preliminary discussion as to which type of investors is likely to be observed in each of the 
sectors. Thereby, services sector FDI is expected to be on average market-seeking given 
the need for local adaptation and its generally non-tradable nature [Fillipaios, (2006); 
Riedl (2010)]. By contrast, FDI in manufacturing is thought to be more sensitive to 
difference in factor costs as manufactures generally tend to face stronger international 
price competition. Thus, in addition to market-seeking motives manufacturing sector FDI 
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102  For our subsequent analysis we alternate between different terminologies so that investments that are 
vertical in nature are associated with resource (or efficiency) -seeking investors while FDI driven by 
horizontal motives can be thought of as market-seeking instead. See also Dunning and Lundan (2008) for a 
detailed discussion of main types of foreign investors.
may be to the same extent efficiency-seeking. Further support to these hypotheses may  be 
provided by  considering the geographical context in which FDI is taking place. As a point 
in case, services sector FDI might indeed be market-seeking as markets for services have 
been either non-existent or largely underdeveloped in the pre-transition period.103 
Therefore, economic transition is expected to have fuelled the demand for services in the 
region via different routes, such as domestic consumers but also other foreign investors. 
As regards manufacturing sector, the bulk of FDI inflows to the countries have been 
associated with investors from developed countries and in particular EU (Barry, 2002). 
Thus, taking into consideration initially  large factor price differences between the regions 
the distinction between FDI types becomes slightly less ambiguous. Indeed, there is 
ample empirical evidence of the region hosting primarily vertically integrated MNEs.104 
Clearly, investment decisions do not rely  on spot markets for inputs only. Instead, there is 
a plethora of other production related costs that best describe the complex relationship 
between various location factors. While existing theoretical models are good in 
conceptualising the broader outcomes of interactions between FDI and aggregate location 
factors, their treatment of principal investment or business environment is usually 
confined to a single parameter ‘trade costs’.105 Neoclassical investment theory  formally 
refers to this type of costs as adjustment or instalment costs borne by  the investor, while 
new institutional economics (NIE) literature describes the existence of broader 
transaction costs characterising a particular location or activity. Sticking to the latter, the 
concept of transaction costs implies that economic agents incur expenditures each time 
they  undertake business transactions, such as the cost of obtaining information or writing 
and enforcing contracts [Williamson (1989); Williamson (1998); Antras and Helpman 
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103  Nevertheless, services sector FDI may be also efficiency-seeking depending on the particular nature of 
their activity. The outsourcing of services has been well documented in the case of CEEC as well (Stare and 
Rubalcaba, 2009). However, given that our inquiry is rather at the broader sectoral level we assume that, on 
average, services sector FDI is market-seeking. 
104 See, among others, Bevan et al. (2001); also Lankes and Venables (1996).
105 Thereby, the chosen values for the parameter are often arbitrary in nature, yet they prove to significantly 
drive the outcomes. For reference, see some of the basic NEG models (e.g. Krugman, 1992). 
(2004)]. Proponents of the approach stipulate that, for instance, absence of sufficiently 
protected property rights, burden of corruption and political hazard, all raise the level of 
uncertainty in economic interactions. It follows that locations characterised by higher 
levels of uncertainty are expected to, all else equal, have lower profitability which in turn 
makes them less likely to host any significant agglomerations within their respective 
borders. Thus, the idea of transaction costs can be used to rank the localities according to 
their respective levels of uncertainty. Accordingly, institutions and institutional quality in 
particular are the prime determinant of size and distribution of transaction costs [North 
(1990); also Murrell (2003)]. However, the role of institutions goes beyond pure efforts to 
reducing transaction costs. Thereby, institutions can also directly affect transformation or 
production costs in a locality  and therefore may qualify as a location factor. North (1990) 
highlights that institutions are a technological feature of the production process in most 
industries, since regulative institutions are entrusted, among others, with the task of 
resolving the issues of variability  in the quantity  and quality of input factors. Institutions 
therefore also entail micro-economic implications for the economy given that they affect 
resource allocation at the firm level.106 As a result, the demand for them is expected to be 
industry or sector specific [for a similar argument see also Levchenko (2004)]. We 
therefore conclude that institutional factors are critical in determining comparative 
advantage of locations hosting them as they are unevenly distributed across space with 
the tendency to expose a significant variation in perceived quality.107
This statement particularly  applies to transition economies where the cost of establishing 
FDI has been described as generally high (Meyer, 2001).108 At the same time, however, 
FDI inflows to the region have been strong throughout the past two decades. 
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106 For further theoretical insights see, among others, Henisz (2000); Henisz and Williamson (1999); Lucas 
(1990); Vinod (2003). 
107  For a further reference see Dunning (1998) who incorporates institutions, as an L-bound factor, neatly 
into his eclectic or OLI framework.
108 A number of authors hint towards the institutional vacuum, that followed the dismantling of old Soviet-
style institutional structures, as the main reason for high cost of doing business in those countries (e.g. 
Murrell, 2003).
Nevertheless, the potential paradox is not necessarily a real one once the progress in 
regional integration with the EU is taken into consideration. Namely, the CEEC demand 
for full EU membership resulted in a comprehensive set of reform prescriptions that had 
to be accepted and enacted by the countries.109  In other words, comprehensive 
institutional reforms have been a prerequisite for the EU membership and are therefore 
assumed to be the centre point of our analysis here. Our main argument runs as follows: 
while the accession process created an institutional anchor that raised foreign investors’ 
expectations for more efficient regulative environment in the medium to long term, it was 
the speed of the institutional convergence, i.e. progress in structural reform, that affected 
the distribution of FDI in the short run.110 It follows that the speed of the reform process 
is crucial determinant of countries’ FDI levels in as far as it  entails information on the 
relative changes in transaction and transformation costs, thus not only approximating the 
size of entry  and adjustment costs but also projecting expectations of future transaction 
costs. We aim at clarifying this hypothesis in the empirical part of the paper. Next, we 
survey the relevant empirical literature. 
4.2.2 Empirical Literature
Until recently, the majority of empirical studies have examined location patterns of 
foreign investors by focusing on economic factors only. Chakrabarti (2001) reviews a 
larger number of articles in the field and concludes that despite the large efforts there is 
little consensus on which economic determinants matter the most. In particular, using 
extreme bound analysis he finds market size to be a robust determinant in almost all of 
the reviewed studies.111 Other, less consistent determinants of FDI include the following 
factors in order of robustness: trade openness, labour costs, economic growth, taxes and 
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109 Recall that most of the CEEC signed the Europe Agreements in the first half of the 1990s. 
110 Note that, when speaking about the progress in reform we refer to the process of the CEEC institutional 
convergence to commonly observed standards of developed market economies. 
111 Market size is most often modelled in terms of GDP although other measures have been used in the past, 
such as total population, GDP per capita.
tariff rates. Our present inquiry, on the other hand, aims at comparing findings from 
empirical research that is primarily concerned with institutional factors as determinants of 
inward FDI. Hereby, we focus mainly on macro-level studies though acknowledge at the 
same time the increasing importance of micro- and meso-level contributions to the field 
[for a summary see, for instance, Dunning and Lundan (2008)]. 
The papers discussed below have been divided into three sub-sections. First, we review 
contributions that are mostly cross-sectional in nature and based on relatively large 
samples of countries, including both developed and developing economies. We label this 
type of studies as mixed country  samples. In the second sub-section, we then discuss the 
evidence from transition economies in particular. Finally, we review a selected few 
papers that examine FDI location across different sectors of an economy.
4.2.2.1 Mixed Country Samples
One example of a study that concentrates on institutional elements and their role in 
explaining global FDI flows is a paper by Globerman and Shapiro (2002). Their analysis 
is based on a cross-sectional sample and features more than 140 developed and 
developing countries over the period 1995-1997. The institutional factors are summarised 
under the common term ‘governance infrastructure’ which comprises composite indices 
that assess quality  of market-based institutions and policies. In particular, the authors use 
World Banks’s Governance Matters database covering a broad range of institutional 
outcomes and including measures of: political stability, rule of law, graft, regulatory 
burden, voice and political freedom, and government effectiveness (see Kaufmann et al.,
1999). In addition, factors measuring human and environmental health are also 
considered in the estimation equation. The results are nevertheless interesting in that they 
show that governance infrastructure matters and can be regarded as a strong predictor of 
FDI inflows; however, its importance diminishes as countries grow larger. Additionally, 
they  argue that some governance factors matter more than others. In particular, policies 
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promoting i) competition, ii) open and transparent legal and regulatory regimes and iii) 
effective delivery  of government services seem to be relatively more important factors 
than measures of political voice, stability and the rule of law. Moreover, a closer 
examination of the sub-samples reveals that governance infrastructure particularly 
matters for attracting FDI to developing and transition economies whereas no significant 
effects are found for the more developed sample. In sum, institutional factors appear to be 
important determinants of FDI, especially so in developing and transition economies. 
More recently, Daude and Stein (2007) launch a further inquiry into the subject matter 
using the same set of institutional indicators as Globerman and Shapiro (2002). Their 
empirical framework closely  resembles the one developed by  Carr et al. (2001), which in 
turn is based on theoretical model of location of MNE activity developed by Markusen 
(1997). In contrast  to the previous paper, they place greater value on testing the 
robustness of the underlying results. Hence, they  follow Gastanaga et al. (1998) and 
Benassy et al. (2007) in estimating panel but also cross-section models. For that purpose, 
they  use bilateral outward FDI stocks from 34 source to 152 host countries over the 
period 1982 to 2002 and derive complementary insights from dynamic regressions in 
addition to cross-sectional analysis.112  From the cross-sectional analysis they obtain 
qualitatively similar results to Globerman and Shapiro (2002). Thus, regulatory 
framework and effective delivery of government services appear also in their analysis as 
the most sensitive institutional aspects to foreign investors. Interestingly, political 
instability and violence do not appear to have any  significant effects on cross-border 
investment flows. Following a battery of robustness tests and different  estimation 
techniques, the authors confirm the validity  of their results concluding “that unpredictable 
policies, excessive regulatory burden, and lack of commitment on the part of the 
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112  To further test the robustness of the results they consider in addition to Governance Matters indicators 
an additional set of institutional factors. First, they source data from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) that measures the political risk in a country. Second, they use World Bank’s survey questionnaires 
conducted under the World Business Environment Survey program measuring various quality aspects of 
business environment (http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/
0,,contentMDK:20673879~menuPK:1742423~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:
1740530,00.html)
government seem to play  a major role in deterring FDI” (Stein and Daude, 2007, p.341). 
It follows that predictable frameworks for economic policies and enforcement are a 
prerequisite for generating higher FDI inflows. Hence, their findings seems to be broadly 
in line with empirical growth literature in that institutions matter while FDI is to be 
regarded as a channel to impact countries’ economic performance.
A number of papers have examined particular institutional aspects in large cross-country 
samples as well. For instance, Jensen (2003) finds in a comparison across 114 countries 
that in terms of GDP democratic governments attract as much as 70 percent more FDI 
than authoritative regimes. The author thereby links the effect of democracy to lower 
country  risk as perceived by the MNEs. Interestingly, the research undertaken by Li and 
Resnick (2003) into the role of democratic institutions is less conclusive. Based on 
insights from a sample of 53 countries, they argue that in the short run higher levels of 
democracy  in less developed countries drive foreign investors away as improved judicial 
system and better rule of law impose constraints on them as well as the host government. 
Over time, however, the consolidation of democratic governance should bring about 
better property rights protection, thus generally improving the prospect of receiving more 
FDI inflows.113 
Maskus (2000), studying the impact of protection of intellectual property  rights on FDI, 
finds that  a 1 percent increase in degree of patent  protection in host economy raises US 
investment stock by almost half a percent. Egger and Winner (2004) investigate forms of 
corruption in the context of 59 developed and developing countries for the period 1983 to 
1999. They find that the ‘grabbing hand corruption’ is expected to impose a burden on 
firms while the ‘helping hand corruption’ is perceived as a solution to an institutional 
failure. Thus, the relative importance of these two aspects indicates whether the overall 
impact of corruption on FDI is positive or negative. Surprisingly, they find that 
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113  Using panel data for 196 countries from 1965 to 2002, Biglaiser and DeRouen (2005) show that 
democracy has a relatively limited effect on US FDI inflows. Instead, it is mainly market size, protection of 
property right and economic reform (approximated by limited capital controls) that positively influence 
location decision of US multinationals. 
corruption is not a relevant factor when considering OECD countries’ investments in non-
OECD economies. The authors link the observed patterns to the vertical nature of FDI in 
the non-OECD economies as they argue that  specialisation gains from this type of 
investment outweigh comparatively small increases in corruption levels.
Due to various data limitations empirical studies examining the role of institutions in 
attracting FDI to developing countries in particular started emerging only  recently.114 
Benassy-Quere et  al. (2007) study institutional factors in such a context by constructing 
institutional performance proxies from a unique database. The Institutional Profiles (IP) 
database is based on a survey of French civil servants in 52 developing countries and rich 
in detailed information on countries’ formal and informal institutions.115  The authors 
estimate standard gravity model for country  pairs (home and host country) with bilateral 
stocks of FDI as dependent variables and controlling for traditional economic factors 
such as market size, geographic distances, as well as dummies for contiguity and 
common language. The institutional variables measure the quality of institutional 
frameworks while also considering institutional distances, between home and host 
countries. The latter is defined as the absolute difference of reported institutional quality 
between the two sets of countries, as such a novelty  in the literature. The first set of 
results is in line with expectations: lower levels of bureaucracy and corruption indeed 
appear to increase FDI inflows. A similar effect on FDI is exercised by the presence of a 
stronger legal system and banking sector while FDI is a decreasing function of 
institutional distance.116 Interestingly, FDI inflows appear to be lower when capital is less 
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114 For a literature review see Nunnenkamp (2002).
115 According to the authors, “a total of 330 elementary questions were asked concerning public institutions, 
capital markets, goods markets and labour markets. In each case, a set of questions were asked covering 
political institutions, public order, public governance, market freedom, investment on future, ability to 
reform, security of transactions and contracts, regulation, openness and social cohesion. Each question was 
itself decomposed into elementary, objective items ranked 0 or 1 (low level or weak enforcement) to 4 
(high level)” (Benassy-Quere et al. 2007, p.768).
116 With respect to the banking sector, Al Naser and Gomez (2009) examine the direct relationship between 
FDI and financial sector performance, the latter being defines as the improvement in the quantity, quality, 
and efficiency of the financial sector, in 15 Latin American countries for the period 1978 to 2003. They 
conclude that FDI is directed to countries that are more financially developed and institutionally strong. 
concentrated and when labour laws are strong. The latter finding therefore points in the 
direction of Li and Resnicks’s (2003) conclusion in that a strengthening of the 
institutional environment in less developed countries can have initially a negative effect 
on FDI inflows. 
4.2.2.2 Transition Economies
The less studied aspect of FDI in transition economies centres on reforms and 
institutional quality  as factor determinants of FDI. What is more, there is a dearth of 
evidence on the interplay and relative importance of institutional factors at the sectoral 
level. In this section we study available evidence pertaining to these two aspects in 
particular.117 
We start  with a concise review of an often cited paper by Bevan and Estrin (2004). They 
use panel data on bilateral FDI flows from individual source countries to 11 CEEC 
economies during the 1990s. The focus of their study is on location factors primarily 
relating to proximity, agglomeration, and factor costs aspects. In addition, they explicitly 
account for the effects of countries’ progressive integration with the EU. Lastly, legal and 
institutional aspects of host countries are considered by making use of country  credit 
ratings as a measure of overall country risk. The authors posit that such a measure already 
absorbs effects of individual institutional factors, such as capital market development, 
state of legal framework, etc.; thus, it reduces the incident of collinearity  in the 
estimation. In general, their results on traditional location determinants are in line with 
previously  described findings. In sum, FDI is related positively to both source and host 
country  GDP while negatively  associated with unit  labour costs. Thus, they conclude that 
FDI to the region is both market- as well as efficiency-seeking. However, more 
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117  Note that we examine here primarily cross-country evidence on transition economies and in relation to 
CEEC in particular. For studies on SEE see, e.g.,  Demekas et al. (2005) and Kaditi (2010); studies on CIS 
include among others Shiells (2003), also Beck and Laeven (2006). A number of recent studies on location 
determinants of FDI in single country frameworks have emerged that we do not consider at present. See, 
for instance, Walkenhorst (2004) for Poland; Kral (2004) for Czech Republic; Boudier-Bensenbaa (2005) 
for Hungary.
interesting results pertain to integration and institutional aspects. First, they find that 
progress in EU accession process increase FDI inflows.118 It follows that the speed of 
implementation of structural reforms determines the speed of EU accession process 
which in turn accelerates FDI inflows, a type of virtuous circle. Interestingly, the authors 
do not  find any  evidence on the negative effect of higher perceived risk on FDI. 
Therefore, they conclude that perceived risks are temporary and overshadowed by 
investors’ confidence in the accession process.119 
In contrast to the previous study, Resmini (2000) examines location patterns of European 
FDI in manufacturing sector only. The scope of her study  includes 10 CEEC while the 
period under consideration is restricted to initial years of transition, 1990 to 1995. The 
conclusions coming out of her analysis are insightful in that she divides the sector into 
four homogenous groups of industries.120 She therefore anticipates the location factors to 
be industry specific in the first place. Indeed, in her model, progress in transition towards 
market-based standards appears to positively affect FDI in economies of scale intensive 
but also high-tech industries. She posits that successful transition implies stabilisation of 
macro-economic environment and therefore attracts investments with higher sunk costs. 
The role of institutions is operationalised in the model by the Operation Risk Index 
(ORI), which is a composite indicator approximating the state of the business climate in 
host countries.121  In contrast to Bevan and Estrin (2001), she finds that the impact of 
institutional factors is significant and also positive when controlling for different slope 
parameters between industry groups. In particular, impact of ORI on FDI is especially 
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118 See also Baldwin et al. (1997) for a similar conclusion. 
119  However, Janicki and Wunnava (2004) examine bilateral FDI between EU and 8 CEEC in a cross-
sectional analysis based on data for 1997. They find that, after controlling for traditional economic factors, 
country risk as measured by Institutional Investor Survey is a significant determinant of FDI in the region, 
i.e. lower risk indicates higher FDI inflows. 
120  She follows Pavitt (1984) taxonomy and classifies manufacturing industries into following groupings: 
economies of scale intensive, high tech, traditional, specialised producers. 
121 The indicator is compiled by a private provide Business Environment Risk Intelligence S.A. and weighs 
15 different criteria, among others: policy continuity, degree of privatisation, inflation, bureaucratic delays, 
currency convertibility, credit conditions, foreign investor and profit attitude, enforceability of contracts, 
labour costs and productivity, etc. (ibid)
pronounced in industries characterised by high sunk costs of the investment, i.e. 
economies of scale intensive industries and high tech industries. Thus, location of FDI in 
this type of industries appears to be at least partially  explained by advances in the reform 
process.
Carstensen and Toubal (2004) specify  a dynamic panel data model where they assess the 
effects of both, economic and institutional factors, in explaining FDI into 7 CEEC. The 
period of examination is limited once again to the 1990s. As to the institutional variables, 
they  focus on the level and method of privatisation as proxies for the transition status to a 
market economy and efficiency of the corporate governance respectively. Their approach 
therefore further complements previous research focusing on effects of privatisation 
reforms in a static framework, e.g., Lansbury  et al. (1996) and Holland and Pain (1998). 
In general, the strong influence of institutional factors on FDI confirms their view that 
more traditional variables cannot fully explain FDI in the CEECs. In particular, they 
conclude that both the level of privatisation and the method of privatisation have 
significant impact on the decision to invest in CEECs. Besides that, introducing the 
additional variable measuring the country risk confirm the view that uncertainty linked to 
the legal, political and economic environment is a barrier to FDI.122 
Campos and Kinoshita (2003, 2008) place explicit focus on examining the role of 
institutions and agglomeration as determinants of FDI. Their two papers come closest to 
our stated research interest. Specifically, in Campos and Kinoshita (2003), they highlight 
the importance of institutions as an important input factor in MNEs’ production process. 
Thereby, the authors underline the differences between the soft (institutions) and hard 
(physical) infrastructure making a strong point for a more detailed inspection of the 
former in regression models aimed at explaining investment flows into transition 
economies. In contrast to the majority of previous papers, institutional factors feature 
prominently  in their estimation equation with a number of business environment 
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122 Information on country risk is sourced from Euromoney while information on privatisation comes from 
EBRD and Holland and Pain (1998). 
components considered, such as efficiency of the legal system and quality of bureaucracy. 
Thereby, they use a panel data set covering the period 1990 to 1998 while also employing 
a number of different estimation techniques as a means to derive robust results. Their 
findings are interesting in that the primacy  of soft- over hard-infrastructure is supported 
by the data.123 In other words, they  show that  the quality of institutions appears to be a 
more important location determinant when compared to more traditional location factors. 
Besides, regional differences exist in that institutional quality, reforms and agglomeration 
factors matter for CEEC, while natural resources endowments and economic reforms 
drive the FDI inflows in CIS region.
In a more recent paper, Campos and Kinoshita (2008) examine the effects of structural 
reforms on FDI in a sample of 44 emerging and transition economies for the period 1989 
to 2004. Their particular focus is placed on reforms related to financial sector- and trade 
liberalisation using World Bank and UNCTAD data.124 In doing so, the authors make an 
attempt at distinguishing between reform outcomes and reform efforts. Hereby, reform 
indicators are sourced measuring the observed development levels (outcomes) but also 
government policy changes (efforts) in this respect. They are subsequently  included in the 
model as one of three categories of FDI determinants, the other two being traditional 
factors, such as market size, natural resources and infrastructure, and institutional factors 
including risk factors according to Polity  IV and ICRG data. For estimation purposes, the 
GMM approach according to Blundell-Bond (1998) is deployed whereby the dependent 
variable is measured as the ratio of FDI to GDP. While the traditional indicators remain in 
line with expectations and previously described literature, the results for structural reform 
variables deserve greater attention. The baseline regression indicates that among 
standardised reform variables, bank efficiency - a proxy for financial reform - is the most 
significant reform variable. The authors describe this finding as a “paradox of finance” in 
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123  In a similar vein, Fung et al. (2005) show that soft infrastructure, i.e. institutional quality,  is a more 
important factor of FDI than hard infrastructure for Chinese regions.
124 See also Majocchi and Strange (2007) for firm level evidence of Italian firms investing in 7 CEEC. FDI 
location appears to be positively and significantly related to trade and financial liberalisation, weakly 
significant for market liberalisation and negatively related to openness of foreign banks. 
the context  of FDI, as multinationals that are not financially constrained appear to be 
drawn to locations in which such constraints are more relaxed. A further decomposition 
of financial sector reform indicates that a pre-commitment to reform process sends a 
positive signal to foreign investors even in the absence of sufficiently developed financial 
markets. This confirms the relationship  running from the reform to FDI, and not the other 
way around. 
4.2.2.3 Sectoral studies
In the third set of papers, we briefly review three recent contributions examining location 
patterns of foreign investors at the sectoral level. The initial two papers do not 
extensively  consider institutional factor in their analysis and, hence, we limit  our review 
to a short summary of their findings. 
Py  and Hatem (2009) investigate the location patterns of 14.000 investment projects in 
Europe in the period 2002 to 2006. They split  the observations between  those pertaining 
to services and manufacturing sectors while also taking into consideration the 
geographical location of the investments, i.e. Western versus Eastern Europe. In their 
descriptive analysis they detect significant differences in the location of manufacturing 
and services that are especially pronounced when comparing across the two geographical 
regions. To explain the diverging trends, they compare location factors first at  the sectoral 
level, i.e. services versus manufacturing, followed by an examination at the functional 
level and distinguishing between functions such as headquarters activities, R&D, 
production, commercial offices, call centres, etc. As regards the results, they indicate that 
both sectors are sensitive to market size and to cultural proximity the latter being proxied 
by a dummy for shared language. However, in contrast to the manufacturing sector, 
countries endowed with better skilled labour force are particularly  attractive for FDI in 
services. The results by  function suggest that the market size criterion, which is important 
when service activities are concerned, has no effect for call centres. The labour costs 
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criterion is decisive only when choosing where to locate production centres, while skilled 
labour force is an important determinant of headquarters’ location. Thus, according to the 
derived conclusions, FDI location not only appears to be sectors specific but also function 
specific. 
In a similar vein, Riedl (2010) examines the location patterns of foreign investors in 
manufacturing and services for 8 CEEC over the period 1998 to 2004. Using FDI stock 
data she applies a dynamic panel design to her study that is based on the partial stock 
adjustment model, following Cheng and Kwan (2000). Thus, in addition to analysing 
determinants of FDI across sectors, she also explores foreign investments’ speed of 
adjustment to the desired investment levels. The explanatory  variables chosen are 
standard traditional economic factors as described in the literature on economic 
determinants of FDI and include variables such as the size of the GDP, extent of 
agglomeration, labour costs, tariffs, and exchange rates. Interestingly, she initially 
considers transition-specific variables, such as inflation, risk and privatisation, however 
drops them from the analysis as they prove to be insignificant in the baseline estimation. 
Her findings as regards the sectoral comparison can be summarised as follows. First, 
there indeed appears to be a difference in FDI location patterns between manufacturing 
and services sectors. While the former is significantly  influenced by the size of unit 
labour costs, that does not seem to be the case for the latter. Moreover, agglomeration 
economies are found to impact equally services and manufacturing FDI while market 
size, as measured by absolute GDP, exhibits a significantly higher influence on services 
FDI. Second, services FDI seems to adjust much faster to its desired stock level, after 
circa 2 years, while manufacturing moves to its equilibrium level within approximately  5 
years. According to the author, comparatively lower installation costs for services explain 
most of the variation in time. 
Finally, Walsh and Yu (2010) use UNCTAD’s FDI database for a sample of 27 advanced 
and emerging market economies, including Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and 
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investigate the explanatory power of various institutional factors on FDI inflows in 
primary, secondary  and tertiary sectors. The institutional indicators considered in their 
dynamic panel data framework include labour market flexibility, infrastructure quality, 
judicial independence, legal system efficiency, and financial depth.125  Besides, other 
traditional factors enter the estimation equation as well, whereby FDI stock is included as 
an additional explanatory  variable to account  for any clustering of foreign investors. As a 
result, the estimation method is according to Arellano-Bond (1991) and uses a GMM 
estimator that is capable of dealing with endogeneity  present in lagged dependent 
variable models. Their findings are interesting as they highlight the differences in sectoral 
location patterns of FDI, and are certainly  non-conventional. The relative importance of 
various macro economic indicators is questioned once sector fixed-effects are taken into 
consideration. In particular, the extent  of country openness and inflation do not appear to 
affect location decisions in the manufacturing sector investment while appreciation of 
real effective exchange rates and higher labour costs seem to attract services sector FDI. 
With respect to the institutional factors, their importance differs across manufacturing and 
services FDI. The only  significant  factors relating to the former include labour market 
flexibility and financial depth. In contrast, the services sector is more reliant on presence 
of impartial courts and quality  of infrastructure. Finally, when splitting the sample into 
advanced and emerging economies, the effect of institutional factors on FDI in 
manufacturing sector is reinforced for the emerging market economies, whereas it  loses 
significance for the advanced once. Interestingly, services sector investments behave in a 
similar way in both advanced as well as emerging economies. In sum, the authors show 
that institutional factors matter for attracting FDI; what is more, they  matter to a different 
extent across different sectors. 
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125  The authors source them from two major data bases, the Global Investment Report produced by the 
World Economic Forum and the World Development Indicators (WDI) provided by the World Bank. 
4.3 EMPIRICAL MODEL
4.3.1 Variables and Data
We use a balanced panel dataset including 10 CEEC for the period 1995 to 2005. The 
dependent variable is measured as inward FDI stocks and comes from UNCTAD’s FDI 
database (UNCTAD, 2009). We chose FDI stocks instead of FDI flows due to their 
relatively higher stability over time. In other words, when tracked over time stocks are 
less volatile than flows as they preclude erratic behaviour that can be caused by only a 
few large investments (Devereux and Griffith, 2002). Still, our subsequent robustness 
tests also consider FDI flows in addition to another alternative measure of FDI intensity. 
Both, FDI stocks and FDI inflows will be discussed in greater detail below. Following, 
we explain the independent variables after dividing them into three groups of factor 
determinants: i) economic, ii) integration and iii) institutional. All relevant information 
pertaining to variables outlined below will be also neatly summarised at the end of this 
section. 
4.3.1.1 Economic Factors
A number of different measures have been proposed in the literature to approximate the 
market potential of a location, such as the absolute/relative values of GDP, per capita 
incomes and population size (e.g. Hunya and Geishecker, 2004). For our purposes, we 
remain closely  aligned to the notion of market potential as originally  described by  Harris 
(1954). Thus, our variable Market Potential can be described as relative measure of 
national GDP, expressed in a common currency  and at purchasing price parities, that is 
then discounted by great circle distance between the countries’ capitals. In an alternative 
specification of the model we also consider the total size of population as a substitute for 
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GDP.126 Irrespective of the variable specification, it is expected that, on average, foreign 
investors will display higher propensity to locate in countries with comparatively larger 
market potential. 
In line with new trade theory models, factor endowments need to be given due 
consideration in our analysis as well. Therefore, two distinct indicators are included in the 
model. First, FDI is presumed to be attracted to locations endowed with skilled and 
productive labour force. We therefore proxy for labour productivity by dividing annual 
gross value added of an economy by the total number of hours worked. This is 
nevertheless only one side of the coin. From a foreign investor’s point of view, labour 
costs are expected to matter to the same extent. To account  for labour costs we divide 
total employment compensation by the total hours worked.127 Higher labour costs imply 
higher costs in the production; hence, all else equal, we would expect them to negatively 
affect FDI stocks. However, considering both variables simultaneously in the model 
might lead to potential issues of collinearity.128  As a result, we construct a composite 
indicator, Skilled Labour, in that we discount labour productivity by the corresponding 
proxy for labour costs. The resulting variable has a straightforward interpretation: 
countries with higher labour productivity but relatively lower labour costs have a 
comparative advantage in this respect and are expected to, on average, have larger FDI 
stocks. Thus, a positive sign is expected in front of the variable coefficient. 
Second, natural resource endowments are included in the model as well. The variable 
Natural Resources is approximated by country level exports of ores and metals as 
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126  The data is sourced from a number of sources: GDP values are obtained from World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database (World Bank, 2009). Distance measures are provided by  the Centre d'Etudes 
Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) while population data is sourced from Eurostat (May 
2009 version). 
127  Information on gross value added and employment compensation is sourced from Eurostat while total 
hours worked is to be found in ILO’s LABOURSTA database.
128  Indeed, the two variables are almost perfectly linear as indicated by the partial correlation coefficient 
equal to 0.98, which is significant at a 1 percent confidence level. 
percentage of total merchandise exports.129 Its effects on the location of FDI are a priori 
ambiguous. On the one side, natural resources represent  a comparative advantage for 
entities overseeing them. That alone may result in large FDI inflows, especially in sectors 
dependent on inputs coming from those resources (see, e.g., Campos and Kinoshita, 
2003). On the other side, larger inflows in resource-seeking FDI might come at the 
expense of lower inflows in manufacturing and services FDI. As Beck and Laeven (2006) 
show, transition economies rich in natural resources have suffered more, on average, from 
higher rent-seeking behaviour of entrenched elites that has resulted overall in less 
attractive business environment and lower economic growth in those countries. This is 
expected to have negatively affected overall FDI flows. 
Next, we also account for factors pertaining to the macro economic environment. Real 
effective exchange rate, variable REER, is a proxy for countries’ price or cost 
competitiveness relative to the international markets.130 The calculation of REER is based 
on the assumption that changes in competitiveness not only depend on exchange rate 
movements but also on cost and price trends (Eurostat, 2009). In theory, a rise in the 
index means a loss of competitiveness and, therefore, we would expect to observe a 
negative sign in front  of the variable. However, as Cushman (1985) shows, the effect of 
REER on FDI is often ambiguous and dependent on underlying firm-level financing 
options and trade linkages. In other words, use of aggregate data may hide these very real 
firm-level effects. We therefore cannot determine a priori the expected sign in front of the 
variable coefficient. 
Previous studies have indicated that the level of taxation in the host country  has an effect 
on FDI location. The results have been nevertheless context specific and therefore a priori 
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129 World Bank - WDI database (2009). 
130 Eurostat (2009). For technical details on how it is constructed see: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
db_indicators/competitiveness/documents/technical_annex_en.pdf
ambiguous.131 To operationalise the concept of taxation we chose the level of implicit tax 
rate on corporations, i.e. variable Tax Corp, as our preferred proxy. 132 In general, higher 
tax rates are expected to negatively  affect  location decisions of foreign investors, 
especially those driven by desire for cost  savings. However, under the assumption that 
they  are not  prohibitively high, higher tax rates might  also positively  affect FDI inflows. 
Thereby, they can be understood as proxy for existence of a range of support 
infrastructure and services in a location, thus implying presence of positive externalities. 
The net effect of taxation on location of FDI remains therefore subject to empirical 
testing. This conclusion holds for most of the other independent variables as well. 
Finally, we account for agglomeration economies in our empirical model as well. In 
general, there are three sources of positive externalities that can lead to spatial clustering 
of foreign investors: technology spillovers, industry-specific factors and linkages 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008). As we are not able to distinguish between them in the 
present context of the study, we simply assume FDI to be attracted to countries with a 
larger share of already  existing foreign investments. Thus, we interpret the presence of 
other foreign investors as a signal of favourable country conditions and reduced 
uncertainty levels. To construct the indicator we borrow from the existing literature and 
use lagged FDI stock levels to approximate the extent  of FDI agglomeration [see, e.g., 
Cheng and Kwan (2000); Campos and Kinoshita (2003)].133  The resulting variable 
Agglomeration is therefore expected to feature a positive sing in front of the variable 
point estimate. 
4.3.1.2 Factor Integration
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131  The results may vary according to the type of taxes employed, presence of alternative/supplementary 
investment incentives, tax treatment regimes between country-pairs, etc. (for a review see Bloningen, 2005)
132  Our choice is influenced by the indicator’s longer and more complete time series when compared to 
alternatives. The values are sourced from Eurostat (2009).
133 Note that we estimate the agglomeration effect only in the dynamic specifications of the model.
As previously outlined, the term institutional factors refers to two distinct concepts in our 
context, i.e. structural reforms on the one side and perceived institutional quality on the 
other. Both of them are intrinsically linked to the integration process of the CEEC 
economies with the one of the EU. Thus, we proceed first by providing the broader 
context in which to fit the institutional factors; following, we discuss the proxies related 
to institutional reform and quality aspects. 
The process of progressive economic integration of the CEEC with the EU was kick-
started by countries’ trade re-orientation towards European single market immediately 
after the transition process started. Thus, already in 1993 the share of the CEEC exports 
to the EU was at more than 50 percent of their cumulative exports (Crespo and Fontoura, 
2007). At the time EU formally announced the accession of 8 CEEC, that  figure was 
already more than two-thirds with tendency increasing.134  Economic integration was 
closely followed by institutional integration. The signing of Europe Agreements in the 
first half of 1990s initiated formal accession negotiations between the EU and individual 
countries. Above all, the integration map highlighted structural reforms and creation of 
functioning market-based institutions as major pillars of that  process. It  follows therefore 
that economic integration and institutional factors are interdependent and they are 
expected to have fundamentally reshaped existing economic and political structures in the 
region. 
The variable Economic Integration measures the extent of countries’ economic 
integration with the EU being the ratio of trade (exports plus imports) in GDP.135 Broadly 
speaking, greater economic integration enlarges effective size of markets for goods and 
services and is therefore expected to positively  influence the location decisions of foreign 
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134  As previously outlined, formal commitment for granting full membership has been made by the EU in 
2001 and initially included 8 CEEC, excluding Romania and Bulgaria. The latter two received their 
invitation in 2006 and have accessed the EU in 2007. 
135  Note that in the literature the variable is often taken as a proxy for country’s degree of openness and, 
hence, extent of economic integration with the world economy, if not specified differently. Here, we 
interpret it as the extent of economic integration with the EU given the importance of the single market in 
CEEC’ trading patterns. 
investors. Moreover, it provides incentives for further institutional integration and can be 
therefore assumed to have an impact on the reform process and overall institutional 
quality. We intend to account for this effect by considering interaction variables featuring 
Economic Integration and institutional factor determinants. Following, we discuss the 
latter in greater detail.  
4.3.1.3 Institutional Factors
Our structural reform indicators are based on information provided in the EBRD’s annual 
Transition Report. Since 1994, these reports have been the major source of information 
providing a detailed assessment of progress in transition (Snoy, 2001). The assessment 
considers a number of core dimensions of reform that are in line with main tenants of a 
market-based economy and include: market operations and trade, enterprises and 
financial institutions. Although there are nine indicators in total we focus here only  on 
four of them that we deem of particular relevance to foreign capital. 
From the methodological point of view, the indicators are constructed based on expert 
views who assign to each dimension a grade on a scale between 1 to 4 + , i.e. transition 
has not started yet as opposed to standards and performance are typically in line with 
those of advanced industrial economies.136  For the sake of simplicity, we re-standardise 
the values to have mean zero and a standard deviation of one in order to allow for 
comparison of variables according to relative importance of their coefficient estimates. In 
all instances larger values indicate greater progress in achieving institutional reforms. 
Thus they provide information on the distance and speed of adjustment between the 
institutional frameworks and measure therefore the institutional effect as opposed to 
outcome. 
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136 In calculating averages, ‘+’  and ‘–’  ratings are treated by adding 0.33 and subtracting 0.33 from the full 
value.
On market operations and trade, the indicator Competition Reform captures primarily the 
effectiveness of competition policy  in combating market abuses and anti-competitive 
practices. Hereby, it is assumed that entry of foreign capital is to a certain extent 
conditioned on presence of competitive forces in the market. Anti-competitive behaviour 
on the side of either incumbent firms or governments is assumed to raise the likelihood of 
rent-seeking and collusion, thus also increasing barriers to entry and transaction costs for 
foreign investors. On enterprises, the indicators capture the introduction of effective 
enterprise restructuring policies and governance, Enterprise Reform, but also account for 
the extent in progress of small- and large-scale privatisation, Privatisation Reform. The 
former can be intertwined with the establishment of a competitive business environment 
in that it is primarily concerned with the formation of transparent legal frameworks, such 
as company and bankruptcy  laws, but also creation of markets for corporate control, i.e. 
enabling environment for mergers and acquisitions. The latter relates mainly to progress 
in privatisation of state owned enterprises. It is assumed that more advanced countries in 
this field present the foreign investors with a larger menu of tangible investment 
opportunities and, hence, are more likely to generate FDI. Finally, the indicator 
Infrastructure Reform measures the progress in the restructuring of physical 
infrastructure networks (including utilities). In particular, the establishment of 
independent regulatory agencies has been paramount in this respect as it is a basic 
requirement for the design of effective legal and regulatory  systems. The foreign 
investors on the other hand are expected to be highly sensitive to availability of timely 
and efficient infrastructure, given that it is an input factor in the production process. 
Besides, restructuring also implies to a certain extent ongoing efforts to privatise utilities 
providers, thus also represents a potential acquisition target for foreign investors. 
Summarising, our specified measures of structural reforms relate to differences in 
institutional development between transition economies and developed market countries. 
In particular, they provide information on the distance and speed of adjustment between 
these institutional frameworks. For that reason, we do not treat them as institutional 
outcomes per se but rather as effects that impact overall institutional quality. 
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To account for institutional outcomes, i.e. perceived institutional quality, we utilise two 
distinct composite indicators. First, we make use of the Economic Freedom of the World 
Index (EFW) as compiled and provided by the Fraser Institute.137  The index has been 
frequently used in growth related research [for recent contributions see, e.g., Justensen 
(2008); Xu and Li (2008); Faria and Hugo (2009)]. In the FDI literature, some authors 
have employed it  as a generic indicator of a country’s overall attractiveness (see, e.g., 
Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2003). Its main advantage is the detailed and comparatively 
large set of indicators that are mostly based on robust economic data coming from the 
IMF and the World Bank. In our specific context, the indicator Economic Freedom 
represent a country’s overall attained score that is a joint measure of the following five 
components: i) size of government, ii) legal structure and security of property rights, iii) 
access to sound money, iv) freedom to trade internationally, v) regulation of credit, 
labour, and business. Comparatively better performance in each of the five areas is 
assumed to imply also a better overall institutional quality. Corresponding data is 
available for all 10 CEEC for the period 1995 to 2005.138 
Second, we make use of the Government Effectiveness Index that is sourced from the 
World Bank’s Governance Matters reports.139  In particular, our indicator Government 
Effectiveness describes the ability of governments to implement policy and effectively 
deliver public services. According to the authors, our designated variable measures the 
quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of 
public servants, and the independence of the civil service from political pressures
(Kaufmann et al., 2009). As with the preceding indicator, our primary focus is once again 
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137 http://www.freetheworld.com/datasets_efw.html
138  Before 2000, the index has been published in a five year interval only. Therefore, we use linear 
interpolation to account for the sub-period 1995 to 2000. Moreover, the indicator is coded on a scale 0 to10 
with higher values indicating better institutional quality.
139  The data shown here are for 1996, 1998, 2000, and annually for 2002-2008 and are available online as 
part of the World Bank's Governance Matters report, available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
index.asp.
the composite indicator that is a construct of 6 governance-related indicators as presented 
in Governance Matters reports.140 Thereby, the overall score is derived based on expert 
opinions, surveys, and robust economic data. In all cases, higher rankings imply better 
institutional quality. Lastly, as with the structural reform variables, we also standardise 
both institutional quality  indicators to have a mean zero and standard deviation of one. 
Finally, we summarise our preceding discussion of the variables in Table 4.1 below. 
170
140 As with the previous indicator, linear interpolation is used, where possible, to account for missing years. 
Besides that, the variable is coded on a scale -2.5 to 2.5 with positive scores indicating higher government 
effectiveness. Due to the original scaling of the variable negative values would be dropped from the data set 
when taking natural logarithms. In order not to lose those observations we rescale the indicator by adding 
(+3.5) to each observation.
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Table 4.1: Summary of the variables used in the empirical model
Variable Definition Type Expected sign Source
FDI FDI stock (Dependent) UNCTAD
Market Potential GDP at PPP discounted by distance
between countries’ capitals
Economic + World Bank and CEPII
Skilled Labour Ratio of value added/hour discounted by
labour costs/hour
Economic + Eurostat and ILO
Natural Resources Exports of ores and metals in total 
merchandise exports
Economic +/- Eurostat and ILO
REER Real effective exchange rate Economic - Eurostat
Tax Corp Implicit corporate tax rate Economic +/- Eurostat
Agglomeration One-year lagged dependent variable Economic + UNCTAD
Economic Integration Ratio of total exports and imports to GDP Integration + World Bank
Competition Reform Annual EBRD score for competition 
policy reform 
Structural 
Reform
+ EBRD Transition Report
Enterprise Reform Annual EBRD score for enterprise 
restructuring and governance reform 
... + EBRD Transition Report
Privatisation Reform Annual EBRD score for small and large 
scale privatisation  reform 
... + EBRD Transition Report
Infrastructure Reform Annual EBRD score for infrastructure 
reform 
... + EBRD Transition Report
EBRD Reform Composite index based on average of 
the four preceding reform indicators 
Structural 
Reform
+ EBRD Transition Report
Economic Freedom Overall score on Economic Freedom of 
the World Index
Institutional 
Quality
+ Fraser Institute
Government Effectiveness Composite index measuring effectiveness
 of bureaucracy and public services
Institutional 
Quality
+ World Bank
4.3.2 Model Specification
It should be noted that  the estimation strategy discussed in this section relates to the 
country  level data for 10 CEEC countries only. We discuss the estimation approach and 
results relating to sectoral-level data and non-CEEC transition economies in subsequent 
sections. This section is divided into two parts. First, we explore the static model that is 
to be considered as our baseline specification. In relation to that, we provide a brief 
summary  of the sensitivity analysis to follow, including instrumental and lagged variable 
estimation methods. Second, we discuss the dynamic framework based on the partial 
stock adjustment model (Cheng and Kwan, 2000). Subsequently, we present and interpret 
estimation results. 
4.3.2.1 Static Model
Our basic empirical model is loosely  based on the gravity model as frequently described 
in the trade literature [Anderson (1979); Anderson and Wintcorp (2003)]. In our context, 
the framework postulates that FDI stocks depend positively on the product of the market 
size (GDP) of observed economies and negatively on the distance between them. 
Typically, the gravity  specification in the FDI literature includes additional explanatory 
variables, i.e. mostly economic factors that include proxies for factor endowments, macro 
economic environment, etc. Thus, our proposed baseline model reads as follows: 
               
      yit = α + β1(Η it ) +υit                       (11)
where i indicates country i = 1, 2,...10; and t denotes the time t = 1,2,..11. The dependent 
variable yit  is the FDI stock, while the vector Η it includes economic factor determinants 
as summarised in Table 4.1 with υit being the remainder disturbance term. 
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The double-log specification is chosen due its particularly good adjustment to the data in 
the empirical literature (Daude and Stein, 2001). In addition, it relaxes the assumption of 
strict linearity of regressors while it reduces, at the same time, the likelihood of outliers. 
The estimation approach is as follows. We first estimate random- and fixed-effects 
specifications of the baseline model, without institutional factors. According to Hsiao 
(2003) both generalised least  squares and fixed-effects estimators can respectively be 
applied for this purpose. The former operates under the assumption of absent correlation 
between individual level effects on the one side and regressors and the overall 
disturbance term on the other. This is the so called orthogonality assumption (ibid). In 
contrast, the fixed-effects estimator relaxes the assumption of regression function being 
constant over time and space and assigns instead individual-specific intercepts to each 
unit. However, this comes at the expense of inferences being conditional on individual 
levels that  are sample- rather than the population-specific. Instead, the random effects 
estimator identifies the population parameter that describes the individual level 
heterogeneity. Generally speaking, random-effects is more efficient estimator and to be 
preferred to the fixed effects specification of the model provided that the orthogonality 
assumption holds. Thus, it  needs to be formally  tested before we can decide on the 
estimator to be used. To do so we use the Hausman test statistic. A rejection of the null 
casts doubt on suitability of the random-effects estimator and suggests use of the 
alternative specification of the model, i.e. fixed effects.
Following the selection of the appropriate estimator we add remaining factors to the 
baseline equation. The fully specified empirical model reads then as follows:
    yit = α + β1(Η it ) + β2zit + β3(Ιit ) +υit                      (12)
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where in addition to factors described in equation (1), zit indicates the extent of economic 
integration while Ιit is the vector comprising all previously described institutional factors. 
To be noted at this stage is a potential issue that pertains to the exact specification of the 
estimation model. Harshvylyn (2004) finds that commonly used measures of institutions 
tend to be highly correlated. In fact, this seems to be the case here as well. For instance, 
the pairwise correlation coefficient between Economic Freedom and Government 
Effectiveness is 0.75 (see Table 4.2). In order to avoid potential issues of multicollinearity 
we propose the following estimation strategy. Following the baseline specification we 
add institutional factors into equation (12) one at a time. Thereby, we explicitly  assume 
that such an approach does not lead to omitted variable bias. To partially relax that 
assumption, individual reform indicators are then grouped into a composite indicator, 
Reform EBRD, which is calculated as the simple average of 4 individual reform 
indicators. The variable can be thought of as indicating the overall progress in structural 
reform process. In a similar vein to institutional quality  factors, it further contributes to 
the sensitivity analysis as it reduces measurement problems of the individual components. 
Other potential estimation issues may nevertheless persist. First, our specification of the 
model may be plagued by reverse causation. For instance, it is possible that FDI boosts 
the market potential of the host country by means of productivity  spillovers which 
feedback into increased levels of GDP and ultimately  market potential. The issue of 
reverse causation might nevertheless stretch beyond market potential aspects. In 
particular, FDI may  directly  affect the extent of economies’ economic integration by 
significantly affecting the overall trading patterns of host countries. Alternatively, foreign 
investors might actively demand better institution and therefore have some leverage over 
the reform process in the host countries (Selowski and Martin, 1997). To account for these 
possibilities, we first make use of the two-step  least square (2SLS) procedure and 
explicitly assume variable Market Potential to be endogenous in nature. In the next step, 
we consider an additional regression in which all regressors are entered in their one year 
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lags. The resulting coefficient can be assumed reliable provided that they do not differ 
substantially  from the previous findings. In that case, we could infer that a potential bias 
due to reverse causality  is negligible in our specification of the model (Wooldridge, 
2002). The latter estimation approach has an additional advantage as opposed to the 
others in that it accounts for the time lag that it  takes for a foreign investor to react to 
changes in location factors. Thus, it appears to be more closely affiliated to the reality  on 
the ground. 
4.3.2.2 Dynamic Model 
Following static estimations, we consider a dynamic specification of the model which 
enables us to obtain several additional insights into our topic of interest. First, using a 
dynamic estimator we are able to account for the role of agglomeration forces in 
attracting FDI. In other words, we can derive certain conclusions on the path dependency 
of FDI flows in the context of CEEC. Second, the partial stock adjustment model that we 
introduce below allows us to comment on the speed of adjustment to the desired 
investment level and thus carries implications for the persistence of FDI. Finally, when 
considering a dynamic estimator we also intend to further test the robustness of our 
original results. Following, we briefly  describe the theoretical framework that is used as a 
basis for further inquiry. 
In particular, we make use of the partial stock adjustment model, as proposed by Cheng 
and Kwan (2000).141  Thereby, it is assumed that investment flows serve to adjust the 
installed (actual) FDI stock yt−1  to the equilibrium FDI stock yt*  so that,
    yt − yt−1 = Θ(yt* − yt−1)                      (13)
the equation (13) can be re-arranged to read, 
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141  see also, e.g., Campos and Kinoshita (2003) and Riedl (2010) for similar approaches in the context of 
transition economies. 
    yt = (1− Θ)yt−1 +Θyt*                       (14)
The underlying logic of the model is as follows. From an investor’s perspective, the 
transition to the equilibrium FDI stock level yt* involves a payment of certain adjustment 
costs, indicated by  the parameter Θ . Following neoclassical investment theory, the 
parameter can be understood as the relative shadow price of investment in that it 
embodies all the useful information about the operating environment [Lucas (1963); 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003)]. It relates positively to the level of investment and hence 
prevents investors from raising the capital stock to the equilibrium level instantaneously. 
Instead, they will choose to converge (or adjust) to that level at the speed determined by 
the size of Θ .142 While the speed of adjustment depends on internal adjustment costs, the 
distribution of the FDI stock yt* is assumed to be determined by relevant location factors. 
Summarising those factors in terms of Xt , the complete model now reads:
    yt = (1− Θ)yt−1 +ΘωXt                      (15)
Alternatively, we can adjust it to our present context so that, 
               
    yit = α + β0yit−1 + β1(Η it ) + β2zit + β3(Ιit ) +υit                     (16)
where yit−1  is the lagged dependent variable. The consideration of the dynamic structure 
invariably  leads to presence of endogeneity in the model as lagged dependent variable is 
correlated with the error term. To derive consistent estimates we follow the literature and 
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142 The parameter is constrained to any value between 0 and 1.
estimate equation (6) using Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator.143 The estimator 
tackles the issue of endogeneity by  using lagged levels of dependent variable yit−s , 
where s >= 2 and t = 3,4,..T, in addition to any other independent variable as instruments 
in the estimation equation. To test the validity  of specified instruments we use and report 
results from the Sargan test. When the number of observations is small relative to that of 
parameter estimates, however, we should be concerned with small sample bias being 
introduced in the GMM  estimation. Because the data set we employ may suffer from such 
a bias, we report in addition results from an identical estimation using fixed-effects 
estimator.
4.3.3 Results
We start this section by first inspecting our underlying data for consistency. The basic 
summary  statistics are presented in Table C4.1 in the Appendix C. It should be noted that 
all the regressors are time variant, as indicated by  non-zero values in terms of within 
variation, and can therefore be considered in both random- and fixed-effects models. 
Next, we test  for presence of potential outliers via box plot  analysis (see Graph C4.2 in 
the Appendix C).144 In general the observed values appear to be within the normal range. 
Closer inspection of variable REER however reveals two potential outliers.145  To 
determine their leverage on the estimation equation we use Cook’s Distance measure and 
conclude that inclusion of the marked observations does not significantly affect the 
underlying regression coefficients.146 Next, variance inflation factors (VIF) are calculated 
to identify potential incidence of multicollinearity. The results are reported below in 
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143 The estimator is implemented in STATA 11using xtabond2 command (Roodman, 2006). 
144 The presence of outliers can lead to inflated error rates and substantial distortions of parameter estimates 
(e.g., Zimmerman, 1998).
145  In particular, they relate to observations for Bulgaria (1995) and Lithuania (1996) and might be due to 
either measurement error or simply a peculiarity of the transition process.
146  While there is no theoretical justification for dropping these observations, it would be of considerable 
concern if our results were completely driven by them. Therefore, we re-estimate all our model 
specifications excluding the outlier observations and find no significant difference to results reported 
below. 
Table 4.2 along with the pairwise correlation coefficients. When considered jointly, there 
appears to be significant collinearity among institutional factors in the first place as 
EBRD Reform is dropped from estimation while Economic Freedom features a VIF 
higher than 10. Further examination of the pairwise correlation coefficients supports this 
notion. While the pairwise correlation coefficients for the traditional set of regressors 
remain on average below 0.50, those relating to reform and institutional factors appear to 
be rather highly  correlated with each other. Our findings therefore confirm previously 
made observations pertaining to generally  high correlation among institutional indicators 
(see, e.g. Harshvylyn 2004). Hence, the proposed estimation approach of including one 
institutional factor at a time appears to be justified. Following, we proceed to a thorough 
discussion of estimation results. 
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Table 4.2: Correlation matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 VIF
1 Market Potential 1.00 3.84
2 Skilled Labour -0.04 1.00 2.46
3 Natural Resources -0.22 0.52 1.00 2.07
4 REER 0.42 -0.07 -0.04 1.00 2.87
5 Tax Corp 0.36 -0.10 0.23 0.12 1.00 3.54
6 Economic Integration -0.05 -0.44 -0.26 0.26 0.08 1.00 2.78
7 Competition Reform 0.51 -0.37 -0.30 0.57 0.04 0.34 1.00 3.35
8 Enterprise Reform 0.54 -0.31 -0.45 0.28 -0.13 0.42 0.66 1.00 6.50
9 Privatisation Reform 0.22 -0.43 -0.22 0.48 0.03 0.51 0.62 0.52 1.00 2.94
10 Infrastructure Reform 0.45 0.03 -0.14 0.63 -0.09 0.16 0.59 0.57 0.55 1.00 4.00
11 EBRD Reform 0.51 -0.31 -0.32 0.60 -0.05 0.42 0.85 0.81 0.82 0.84 1.00 -
12 Economic Freedom 0.28 -0.35 -0.38 0.58 -0.31 0.51 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.73 0.89 1.00 12.11
13 Gov. Effectiveness 0.40 -0.40 -0.48 0.32 -0.09 0.50 0.67 0.86 0.57 0.55 0.79 0.76 1.00 5.16
Note: EBRD Reform automatically omitted when calculating VIF due to high collinearity with other institutional variables.
4.3.3.1 Static Estimations
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.3, we present baseline results pertaining to estimation of 
equation (11) using fixed effects and random effects estimators respectively. A first 
interesting point to note is that both models explain a high proportion – 77 and 79 
percentage points respectively – of the total variation in FDI stocks. Moreover, the 
magnitude of the estimation coefficients does not  differ significantly across the models, 
implying that  both generate consistent point estimates of the slope parameters. However, 
as random-effects is more efficient in such situations, it is to be preferred to the fixed 
effects estimator. More formal support for our conclusion is derived by using the 
Hausman test statistic. In particular, we are not able to reject the stated null hypothesis 
and thus confirm the validity  of orthogonality  assumption. The subsequent discussion of 
results is therefore based on coefficient estimates associated with the random effects 
estimator. 
The observed effects of economic indicators are broadly in line with those described in 
the existing empirical literature (Blonigen, 2005). Specifically, variables Market Potential 
and Skilled Labour are significant determinants of FDI while also featuring the expected 
sign. Interestingly, countries that exhibit a relatively greater dependency on exports of 
natural resources tend to receive on average less FDI. The negative relationship  is 
statistically  significant and, hence, lends tentative support  to similar findings found 
elsewhere in the literature on transition economies, e.g. Beck and Laeven (2006). With 
respect to the macro economic indicators, the apparently positive effect of REER on FDI 
stocks is puzzling at first. It suggests that foreign investors are drawn to locations 
characterised by  a steady appreciation of the REER and, thus, faced with decreasing 
(cost) competitiveness over time. In the CEEC context, this could imply that in particular 
market seeking investors are attracted to countries with higher purchasing power. An 
alternative explanation is that variable REER is picking up some of the positive effects 
associated with a move away from artificially  low exchange rates towards a more stable 
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macroeconomic environment.147 An equally interesting finding relates to the relationship 
between implicit corporate tax rates, variable Tax Corp, and FDI. In particular, the former 
seems to positively influence location choice of foreign investors as it is confirmed by the 
statistically  significant coefficient estimate. Although this can be classified as a less 
conventional finding, it has been nevertheless previously reported in the literature 
(Bloningen, 2005). As a potential explanation, it  may be argued that higher tax rates 
reveal additional information to foreign investors, in particular about the availability  of 
physical and social infrastructure in a location. Thereby, it can be assumed that higher 
taxes are used to improve the business environment and should result, all else equal, in a 
more favourable investment climate.148
181
147 We have also re-estimated the equation excluding REER obtaining qualitatively same results as reported 
here. 
148 However, it might be also argued that our choice of proxy may be of little relevance to foreign investors. 
Depending on the size of the investment, investors can often negotiate applicable tax rates directly with the 
national counterparts. Second, transition countries have competed for FDI intensively and thus offered 
elaborate investment incentive packages to foreign investors that might have compensated for higher tax 
rates.
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Table 4.3: Determinants of FDI location: fixed- and random-effects estimators
Dependent variable: log of FDI stock 
FE RE RE
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Market Potential 0.740*** 0.731*** 0.631*** 0.693*** 0.685*** 0.697*** 0.616*** 0.537*** 0.660***
[0.071] [0.066] [0.059] [0.071] [0.056] [0.048] [0.047] [0.069] [0.063]
Skilled Labour 0.310*** 0.284*** 0.203*** 0.222*** 0.211*** 0.132*** 0.166*** 0.192*** 0.231***
[0.056] [0.053] [0.057] [0.059] [0.053] [0.041] [0.043] [0.052] [0.054]
Natural Resources -0.071** -0.072** -0.055* -0.031 -0.080** -0.063** -0.085** -0.087** -0.063
[0.035] [0.034] [0.030] [0.042] [0.039] [0.026] [0.033] [0.035] [0.044]
REER 0.346*** 0.348*** 0.281*** 0.324*** 0.278*** 0.185*** 0.200*** 0.235*** 0.277***
[0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028] [0.026] [0.030] [0.027]
Tax Corp 0.120*** 0.096** 0.091*** 0.071* 0.044 0.012 0.040 0.115*** 0.073**
[0.045] [0.043] [0.034] [0.037] [0.035] [0.027] [0.029] [0.039] [0.032]
Econ. Integration - - 0.196*** 0.177*** 0.127*** 0.130*** 0.100*** 0.109*** 0.198***
[0.039] [0.044] [0.040] [0.033] [0.032] [0.038] [0.046]
Competition Ref. 0.130***
[0.030]
Enterprise Ref. 0.016
[0.054]
Privatisation Ref. 0.121***
[0.040]
Infrastructure Ref. 0.208***
[0.032]
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Table 4.3 continued
FE RE RE
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EBRD Reform 0.263***
[0.029]
Econ. Freedom 0.249***
[0.062]
Gov. Effectiveness 0.135**
[0.060]
Hausman test stat. - 4.01 - - - - - - -
(p-val) - (0.558} - - - - - - -
R-squared (within) 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95
R-squared (between) 0.69 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.77 0.83 0.82 0.77 0.69
R-squared (overall) 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.84 0.88 0.87 0.84 0.79
RMSE 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16
Observations 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110
Notes: FE and RE represent fixed- and random effects models respectively. The time period under consideration is 1995-2005. Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in square brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
In columns 3-6, we consider the effects of economic integration and structural reforms in 
addition to traditional determinants.149 As expected, progressive economic integration has 
a positive and statistically  significant impact on FDI in all specifications. Thus, in line 
with the theoretical predictions, it  follows that more open and economically integrated 
locations attract comparatively more FDI. As regards structural reform indicators, the 
estimates show that their actual impact depends on the specific dimension considered. In 
particular, advances in reforms related to competition, privatisation and infrastructure 
have a positive and highly significant effect on investors’ location decisions. In contrast, 
no statistically  significant effect is evident for policy  changes pertaining to enterprise 
restructuring and governance. If we were to rank the individual reform variables 
according to their importance, the most pronounced effects would seem to be associated 
with infrastructure reforms. More specifically, a one standard deviation increase in this 
indicator is expected to increase FDI stocks by a factor of 1.23.150 A comparative analysis 
of all point estimates in column 6 is further revealing as it suggests that infrastructural 
reforms rank higher than most of the other economic factors, bar Market Potential. This 
is a significant finding that further highlights the role of infrastructure in determining 
spatial location of production. Nevertheless, we also notice positive effects of reforms 
that are related to issues of competition and privatisation. For instance, a one standard 
deviation improvement in the latter implies an increase in FDI stocks by a factor of 1.13 
and is therefore in the order of same magnitude as an increase of one standard deviation 
in economic integration.151  We therefore find preliminary  evidence that several 
dimensions of the reform process seem to qualify as significant factors explaining the 
location of foreign investors. 
There remains, however, a potential issues in that our approach may suffer from the 
omitted variable bias. The likelihood of that bias is expected to be particularity high if the 
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149 Recall estimation equation (12).
150 exp(0.208)=1.233
151 exp(0.121)=1.127, while for Economic Integration exp(0.130)=1.138 
location of FDI is determined by a number of reform dimensions simultaneously. 
Although plausible, a joint consideration of individual factors may not be desirable in our 
case given the extent of correlation among the reform variables. If we were to consider 
them jointly that could potentially  lead to issues of multicollinearity. In order to address 
the issue we cluster individual reform variables into the composite indicator EBRD 
Reform. The corresponding results are presented in column 7 of Table 4.3. As expected, 
the composite indicator is positive and highly  significant while its point estimates 
dominate those of all the other explanatory  factors, bar Market Potential. For instance, a 
one standard deviation improvement in overall index would increase FDI by  a factor of 
1.30.152 Thus, from our preliminary analysis of FDI determinants we can conclude that 
the progress in reform process is perceived by foreign investors as one of the most 
significant location factors. 
As previously argued, structural reforms carry also implications for the perceived 
institutional quality. Therefore, we first consider variable Economic Freedom that 
measures five “basic economic freedoms” including: i) size of government: expenditures, 
taxes, and enterprises, ii) legal structure and security  of property rights, iii) access to 
sound money, iv) freedom to trade internationally  and v) regulation of credit, labor, and 
business.153 Second, we make use of World Bank’s Government Effectiveness index that 
has been extensively used in empirical studies (see Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; also, 
Daude and Stein, 2007). It is worth recalling at this stage that  variable Government 
Effectiveness measures the quality of public service provision and the quality of the 
bureaucracy, including independence of the civil service from political pressures 
(Kaufman et al., 2009). We report the results in columns 8 and 9 of Table 4.3. Starting 
with the former, it is evident that institutional quality, as measured by Economic 
Freedom, matters and it does so significantly. The magnitude of the point estimate on the 
coefficient is comparable in size and ranking to the indicator of composite reforms, i.e. 
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152 exp(0.263)=1.296
153 Note that each of the areas specified is given equal weight in the final score (see Economic Freedom of 
the World Report 2010). 
EBRD Reform. Therefore, it can be concluded that aligning the institutional frameworks 
to commonly accepted standards of developed economies can have a largely  positive 
effect on FDI. Given the components of the composite indicator, our results are therefore 
in line with previous studies that find positive relationships between property  rights and 
FDI (Javorcik, 2004), openness and FDI (Motta and Norman, 1996) and financial 
liberalisation and FDI (Kinoshita and Campos, 2008).  Finally, in column 9 we report the 
results from regression featuring the Government Effectiveness indicator. As expected, 
there exists a positive relationship between quality of bureaucracy and FDI which lends 
further support to overall findings derived until now. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the 
variable is approximately half the size of the preceding two indicators indicating that 
there exist significant variation among individual institutional factors in terms of their 
relative importance for foreign investors [for similar conclusion see, e.g., Daude and 
Stein (2007)]. 
So far, we have presented a one-sided view of institutional factors and their respective 
impacts on FDI location. The view has been one sided in that we have considered those 
factors in isolation. However, we have argued that institutional reform and quality  are 
expected to be significantly affected by underlying changes in the economic environment. 
In the case of CEEC, progressive economic integration with the EU has preceded the 
institutional integration; thus also determining the pace of reforms and institution 
building. In particular, greater trade liberalisation required the CEEC to rapidly  converge 
to the standards and requirements of developed market-based economies. From the 
theoretical point of view, Markusen (2002) provides a solid framework that links FDI 
inflows into an economy to the degree of its integration with regional and global markets. 
Here, we argue that the extent and speed of economic integration further affects 
investors’ perception of host countries’ progress in institutional reform and quality. 
Hence, we subsequently consider the join-effect of economic integration and institutional 
factors on FDI location. As previously outlined, the former can be approximated by a 
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country’s ratio of overall trade in GDP, i.e. variable Economic Integration.154 We interact 
the variable with each of the four structural reform indicators as well as the remaining 
three composite indices. The results are shown in Table 4.4.155
187
154  Spies and Marques (2006) argue that trade volume is a good indicator of country’s progress in the EU 
Accession process.  They find that in particular Europe Agreements, CEEC’ ‘the integration road map’, have 
had a significant impact on economies’ trade re-orientation towards EU and away from rest of world. 
155 Note that the estimation equation remains structurally the same as initially specified. 
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Table 4.4: Determinants of FDI location: focus on interaction terms using random-effects estimator
Dependent variable: log FDI stock
RE
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Market Potential 0.632*** 0.660*** 0.682*** 0.687*** 0.644*** 0.622*** 0.667***
[0.058] [0.065] [0.058] [0.052] [0.057] [0.063] [0.061]
Skilled Labour 0.202*** 0.218*** 0.220*** 0.149*** 0.170*** 0.202*** 0.227***
[0.057] [0.059] [0.056] [0.048] [0.056] [0.060] [0.054]
Natural Resources -0.054* -0.027 -0.064* -0.048* -0.040 -0.044 -0.055
[0.031] [0.046] [0.038] [0.027] [0.035] [0.037] [0.042]
REER 0.282*** 0.318*** 0.287*** 0.211*** 0.258*** 0.288*** 0.286***
[0.026] [0.030] [0.025] [0.022] [0.021] [0.026] [0.025]
Tax Corp 0.090*** 0.075** 0.065** 0.033 0.053* 0.085** 0.072**
[0.034] [0.036] [0.033] [0.028] [0.030] [0.035] [0.033]
Econ Integ * Comp Ref 0.267***
[0.044]
Econ Integ * Enterp Ref 0.201***
[0.055]
Econ Integ * Privat Ref 0.228***
[0.048]
Econ Integ * Infra Ref 0.272***
[0.034]
Econ Integ * EBRD Ref 0.303***
[0.051]
Econ Integ * Eco Freedom 0.260***
[0.050]
Econ Integ * Gov. Effect. 0.269***
[0.061]
R-squared (within) 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.94
R-squared (between) 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.78 0.71 0.70 0.69
R-squared (overall) 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.85 0.80 0.80 0.79
RMSE 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.17
Observations 110 110 110 110 110 110 110
Notes: RE represents random effects models. The time period under consideration is 1995-2005. Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in square brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
In columns 1 to 7, we present results from regressions that include one interaction 
variable at a time. The overall fit  of the model, along with the significance levels of 
control variables, closely follows the results obtained in preceding tables. Moreover, the 
joint effects of Economic Integration on the one side and reform and institutional quality 
indicators on the other are in line with our expectations. All the variables are positive and 
statistically  significant at 1 percent significance level. We also note that the ranking of the 
relative importance of individual interaction terms closely resembles the ranking of 
institutional factors presented in Table 4.3. In particular, it is once again infrastructural 
reform, now paired with economic integration, that has the strongest location effect 
among reform variables. Still, there are some notable differences to previously  obtained 
results as well. First  of all, the indicator Enterprise Reform, when considered jointly with 
the extent  of economic integration, now becomes highly significant predictor of FDI. In 
terms of its magnitude, it is directly comparable to the impact that Skilled Labour has on 
investment location. More detailed comparison of the size of estimation coefficients 
reveals further interesting results. For instance, a simultaneous increase of one standard 
deviation in the interaction term, Economic Integration * Competition Reform, is 
expected to increase FDI by a factor of 1.31.156 In comparison, Competition Reform when 
considered on its own contributes to an increase in FDI stocks by a factor of 1.14 only.157 
We obtain qualitatively the same results for our composite indicators and, hence, 
conclude that the significance and magnitude of the interaction terms is more profound 
when compared to effects of individual institutional factors. In sum, progressive 
economic integration along with the institutional factors seem to reinforce each other and 
thus have a larger impact on influencing the location of FDI. As our research shows, 
location decisions of foreign investors appear to be skewed towards countries with better 
institutional environment but also more extensive economic links with other nations. 
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156 exp(0.267) = 1.306
157 exp(0.130) = 1.138
We have previously emphasised that our model may be potentially  plagued by issues of 
reverse causation. The relationship between FDI and the proxy for Market Potential in 
particular may be expected to be endogenous in nature. As a matter of fact, the presence 
of foreign investors in a location might directly  affect the market potential through 
various spillover effects that increase location’s effective size. Nevertheless, possibility of 
other explanatory  indicators being endogenous should be considered as well. For 
instance, the extent of economic integration into regional and global markets could be 
significantly affected by trading patterns of MNEs. Moreover, incumbent foreign 
investors might demand better institutions and, thus, endogenously affect the process of 
institutional reform. 
To account for presence of potential endogeneity in the model we use two different 
methods. First, a two stage least squares estimator (2SLS) is applied to estimation 
equation (12).158  Specifically, we treat Market Potential as endogenous variable while 
assuming other regressors to be exogenous. This assumption is subsequently  relaxed. In 
order to derive consistent coefficient estimates we must find instrumental variable(s) that 
satisfy two properties: i) the instrument(s) must be uncorrelated with the error term and 
ii) they must be highly correlated with the regressor. We instrument for variable Market 
Potential using GDP per capita in terms of purchasing price parities as well as total 
population size. The pairwise correlation coefficients between the regressor and 
instruments GDP and Population are 0.62 and 0.61 respectively. Although we cannot test 
the validity of the assumption directly, we can assess the adequacy of instruments using 
Hansen’s J statistic of over-identifying restrictions (Baum, 2006). A rejection of the null 
hypothesis casts doubt on the suitability  of the instrument set. We report the test statistic 
following each of the estimations. Moreover, we explicitly test for endogeneity  of the 
particular regressor using the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics.159 The model is 
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158  We use a two-step instrumental variable estimator assuming presence of conditional heteroskedasticity 
and first-order autocorrelation. The estimator is implemented in STATA 11 using the xtivreg2 command. 
159 The test is implemented in STATA 11 using endogtest option. 
tested under the assumption of conditional heteroskedasticity and in presence of fixed 
effects. 
Next, as a means to account for possible endogeneity of any other regressor we follow 
Bellak et al. (2010), among others, and re-estimate the same model whereby all 
independent variables enter the regression in one-year lags. It  follows that  corresponding 
point estimates will be consistent  provided that the present endogenous variables do not 
correlate with the future realisation of the error term. In that case, we would expect to 
observe close similarity between previously obtained results and present ones and, thus, 
conclude that a potential bias due to reverse causality is negligible in our specification of 
the model. Finally, and as a further measure of robustness, we repeat the same exercise by 
considering the joint effect of interaction terms resulting from the product of Economic 
Integration and institutional factors. 
The results corresponding to outlined approaches are reported in Table 4.5. For the sake 
of brevity, we only  present results related to the composite indices of structural reform 
and institutional quality.160 
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160  Note that remaining estimations pertaining to individual institutional reform variables can be obtained 
from the author upon request.
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Table 4.5: Determinants of FDI location: 2SLS and lagged independent variable approach
Dependent variable: log FDI stock
Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) RE (L-1) RE (L-1)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Market Potential 0.700*** 0.602*** 0.728*** 0.646*** 0.504*** 0.721*** 0.712*** 0.673*** 0.721***
[0.066] [0.088] [0.071] [0.060] [0.090] [0.093] [0.078] [0.083] [0.083]
Skilled Labour 0.137*** 0.169*** 0.211*** 0.200*** 0.217*** 0.273*** 0.200*** 0.230*** 0.272***
[0.052] [0.052] [0.052] [0.046] [0.056] [0.066] [0.067] [0.071] [0.062]
Natural Resources -0.056** -0.090*** -0.076* -0.129*** -0.155*** -0.108** -0.085** -0.091** -0.107**
[0.025] [0.034] [0.041] [0.039] [0.037] [0.053] [0.042] [0.043] [0.047]
REER 0.199*** 0.227*** 0.254*** 0.127*** 0.138*** 0.225*** 0.190*** 0.222*** 0.228***
[0.026] [0.032] [0.031] [0.034] [0.032] [0.032] [0.029] [0.032] [0.032]
Tax Corp 0.043 0.075** 0.048 0.028 0.125*** 0.064 0.041 0.074* 0.061
[0.028] [0.032] [0.030] [0.032] [0.043] [0.040] [0.037] [0.043] [0.040]
Econ. Integration 0.146*** 0.122*** 0.174*** 0.103*** 0.097** 0.195*** - - -
[0.045] [0.045] [0.046] [0.036] [0.043] [0.058]
EBRD Reform 0.210*** 0.284***
[0.045] [0.046]
Econ. Freedom 0.205*** 0.351***
[0.063] [0.074]
Gov. Effectiveness 0.122** 0.107
[0.052] [0.084]
Econ Integ*EBRD Ref 0.317***
[0.067]
Econ Integ*Eco Freedom 0.286***
[0.063]
Econ Integ*Gov. Effect. 0.256***
[0.078]
Fixed effects yes yes yes no no no no no no
Hansen J test 3.04 2.63 3.86 - - - - - -
Hansen-Sargan test 0.89 0.02 0.26 - - - - - -
F-stat 237.64 189.94 180.72 - - - - - -
R-squared (within) - - - 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.91
R-squared (between) - - - 0.79 0.72 0.67 0.69 0.67 0.67
R-squared (overall) - - - 0.84 0.79 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.74
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: RE represents random effects models. The time period under consideration is 1995-2005. All the variables in columns (4) to (9) enter in their one-year lags (L-1). 
Instruments: (L-1) log of GDP per capita and (L-1) log of total Population. Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in square brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
In columns 1-3, we first present point estimates from the 2SLS instrumental variable 
approach. The first observation relates to validity  of specified instruments. In particular, 
the Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions indicates that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of independence of instruments and the disturbance process. In other words, 
the specified instrumental variables are valid. However, following the endogeneity  test 
and corresponding Sargan-Hansen statistic, neither can we reject the null hypothesis that 
Market Potential can be treated as exogenous in our specification of the model. Thus, 
estimating the model via instrumental variable approach might be overly  restrictive and 
inefficient in absence of endogeneity  (Hauk and Wacziarg, 2009). A closer look at the 
estimation results is still informative. In general, it  should be noted that the coefficient 
signs and significance levels remain largely in line with our preceding estimations. 
However, they appear to be somehow smaller in absolute size which might be due to 
inefficiency of the chosen estimator. As to the institutional factors, they remain a notable 
determinant of FDI even when accounting for presence of reverse causality. Thus, we 
find further support to our initial set of findings pertaining to this group of variables. 
In columns 4-6, we use a heteroskedasticity  consistent GLS estimator and introduce 
lagged independent variables into the regression. Thereby, we intend to account for 
presence of other potentially endogenous regressors. Once again, the results are very 
similar to those obtained in the initial specification of the model except for the variable 
Government Effectiveness that remains positive although loses its significance. The 
reasons for this could possibly be due to reduced sample size. Still, we find the results 
comforting and interpret them as further confirmation of absence of reverse causality  in 
the model. 
Finally, results from estimations featuring previously  specified interaction terms of 
Economic Integration and composite institutional indicators are reported in columns 7-9. 
As before, the lagged regressors provide us with qualitatively same results as presented in 
columns 1 to 6 of the same table. An interesting observation can be made with respect to 
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the effect of natural resource endowments on FDI when controlling for the joint effect of 
interacted variables. Whereas their impact on FDI appears to be largely insignificant in 
the initial estimations, the present results suggest existence of a robust  and inverse 
relationship  between natural resources and location decisions of foreign investors. In 
other words, it appears that countries relying more on exports of natural resources tend to 
attract, all else equal, less FDI. Indeed, Beck and Laeven (2006) derive the same results 
for a larger set of transition economies suggesting that higher rent-seeking, associated 
with extractive industries, hampers the institution building process.
Overall, the results so far show that structural reforms and institutional quality  have a 
significant and economically  important effect on location of FDI. Moreover, not all 
dimensions of institutional frameworks appear to have the same importance to foreign 
investors. The importance of reforms in particular is confirmed by the significance of the 
composite indicator that ranks high in all our estimations; being the most important 
location factor, bar Market Potential. As previously  noted, the extent and speed of 
structural reforms have been largely  determined by the process of CEEC’s institutional 
integration with the EU. Thus, we might interpret progress in reform as a strong 
signalling device that contains information for the foreign investors on the potential size 
of transaction and transformation costs in a location. Indeed, the joint consideration of 
economic integration on the one side and institutional reforms on the other points towards 
significant interdependency between these factors in the context  of CEEC. With respect 
to the individual reform indicators, infrastructural reforms rank highest followed by 
policy changes pertaining to competition and privatisation. In contrast, reforms related to 
enterprise restructuring and governance remains largely  insignificant. The results for 
indicators on institutional quality are also broadly in line with our expectations. Both 
basic economic freedoms, as measured by variable Economic Freedom and Government 
Effectiveness are good predictors of foreign investments.
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4.3.3.2 Dynamic Estimations
In this section we intend to enrich our analysis in at least three different ways. First, by 
estimating dynamic instead of static models we further probe into the overall robustness 
of previously  derived results. Second, based on the theoretical framework developed by 
Cheng and Kwan (2000) we assess the effects of agglomeration forces on FDI in addition 
to our standard regressors. Finally, we also make an attempt at estimating the speed 
(time) it takes for FDI to adjust to its equilibrium level. Thus, we are able to derive some 
conclusions on the persistence of FDI in transition economies. In order to do so, we 
estimate the partial stock adjustment model as proposed by  Cheng and Kwan (2000) and 
as summarised in equation (16). The specification of the model is dynamic in that it 
includes a lagged dependent  variable on the right hand side of the estimation equation. As 
already discussed, the most commonly used estimator for dynamic panel models is the 
GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991). However, as we noted earlier an often 
mentioned weakness of GMM estimator is that its properties hold when N is large, 
although they can be severely biased in small-sample dynamic panels (Beck and Levine, 
2001) and dynamic panels with a short time dimension (Nerlove, 2002). As this might be 
the case in our sample, we report in addition a fixed-effects model for comparison 
purposes. The results related to those two estimators are jointly reported in Table 4.6.161
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161  Note that, once again, we only present results for the composite indices relating to institutional factors. 
Table C4.3 in Appendix C features results based on estimations of individual institutional reform variables. 
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Table 4.6: Determinants of FDI location: dynamic specification of the model
Dependent variable: log FDI stock
Arellano-Bond GMM Fixed Effects
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FDI (L-1) 0.523*** 0.530*** 0.522*** 0.526*** 0.554*** 0.576***
[0.061] [0.038] [0.056] [0.064] [0.045] [0.059]
Market Potential 0.380*** 0.362*** 0.391*** 0.351*** 0.330*** 0.351***
[0.053] [0.057] [0.053] [0.060] [0.065] [0.059]
Skilled Labour 0.086** 0.104*** 0.117*** 0.088* 0.106*** 0.116**
[0.034] [0.034] [0.038] [0.041] [0.032] [0.036]
Natural Resources -0.056** -0.060 -0.072** -0.058** -0.065 -0.060
[0.028] [0.038] [0.033] [0.024] [0.036] [0.035]
REER 0.083*** 0.090*** 0.102*** 0.077** 0.095** 0.098***
[0.023] [0.032] [0.027] [0.027] [0.034] [0.029]
Tax Corp 0.030* 0.044*** 0.034*** 0.041* 0.050** 0.042**
[0.016] [0.016] [0.012] [0.020] [0.015] [0.014]
Econ. Integration 0.025 0.019 0.035 0.028 0.016 0.025
[0.025] [0.024] [0.023] [0.033] [0.031] [0.031]
EBRD Reform 0.082** 0.110**
[0.040] [0.036]
Econ. Freedom 0.069* 0.060
[0.036] [0.040]
Gov. Effectiveness 0.064 0.028
[0.042] [0.032]
Hansen J test 0.01 1.78 0.09 - - -
AR(1) -2.33** -2.08** -2.10** - - -
AR(2) -0.69 -0.69 -0.64 - - -
R-squared (within) - - - 0.98 0.97 0.98
R-squared (between) - - - 0.95 0.95 0.94
R-squared (overall) - - - 0.95 0.96 0.94
Observations 90 90 90 100 100 100
Notes: The time period under consideration is 1995-2005. Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in square brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
In columns 1-3, we first present coefficient estimates using Arellano-Bond GMM 
estimator. In particular, we notice that there is evidence of first order autocorrelation AR
(1) in the residuals, while we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second order 
autocorrelation, i.e. AR(2). Thus, we confirm consistency of the estimator with respect to 
serial correlation. In addition, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of over-identifying 
restrictions. In other words, the Hansen J test confirms validity of specified instruments. 
Next, we proceed to a more detailed discussion of derived results. Overall, we notice a 
rather significant drop in the magnitude of coefficient estimates once lagged dependent 
variable is included in the estimation. It follows that  the results of static and dynamic 
models are not easily comparable to each other. Nonetheless, both composite indicators, 
EBRD Reform and Economic Freedom, retain their explanatory power and remain 
significant, the latter only  weakly. In contrast, Government Effectiveness retains the sign 
though appears to be insignificant in the dynamic specification of the model. A closer 
look at the individual reform indicators is comforting (Table C4.3 in the Appendix C). All 
variables retain their signs while reforms pertaining to infrastructure and competition are 
statistically  significant as well. These findings further highlight differences in importance 
of individual institutional factors and underline the significance of market-based policy 
adjustments related to factors infrastructure and competition in particular. 
As regards the role of agglomeration effects, there appears to be remarkable path 
dependency in location decisions of foreign investors in CEEC. This is indicated by the 
positive and highly significant coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. Thus, past 
FDI stocks are a good predictor of future investments flows. Our finding is therefore in 
line with other studies for transition economies [see, e.g., Campos and Kinoshita (2003) 
and Riedl (2010)]. 
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Lastly, we calculate the corresponding coefficient of partial adjustment factor (β0 ) in 
equation (16). In doing so, we are able to determine the average period of adjustment to 
the desired investment level. For instance, the value of the coefficient estimate of the 
lagged dependent variable in column 1 is 0.52, indicating a coefficient of partial 
adjustment alpha of 0.48. In other words, the net investment in one year is 48 percent of 
the difference between the equilibrium yt* and current investment level y . If the steady-
state level of the FDI stock does not change, it will take about 2 years for the gap 
between the equilibrium and the current FDI stock to close. This finding is in contrast to 
those derived by  Kinoshita and Campos (2003) for 25 transition economies as well as 
Riedl (2010) for 8 CEEC. While the former authors estimate the time gap  to be in the 
range of approximately  5 years (lag coefficient 0.81), the estimated lag parameter in 
Riedl’s study is even higher (ranging from 0.85 to 0.87). Both studies therefore point 
towards higher persistency of FDI.162 
In columns 4-6, we present the results from fixed effects model. In terms of indicator 
signs and magnitude they  are almost identical to those obtained by the GMM  estimator 
and, thus, we do not discuss them at large. Overall, the fact that very little variation is 
found between GMM and fixed-effects estimator indicates that the gains coming from the 
former might be minimal in a small sample setting such as the one here. 
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162  Nevertheless, the differences might potentially be explained in terms of considered time periods and 
sample sizes. Campos and Kinoshita (2003) focus on the early period of transition, 1990 to 1998. 
Especially the first half of the 1990s has been marked by transitional shocks which may have distortive 
effects on their results. Riedl (2010) on the other hand focuses on a more stable period, 1998-2004, 
however sources data from only 20 manufacturing and services industries to construct a panel that is 
significantly larger in size when compared to ours (overall 1085 observations). 
4.4. SECTORAL AND NON-CEEC FDI DETERMINANTS
4.4.1 Sectoral Determinants 
So far, our inquiry into FDI location factors has been based on the assumption of equal 
slope parameters between different sectors of an economy. However, recent empirical 
evidence suggests that FDI location factors might be to a certain extent sector dependent 
[see, e.g., Pusterla and Resmini (2005); also Resmini (2007)]. Moreover, we have 
exclusively  focused on FDI stocks without taking into consideration other measures of 
FDI intensity. To further probe into the role of institutional factors in attracting foreign 
investments, we estimate an equation that allows for different slope parameters between 
manufacturing and services sectors. Additionally, as a means to further test the robustness 
of our results we employ an alternative indicator of FDI intensity  that is discussed further 
below. The empirical model reads therefore as follows: 
    Ln yis1− yis
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= α + β1(Η is ) + β2zis + β3(Ιis ) +υis                     (17)              
where i signals country and s = 1,2 indicates the sector. 
Our dependent variable now measures the share of foreign enterprises in total population 
of enterprises at the two-digit level of NACE Rev. 1.1 classification of industries.163 Note 
that, since the dependent variable has values ranging between 0 and 1 we might be faced 
with the truncated variable problem. To avoid that issue we perform logistic 
transformation of the variable, as indicated above. Overall, data for 23 manufacturing and 
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163 Hereby, an estimation of the model in terms of relative shares of foreign enterprises, instead of absolute 
FDI stocks, serves us as an additional robustness check. We have made an attempt at obtaining sector 
specific information on FDI stocks, however, they were not available free of charge at the time of this 
research. Riedl (2010), for instance, uses sector specific data on FDI stocks for a number of manufacturing 
and services industries in 8 CEEC. 
17 services industries are available for the years 2003 and 2004.164  Our subsequent 
analysis is based on the mean values of those two years. In total, we have a cross 
sectional sample with a total of 400 observations (40 industries*10 countries), missing 
values included. In the best possible case our explanatory variables would be sector 
specific. Due to data limitations, this is not feasible and we therefore restrict the control 
variables to existing measures that we deem most relevant for the proposed estimation 
approach.165 In particular, we consider market potential and factor endowments variables 
while also taking into consideration certain economic policy  aspects, e.g. taxation. In 
order to capture the effects of progressive integration on institutional factors we discuss 
here below results from regressions featuring previously specified interaction terms. We 
also run regression without interaction terms; the results for individual composite 
institutional factors are analogous to those presented below and therefore will not be 
further discussed at this point.166 Finally, country dummies are also considered to capture 
any systematic differences between host economies.
The model is first estimated using standard OLS estimator following White’s (1980) 
procedure to obtain heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. As a means to reduce 
potential issues of endogeneity we introduce a time lag into the equation whereby 
reported values on the dependent variable relate to the period 2003/2004, and those 
related to the independent variables relate to 2001. Still, the bias due to endogeneity of 
some of the regressors might  be persistent in our data. As previously mentioned, FDI may 
directly  affect the market potential of a location. Besides, previous empirical research has 
shown that it can also have a direct effect on labour productivity and costs of the host 
location via various forms of positive and negative spillovers [see, e.g., Aitken and 
Harrison (1999); Smarzynska (2002); Barry et al. (2001)]. For robustness purposes we 
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164  Data source: Eurostat, Structural Business Statistics (2010). The complete list of two-digit industry 
codes is provided in Table A2.1 in the Appendix A.
165 In particular, we do not consider variable REER as it can be argued that the competitiveness component 
at the sectoral level is much better captured by indicator Labour Productivity. We use REER nevertheless as 
an instrumental variable when using 2SLS estimator. 
166 They are available upon request. 
therefore re-estimate equation (17) using instrumental variables. Our choice of 
instruments for the indicator Market Potential includes, as previously, total population 
and GDP per capita at purchasing price parities. As regards Labour Productivity, the first 
instrument features a measure of unemployment rates among working population with 
upper secondary  and post-secondary  education. It is assumed that  higher educational 
attainments are associated with higher productivity levels while higher rates of 
unemployment are assumed to, on average, result in lower wages. Second, we also 
consider R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP as more abstract indicator of 
knowledge base and, hence, productivity levels of the host country. For similar reasons as 
outlined previously, we decide to introduce the institutional factors into equation (17) one 
at a time and chose to work with the log specification of the model.167 For the sake of 
brevity, in Table 4.7 we only report the estimates of the interaction terms of variable 
Economic Integration and composite indicators pertaining to institutional factors.168 
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167 Besides that, all variables enter the equation recoded such that they feature mean zero and unit standard 
deviation. This is to enable an easier comparison across regressors and their respective point estimates.
168  As before, detailed results on remaining interaction terms are neatly summarised in Table C4.4 in the 
Appendix C.
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Table 4.7: Determinants of FDI location at the sectoral level: cross-section OLS estimates
Dependent variable: log share of foreign invested firms
Manufacturing Services
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market Potential 0.152 0.143 0.170** 0.502*** 0.531*** 0.447***
[0.094] [0.102] [0.080] [0.177] [0.187] [0.160]
Skilled Labour -0.735*** -0.730*** -0.705*** -0.209 -0.224 -0.301**
[0.111] [0.109] [0.100] [0.146] [0.142] [0.126]
Natural Resources 0.961*** 0.945*** 0.931*** 0.948*** 0.995*** 1.040***
[0.172] [0.174] [0.178] [0.263] [0.269] [0.276]
Tax Corp -0.415* -0.418* -0.419* -1.497*** -1.489*** -1.484***
[0.250] [0.250] [0.249] [0.391] [0.390] [0.389]
Econ Integ * EBRD Ref -0.152 0.464**
[0.122] [0.193]
Econ Integ * Eco Freedom -0.130 0.397**
[0.104] [0.165]
Econ Integ * Gov. Effect. -0.118 0.360**
[0.095] [0.150]
Dummy variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
F-test (p-val) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
R-squared 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.28 0.28 0.29
Observations 219 219 219 159 159 159
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable corresponds to 2003/2004 while independent ones to 2001. All regressions include country dummy variables. 
Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in square brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
In columns 1-3, we first present OLS results for the manufacturing sector. These can be 
directly  contrasted to the findings for the services sector in columns 4-6. A first point  to 
note is that the goodness of fit  for both regression models is acceptable, as indicated by 
the coefficient of determination R2. Moreover, the individual country effects are jointly 
significant, thus suggesting that they  should be included in the proper specification of the 
model. With respect to the estimation results, we notice significant differences in location 
patterns of FDI when allowing for different slope parameters across sectors. Interestingly, 
the dominant effect of Market Potential that  we have previously observed somewhat 
disappears for the manufacturing in the post-2001 period. Although the indicator retains 
the expected sign it remains nevertheless insignificant in majority of specifications. At 
first surprising, the observed phenomenon can be potentially explained by referring to 
similar findings in Lankes and Venables (1996). In particular, they argue that especially  in 
the initial stages of transition, FDI in manufacturing sector is market seeking. However, 
as the region becomes more integrated and domestic industries become parts of 
international value chains the FDI becomes more export-oriented, i.e. resource-seeking. 
Indeed, a closer look at the positive and highly significant indicator of natural resource 
endowments may imply just that. Services sector on the contrary appear to be market-
seeking and, hence, more sensitive to changes in variable Market Potential. 
Surprisingly, foreign investors seem to shun locations endowed with comparatively more 
efficient labour force as indicated by  the negative sign in front of variable Skilled Labour. 
The negative effect is especially pronounced in the manufacturing sector, however, 
depending on the specification of the model it also applies to services sector. While this is 
contrary to our expectations, we might argue that the dynamics leading to such an 
observation extend beyond the CEEC. In particular, the rise of emerging markets, and 
especially China following its accession to the WTO in 2001, has made it difficult for 
transition economies at large to produce manufacturing goods at globally competitive 
price levels. Therefore, our indicator might be picking up  some of the global trends in 
FDI as well. In addition, progressive economic and institutional integration with the EU 
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also implies price convergence, at least in the long-run, which might deter efficiency 
seeking investors from making long-term commitments in the region. 
In contrast, comparatively larger abundance in natural resources is positively and 
significantly related to presence of foreign firms in the CEEC. In fact, it is the most 
significant location factor for manufacturing indicating that FDI in this sector might be 
primarily  driven by resource-seeking motives. More surprisingly, however, is the finding 
that the same pattern applies to services sector. This is indeed counter-intuitive. However, 
as recent studies have shown there might be significant interdependencies between 
manufacturing and services when choosing investment locations. For instance, Nefussi 
and Schwellnus (2010) compare the location determinants of French foreign investors 
and find no fundamental difference between the location factors of these two sectors. 
Moreover, they demonstrate that the location of business services is dependent on 
downstream demand generated by  manufacturing affiliates. In a similar vein, Defever 
(2006) examines the location determinants of services and manufacturing, finding 
evidence of complementarities at the firm level especially between the location of R&D 
and production. As sophisticated markets for services in pre-transition period were non-
existent in most of the region, it is plausible to assume that FDI in services has potentially 
also followed the demand generated by FDI in manufacturing. 
As regards the taxation variable, we detect a uniform negative effect on both sectors 
although with largely diverging coefficient estimates. Services sector in particular 
appears to be sensitive to changes in implicit corporate tax rates as indicated by a rather 
large size of the coefficient estimates. Accordingly, a one standard deviation increase in 
corporate tax rate would decrease the share of foreign investors by a factor of 3.6 in 
services, that being in rather strong contrast to the recorder factor of 1.6 for 
manufacturing. 
204
The most interesting results relate nevertheless to the role of economic integration and 
institutions. A comparison of coefficient signs and magnitudes in columns 1-3 and 4-6 is 
indicative. The joint effect of economic integration on the one side and institutional 
factors on the other has positive and significant implications for services sector, while the 
opposite holds true for manufacturing. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in 
the interaction term while controlling for EBRD Reform increases the share of foreign 
investors in services by a factor of approximately  1.5. The effect is almost comparable in 
size to the one exercised by variable Market Potential and therefore highlights the 
importance of economic integration and reforms in attracting services sector FDI in 
particular. Indeed, the progress in achieving conformity with rules and regulations 
governing the common market is expected to especially affect location choices of 
services. This is mainly due to their higher dependency on coherent institutional 
frameworks that assure effective use of mostly intangible assets. Besides, we notice 
variation in importance of different reform dimensions for the location of FDI in services. 
In particular, infrastructural reforms seem to be most significant drivers followed by 
reforms pertaining to privatisation, competition and enterprise restructuring and 
governance respectively (Table C4.4 in the Appendix C).169 The composite indicators of 
overall institutional matter as well, indicating that entry of foreign investors in this 
particular sector can be encouraged by a deepening of integration and effective provision 
of soft input factors.
In contrast, manufacturing appears to be less affected by the extent of economic 
integration and institutional factors. In fact, the sign in front of the coefficient estimates is 
negative in all specification, even though it remains statistically insignificant. In our 
view, the most plausible explanation for observed patterns goes back to the examination 
of motives why foreign investors chose one location over another. In the preceding 
paragraphs we have shown that manufacturing FDI in the CEEC has been largely  driven 
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169  Interestingly, the highest shares of foreign investors in CEEC in the year 2004 relates to transportation 
and communication services, in particular: Air transport (NACE code: I61), Water transport (I62) and Post 
and telecommunications (I64).
by resource-seeking motives. As Spar (1999) argues, this type of FDI depends in the first 
place on the availability  of raw materials and, thus, choices are relatively  limited when 
choosing between alternative investment sites. It follows that resource-seeking investors 
are relatively resistant to changes in the economic environment, such as the extent of 
economic integration or institutional quality, as choices between different supply  modes 
of foreign markets do not apply in their context. 
To test the validity of our arguments we finally  re-estimate the model using 2SLS 
estimator under the consideration of previously specified instrumental variables. The 
results are reported in Table 4.8 while being structured in the same way as in the 
preceding discussion. 
In general, we notice that in terms of signs and significance, the results presented here 
broadly  resemble those using OLS. In particular, the diverging patterns between 
manufacturing and services with respect to various FDI location factors are once again 
confirmed, albeit with certain caveats. In particular, we highlight the loss of significance 
on the coefficient estimates relating to institutional factors for services sector FDI. Still, 
the tendency as approximated by  the indicator signs remains nevertheless intact  and as 
previously  described. Additionally, there is a rather significant decrease in the size of 
estimated coefficients across the range of independent variables. This might potentially 
hint towards measurement error associated with certain instruments that could render the 
estimator less efficient. 
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Table 4.8: Determinants of FDI location at the sectoral level: cross-section 2SLS estimates
Dependent variable: log share of foreign invested firms
Manufacturing Services
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market Potential 0.062 0.035 0.050 0.439** 0.476** 0.449**
[0.105] [0.117] [0.096] [0.193] [0.205] [0.178]
Skilled Labour -0.281*** -0.308*** -0.286*** -0.025 -0.026 -0.046
[0.095] [0.101] [0.096] [0.113] [0.121] [0.113]
Natural Resources 0.297*** 0.292*** 0.276*** 0.431*** 0.472*** 0.469***
[0.092] [0.095] [0.093] [0.161] [0.161] [0.157]
Tax Corp -0.232*** -0.230*** -0.229*** -0.368*** -0.382*** -0.376***
[0.069] [0.069] [0.067] [0.135] [0.130] [0.125]
Econ Integ * EBRD Ref -0.101 0.054
[0.094] [0.149]
Econ Integ * Eco Freedom -0.112 0.103
[0.091] [0.145]
Econ Integ * Gov. Effect. -0.126 0.094
[0.085] [0.136]
Wald chi-squared 35.24*** 35.65*** 35.16*** 13.76*** 14.01*** 14.20***
Observations 219 219 219 159 159 159
Notes: 2SLS estimates. The dependent variable corresponds to 2003/2004 while independent ones to 2001. Instruments: Unemployment rate, R&D expenditures 
Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in square brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Summarising, in this section we have explored the determinants of FDI at  the sectoral 
level in the post-2001 period. Overall, we observe to a certain extent a diverging pattern 
of FDI location between the two sectors. Whereas services appear to be primarily  market-
seeking the same motive may be only secondary for investors in the manufacturing 
sector. Instead, they appear to be drawn to location that are comparatively more endowed 
with primary input factors; thus their motives might be mainly resource-seeking. 
Additionally, we only partially  confirm the role of institutions as significant location 
factor. While institutional aspects appear to be of importance for services sector FDI, no 
direct effect is evident for manufacturing. Although the significance of our results is less 
pronounced in the alternative estimation of the model, we still conclude that due 
consideration should be given to sectoral differences when analysing role of institutional 
factors in determining location of FDI.
4.4.2 The Case of Non-CEEC Transition Economies
In this sub-section, we venture beyond the CEEC to consider an additional set of 
transition economies. Thereby, our focus shifts to transition economies of 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and South-East Europe Countries (SEEC) 
respectively.170  Over the past two decades most of these countries have experienced 
similar economic conditions to those described for the CEEC. This is of little surprise as 
their pre-transition market structures have been modelled and governed by very similar 
market principles. Thus, at the outset of the transition process, they  were faced with much 
the same structural problems as the CEEC including, among others, falling income levels, 
obsolete production technologies and absence of market institutions [for an excellent and 
extensive review see, among others, Aslund (2002)]. In contrast to the CEEC, most of 
those countries only gradually embraced trade and FDI as the driving forces of market-
based economic integration and technological change. Their reform process has been 
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170  CIS economies included: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
SEEC feature: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,  Macedonia FYR, Moldova. Note that Serbia and 
Montenegro have been excluded from the sample due to unavailability of data. 
significantly slower due to more profound transitional shocks and generally  higher levels 
of political uncertainty and instability.171 Still, given the commonalities that they share 
with the CEEC, including initial conditions and inherited institutional frameworks, we 
regard these two regions as legitimate comparator groups for further robustness testing 
with respect to the role of institutional factors in attracting FDI. 
Thus, our dataset covers FDI inflows to 15 non-CEEC transition economies over the 
period 1998-2005. Note that  we use FDI inflows instead of stocks due to data 
limitations.172  The relevant information has been sourced from the World Development 
Indicators database provided by the World Bank. With respect to the control variables, we 
restrict our inquiry to the following two variables due to limited availability of 
comparable data. First, we approximate countries’ Market Size by the measure of national 
GDP expressed in a common currency  at constant prices and purchasing price parities.173 
Second, the extent of Economic Integration with the rest  of the world is measured as the 
share of overall trade (export plus imports) in GDP.174  We also introduce a lagged 
dependent variable to account for potential agglomeration effects. As to the institutional 
reform indicators, they  are defined as before and have been extracted for each of the 
countries in the sample from the same source, EBRD’s Transitions Reports. Furthermore, 
definition of the variable Government Effectiveness remains as previously. In contrast, 
most of the SEE and CIS countries are not captured in the Economic Freedom Index of 
the World database. As a result, we make use of a closely related Index of Economic 
Freedom compiled by the Heritage Foundation that contains information on all 
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171  Svejnar (2002) places the declines in GDP at 13-25% in Eastern Europe, 40 percent in the Baltics, and 
45-65% in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Besides that, the majority of the countries also 
lacked real prospects for full EU membership. This was particularly the case for all SEE countries 
throughout the 1990s while it still applies to CIS economies. 
172 In fact, we regard this as an advantage as it enables us to employ yet another measure of FDI intensity. 
This further strengthens our empirical inquiry into the robustness of underlying results.
173  Note that we do not discount the GDP by the any measure of distance. Hence, the resulting variable is 
not to be directly set equal to Market Potential as previously described. 
174 The relevant data source for constructing both control variables is the WDI database, World Bank. 
economies in our sample.175 Thus, we note that Economic Freedom (Heritage) can be 
only tentatively compared to previously derived results. In sum, the estimation equation 
reads as follows:
    yit = α + β0yit−1 + β1Μit + β2zit + β3(Ιit ) +υit                          (18)
 
where yit is the dependent variable as measured by the FDI inflows in country i at time t. 
yit−1  is the lagged dependent variable, Mit is the market size of previously described 
control variables while Ιit is the vector including institutional factors and υit is the 
remainder disturbance term. 
In Figure 4.1, we first examine the relationship between FDI inflows and aggregate 
institutional factors after controlling for Market Size and extent of Economic Integration. 
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175  The index measures ten components of economic freedom including aspects of trade, investments, 
government spending, property right and corruption, among others. We use the overall, averaged, score of 
all ten categories on a scale ranging from 0 to 100, the latter implying maximum freedom. For missing 
values, we use linear interpolation where possible. 
Figure 4.1: Partial correlations between FDI inflows and institutional factors
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Gov. Effectiveness
As evident from the added-variable plots, there appears to exist a positive relationship 
between composite indicators of institutional reform and quality  on the one side, and FDI 
on the other. In other words, higher FDI inflows into non-CEEC transition economies are 
more likely to be associated with countries that  exhibit a stronger progress in 
implementation of structural reforms and that are endowed with better quality 
institutions. A more formal examination of the relationship is presented in Table 4.9.  
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Table 4.9: Determinants of FDI location in non-CEEC transition economies: dynamic specification of the model
Dependent variable: log FDI inflows
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FDI (L-1) 0.089 0.092 0.091 0.073 0.052 0.115 0.153*
[0.095] [0.095] [0.106] [0.092] [0.090] [0.103] [0.087]
Market Size 0.673*** 0.766*** 0.629*** 0.446** 0.658*** 0.505* 0.684***
[0.210] [0.198] [0.204] [0.210] [0.240] [0.323] [0.191]
Econ. Integration 0.292** 0.278** 0.272** 0.292** 0.252* 0.310** 0.243**
[0.134] [0.135] [0.130] [0.147] [0.144] [0.136] [0.107]
Competition Reform 0.127
[0.141]
Enterprise Reform 0.168*
[0.086]
Privatisation Reform 0.273**
[0.131]
Infrastructure Reform 0.254*
[0.144]
EBRD Reform 0.361**
[0.140]
Econ. Freedom 0.086
[0.112]
Gov. Effectiveness 0.148
[0.093]
Hansen J test 8.10 10.02 10.39 7.83 11.05 9.90 7.16
AR(1) -2.13** -2.10** -2.00** -2.04** -2.11** -2.07** -2.63***
AR(2) -1.417 -1.550 -1.521 -1.481 -1.450 -1.568 -1.268
Wald chi-squared 40.09*** 32.80*** 37.44*** 39.96*** 34.07*** 33.89*** 30.77***
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 117 116
Notes: Arellano-Bond GMM estimates. The time period under consideration: 1997-2005.  
Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in square brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
In columns 1-7, the results following Arellano-Bond GMM  approach are presented. To be 
noted is that the Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions accepts the null hypothesis 
of valid instruments. Moreover, Arellano-Bond test indicates absence of second order 
serial correlation (AR2); we are therefore able to proceed to the discussion of estimation 
results. 
In particular, we notice that both control variables, Market Potential and Economic 
Integration, have on average positive and significant impact on FDI inflows. The 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients is comparable in size to those presented in the 
baseline estimations for the CEEC. In other words, aggregate FDI flows to SEE and CIS 
countries display  similar patterns to those observed for FDI stocks in the CEEC, i.e. on 
average FDI seems to be attracted to larger and more integrated (open) economies. 
Interestingly, past FDI flows do feature the expected sign although fail the significance 
test in all specification bar one. 
Turning to our main indicators of interest, a first  notable observation to be made is that 
the structural reforms and institutional quality indicators withstand the robustness test. 
They  all feature the expected sign in front of the coefficient estimates with majority  of 
them also being significant. Specifically, we find that various dimensions of progress in 
institutional reform contain sufficient power to explain FDI flows to the regions. The 
results are interesting when compared to those for the CEEC, as from investors’ point of 
view they hint towards non-uniform reform priorities. For instance, the most significant 
reform dimension in the context of SEE and CIS countries is Privatisation Reform, while 
Enterprise Reform appears to be significant as well, though only weakly. The latter is in 
contrast to observations made in the context of the CEEC where it was largely 
insignificant in most of the specifications. It follows that, foreign investors prefer to 
invest in countries that  are relatively more advanced in the privatisation and restructuring 
process of state-owned enterprises. This finding may therefore highlight once again the 
difference in stages of transition across Eastern Europe. 
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Finally, both indicators of institutional quality remain positive with the magnitude of 
coefficient Government Effectiveness being comparable in size to the one obtained in 
baseline specification for the CEEC. Nevertheless, both indicators appear to be 
insignificant. This might be due to a number of reasons including, among others, the 
parsimonious specification of the model, the nature of the dependent variable or 
discrepancies in measurement of Economic Freedom indicators. It may also potentially 
imply that institutional quality becomes an important location factor only once 
institutional reforms have generated visible effects. Still, based on our analysis we are 
confident that the underlying results obtained in this section provide further support  for 
our hypothesis that institutional factors, and in particular structural reforms, are important 
determinants of FDI in the context of economic transition. 
4.5 CONCLUSION
In this final essay  we use a quasi experimental setting as provided by  the context  of 
economic transition in 10 CEEC economies, to examine the role of institutional factors in 
determining location of FDI. Our particular focus is dedicated to a better understanding 
of differences among institutional factors, namely structural reforms and perceived 
institutional quality, in terms of their underlying impact on FDI location patterns and in 
the specific context  of transition economies. The specified time series includes the period 
1995 to 2005, and thus enables us to consider almost the entire period of CEEC’ EU 
integration process. We start our investigation by estimating static and dynamic panel 
models followed by cross-sectional analysis of location factors at the sectoral level. 
Finally, for comparison purposes, we examine the effects of institutional factors on FDI 
inflows in non-CEEC transition economies, including CIS and SEE countries. Prior to 
highlighting the research findings we briefly  summarise our contributions to the relevant 
body of literature on this topic. 
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First, our inquiry considers a longer and more recent time period than most other 
available studies related to the CEEC economies. As outlined in the review of empirical 
literature on transition economies, the vast majority  of previous studies have been limited 
either to purely cross sectional inquiry or only the initial years of transition. By focusing 
on almost the entire period of transition affecting the CEEC we are therefore able to 
account for determinants of inward FDI in a more extensive or complete manner, hence 
offering a more robust analysis on the subject matter. Second, following the recent work 
of Campos and Kinoshita (2008), we apply a novel approach to examination of 
institutional factors by decomposing institutional aspects into structural reforms and 
perceived institutional quality. Such an approach is beneficial in that it  allows us to 
account for a country’s speed of convergence towards commonly accepted institutional 
standards, while at  the same time, taking into consideration perceived quality  of existing 
institutional frameworks. To the best of our knowledge our paper is the first to consider 
as many  different institutional factors and rank them according to their importance to 
foreign investors. By doing so we have the intention not only  to distinguish between 
institutional efforts and outcomes but also to flag those factors that truly matter for FDI 
location. Third, a further novelty in the context of transition economies in particular is 
that we translate our approach into a systematic investigation of FDI determinants at the 
sectoral level. In other words, we subject the institutional factors to sectoral dynamics 
associated with FDI in manufacturing and services respectively. So far, there has been 
relatively little inquiry into sectoral determinants of FDI and even less so on the cross-
sectoral comparison of the same. Fourth, in contrast to the majority of existing empirical 
studies in this field we estimate both static and dynamic panel models while also making 
use of cross sectional analysis as a means to test robustness of our underlying findings. 
Finally, our study explicitly compares the institutional factor determinants of FDI in the 
CEEC with an alternative sample of non-CEEC economies. This comparison adds a 
potentially important perspective on whether and, if so, how the institutional factors 
impact FDI location patterns when controlling for variation in stages of transition and 
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regional integration that are being observed across East  European transition economies. 
Following, we provide a concise summary of our results. 
In general, we find firm evidence on existence of a positive and robust relationship going 
from better institutional environment to increased FDI. Our analysis therefore provides 
further support to the empirical growth literature linking institutions to economic 
outcomes (for instance, Acemoglu et al. 2001). More specifically, however, our research 
efforts further strengthen the nascent FDI literature focused on a more thorough 
understanding of institutional factors affecting location decisions of foreign investors (see 
Campos and Kinoshita, 2008). In this respect, the analysis conducted here reveals the 
particular importance of institutional reforms for FDI location. The significance of 
various proxy variables is confirmed in nearly all specifications of the models and 
appears to be reinforced when considered jointly  with the process of economic 
integration with the EU. Hence, we show that in the context of transition economies the 
EU integration process is to be understood as the driver of the process of institutional 
convergence and as such a major determinant of FDI inflows into the CEEC. 
Nevertheless, it  is worth highlighting that foreign investors assign different values to 
individual reform factors in terms of their respective importance. Accordingly, from 
foreign investors’ perspective, infrastructural reforms rank highest followed by policy 
changes pertaining to competition and privatisation. In contrast, reforms related to 
enterprise restructuring and governance remain positive though mostly  insignificant. 
From the above, it  follows that  foreign investors are placing a certain premium on 
presence of efficient hard infrastructure in a locality  which, according to the conclusions 
in the preceding essays, is thought to be a major factor in deepening of cross-border 
market integration and expanding of the market potential of a locality. In a similar vein, 
Campos and Kinoshita (2008) find a robust empirical relationship going from structural 
reforms to FDI. They focus thereby on examining structural reforms related to financial 
and trade liberalisation as well as privatisation efforts. While our line of inquiry goes in 
parallel with their recent contribution, our paper is complementary in nature in that it 
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focuses on a different set  of reform factors that have not been previously examined and as 
such provides a significant contribution to the literature.
Another important contribution to the literature stems from the sector specific estimations 
of the underlying econometric model. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first 
on transition economies to launch a detailed inquiry into institutional factor determinants 
of FDI at the sectoral level. The results are indeed interesting as we detect diverging 
pattern in terms of FDI determinants when controlling for different sectors of an 
economy: whereas services FDI appear to be primarily  market-seeking, the same motive 
may be less relevant for foreign investors in the manufacturing sector. In fact, in our 
estimations the latter appears to be drawn to locations that are comparatively more 
endowed with primary input factors; thus we conclude that in the context of the CEEC 
manufacturing, FDI may be primarily resource-seeking. More interestingly, however, we 
detect significant differences in terms of the role of institutional factors in determining 
FDI location patterns across sectors. In particular, while institutional factors appear to be 
of importance for services sector FDI, no direct effect is evident for location of 
manufacturing FDI. We posit that such a finding may be explained by  underlying sector-
specific characteristics, such as services sector reliance on mostly intangible assets that 
rely  on efficient institutional frameworks to enforce and protect intellectual property 
rights. We therefore conclude that due consideration should be given to sectoral 
differences when analysing role of institutional factors in determining location of FDI. 
Finally, a comparison with other transition regions of Eastern Europe, namely SEE and 
CIS countries, reconfirms the importance of institutional factors with progress in 
implementation of reforms being a particularly  important aspect for FDI in these regions 
as well. In contrast to the CEEC, firm-level reforms such as privatisation and 
restructuring appear to be especially relevant for foreign investors. This is a reassuring 
finding in that it formally  highlights the distinct phases of transition across distinct East 
European regional groupings. Nevertheless, a conclusion common to all of them is that 
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faster adjustment of commonly accepted institutional frameworks and standards has a 
positive effect on location of foreign investors. In view of the above, our research 
contains direct policy  implications. In particular, countries that are rapidly integrating 
into larger and deep RIAs are well advised to invest into their institutional frameworks, 
especially by  assuring supply and smooth operations of (hard) infrastructure; as we have 
shown in our research, infrastructure appears to serve as a crucial market integration 
factor for both, manufacturing and services sectors. Alternatively, countries excluded 
from membership aspirations are well advised to engage into a deepening of existing flat 
RIAs. Hence, by providing a more reliable and predictable institutional framework 
modelled after existing elaborate integration agreements, such as the EU, the countries 
engage into positive signalling of potentially reduced transaction costs and increased 
attractiveness of their respective localities for investment purposes. Given the experience 
of the CEEC, our research strongly  suggests that reform and institutional quality 
improvements have a strong effect on location patterns of FDI in transition economies, 
thus directly affecting the economic growth of these economies.
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Appendix C4.1 : Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Market Potential overall 368.40 306.24 45.40 1447.03 N =     110
between 283.33 90.94 919.24 n =      10
within 144.47 110.47 896.19 T =      11
Skilled Labour overall 2.13 0.24 1.54 2.65 N =     110
between 0.24 1.67 2.48 n =      10
within 0.10 1.90 2.37 T =      11
Natural Resources overall 4.09 2.64 0.94 14.25 N =     110
between 2.54 2.08 10.80 n =      10
within 1.05 1.53 7.54 T =      11
REER overall 104.37 14.10 71.47 146.38 N =     110
between 4.94 97.66 114.25 n =      10
within 13.29 73.14 136.50 T =      11
Tax Corp overall 16.42 6.02 3.40 32.30 N =     110
between 5.75 8.12 22.73 n =      10
within 2.48 10.69 25.99 T =      11
Economic Integration overall 90.10 25.17 37.20 138.30 N =     110
between 23.26 50.02 116.21 n =      10
within 11.92 56.14 116.49 T =      11
Competition Reform overall 2.62 0.45 1.00 3.30 N =     110
between 0.33 2.06 3.05 n =      10
within 0.32 1.56 3.29 T =      11
Enterprise Reform overall 2.86 0.45 2.00 3.67 N =     110
between 0.41 2.03 3.27 n =      10
within 0.22 2.10 3.44 T =      11
Privatisation Reform overall 3.47 0.54 2.00 4.00 N =     110
between 0.43 2.95 4.00 n =      10
within 0.35 2.22 4.22 T =      11
Infrastructure Reform overall 2.74 0.59 1.00 3.70 N =     110
between 0.36 2.25 3.47 n =      10
within 0.48 1.22 3.52 T =      11
EBRD Reform overall 2.92 0.42 1.50 3.67 N =     110
between 0.32 2.41 3.45 n =      10
within 0.29 2.02 3.42 T =      11
Economic Freedom overall 6.14 0.85 3.98 7.85 N =     110
between 0.62 5.06 7.04 n =      10
within 0.62 4.65 7.56 T =      11
Gov. Effectiveness overall 3.00 0.44 1.82 3.61 N =     110
between 0.41 2.21 3.37 n =      10
within 0.21 2.37 3.42 T =      11
Graph C4.2: Box plot analysis
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Table C4.3: Determinants of FDI location: dynamic specification of the model (individual reform factors)
Dependent variable: log FDI stock
Arellano-Bond GMM Fixed Effects
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FDI (L-1) 0.525*** 0.592*** 0.575*** 0.518*** 0.551*** 0.589*** 0.583*** 0.534***
[0.063] [0.052] [0.045] [0.052] [0.064] [0.055] [0.054] [0.059]
Market Potential 0.391*** 0.367*** 0.369*** 0.422*** 0.356*** 0.321*** 0.353*** 0.392***
[0.052] [0.055] [0.055] [0.056] [0.060] [0.053] [0.061] [0.060]
Skilled Labour 0.099*** 0.105** 0.103*** 0.079** 0.102** 0.097* 0.114*** 0.086**
[0.037] [0.042] [0.032] [0.035] [0.033] [0.047] [0.035] [0.036]
Natural Resources -0.054* -0.063* -0.070** -0.050 -0.058* -0.040 -0.056 -0.059*
[0.028] [0.032] [0.029] [0.032] [0.029] [0.033] [0.032] [0.028]
REER 0.097*** 0.092*** 0.095*** 0.061** 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.099** 0.066*
[0.025] [0.030] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.030] [0.032] [0.033]
Tax Corp 0.044** 0.028** 0.026** 0.024* 0.049** 0.037* 0.042** 0.034*
[0.019] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.018] [0.018] [0.015] [0.016]
Econ. Integration 0.040 0.013 0.012 0.025 0.034 0.020 0.017 0.021
[0.026] [0.022] [0.023] [0.027] [0.033] [0.032] [0.030] [0.033]
Competition Reform 0.055** 0.045
[0.023] [0.031]
Enterprise Reform 0.005 0.053
[0.059] [0.066]
Privatisation Reform 0.022 0.017
[0.024] [0.023]
Infrastructure Reform 0.084*** 0.082**
[0.021] [0.027]
Hansen J test 0.12 0.13 2.19 0.01 - - - -
AR(1) -2.18*** -2.12*** -2.17*** -2.43*** - - - -
AR(2) -1.18 -0.59 -0.53 -0.31 - - - -
R-squared (within) - - - - 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.97
R-squared (between) - - - - 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.94
R-squared (overall) - - - - 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.95
Observations 90 90 90 90 100 100 100 100
Notes: The time period under consideration relates to 1995-2005. Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in square brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table C4.4: Determinants of FDI location at the sectoral level: cross-section 2SLS estimates (individual reform factors)
Dependent variable: log share of foreign invested firms
Manufacturing Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Market Potential 0.099 0.172** 0.139 0.195*** 0.664*** 0.443*** 0.543*** 0.373***
[0.137] [0.079] [0.105] [0.062] [0.234] [0.158] [0.191] [0.139]
Skilled Labour -0.788*** -0.744*** -0.690*** -0.705*** -0.048 -0.182 -0.347*** -0.300**
[0.139] [0.115] [0.096] [0.100] [0.194] [0.153] [0.120] [0.126]
Natural Resources 1.005*** 0.957*** 0.918*** 0.951*** 0.813*** 0.961*** 1.078*** 0.980***
[0.169] [0.172] [0.181] [0.173] [0.254] [0.265] [0.282] [0.267]
Tax Corp -0.440* -0.404 -0.315 -0.464* -1.421*** -1.532*** -1.802*** -1.349***
[0.246] [0.253] [0.283] [0.242] [0.379] [0.397] [0.459] [0.370]
Econ Integ * Privatisation Ref -0.176 0.534**
[0.140] [0.222]
Econ Integ * Competition Ref -0.149 0.453**
[0.119] [0.189]
Econ Integ * Infrastructure Ref -0.215 0.655**
[0.172] [0.273]
Econ Integ * Enterprise Ref -0.118 0.360**
[0.095] [0.150]
R-squared 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.28
Observations 219 219 219 219 159 159 159 159
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable corresponds to 2003/2004 while the independent ones to 2001. All regression include country dummy variables. 
Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in square brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 CONTRIBUTIONS AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The purpose of here conducted research was to advance our understanding of the link 
between a range of factor determinants and industry  location patterns in the context of 
economic transition and progressive regional integration. The CEEC region was deemed 
to be especially  suitable for this type of inquiry as it  provides a quasi natural experiment 
type of setting. In the course of transition, market forces replaced government planners 
while democracy and regional integration substituted for oppressive and inward-looking 
regimes. Based on these underlying changes in the socio-economic environment of the 
CEEC, our inquiry has been guided by three main objectives. First, we aimed at 
providing a comprehensive picture of changes in industry location patterns over the 
course of transition and integration process. Second, we have launched an attempt at 
explaining those underlying changes by not only focusing on (traditional) economic 
determinants of industry  location. Instead, we haven also accounted for the application of 
a variety  of policy  approaches and instruments and their possible effects on spatial 
dynamics of industry location at both national and regional levels. Finally, given the 
importance of FDI as a market integration and economic growth factor, we have 
attempted to make explicit the link between the levels of institutional development and 
FDI location patterns across countries and sectors. 
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In Chapter 2 of the thesis we provided an account of the geographical location patterns at 
the national level for 23 manufacturing industries across 10 CEEC, covering the period 
1995 to 2005. Using novel sources of industry-level data our particular focus centred 
around a comprehensive assessment of changes in patterns of manufacturing 
concentration and dispersion over time and across space. Moreover, we have made a 
significant effort explaining those underlying changes by estimating a number of 
empirical models; the hypothesis being rooted in established theoretical models and 
including traditional and new trade theories, as well as NEG. In general, we make a 
number of valid contributions to this particular stream of literature. In contrast to existing 
research the rich panel dataset that we deploy allows us to track developments in a larger 
number of industries over almost the entire transition period. Thus, the empirical inquiry 
into the subject matter is unique in that our study  is the first to impose structural breaks in 
the estimation models with the aim to examine changes in manufacturing location as a 
result of changes in structural and industrial policies affecting market integration. As 
regards the results, we provide evidence that manufacturing industries have been 
increasingly  dispersed in space over time and that the observed patterns may, at least to 
some extent, be explained by the use of highlighted policies. Interestingly, our research 
shows that the trend towards industry dispersion gained pace following the 
announcement of the first round of EU’s Eastern Enlargement in 2001, and potentially 
has further affected the development trajectories of individual CEEC economies.
To assess whether industry  re-location has indeed affected development prospects of 
individual CEEC, we have then launched a more detailed inquiry into regional aspects of 
industry location in Chapter 3 of the thesis. In particular, our aim was to identify how the 
process of transition and regional integration might have affected agglomeration patterns 
of industries across dichotomous types of internal and border regions. Once again, this 
research has benefited from a new source of regional data that in this particular case 
consisted of 43 NUTS-2 regions located in 5 CEEC for the period 1999 to 2007. While 
exploiting the insights from a novel data set can already be seen as a contribution to the 
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existing literature in itself, we have advanced the stock of knowledge pertaining to the 
topic at hand in a number of additional ways. Specifically, in contrast to the existing 
research, we have used complementary  tools such as spatial autocorrelation statistics as a 
means to measure the true extent of industry  agglomeration across regions. More 
importantly, our study has been the first on transition economies to formalise in an 
empirical model deployment of targeted regional assistance programmes that are aimed at 
enhancing geographical position of recipient regions. Broadly speaking, the analysis 
conducted using spatial autocorrelation statistics suggested existence of an ongoing 
process of spatial polarisation among the CEEC regions whereby industry location 
became more skewed over time towards Western border regions; that being most likely at 
the expense of lower industry agglomeration in Eastern border regions. We have therefore 
provided some preliminary  evidence that proximity  to the core EU markets matters for 
observed industry concentration patterns in the CEEC. However, the research has also 
shown that  industry location patterns in the CEEC are indeed industry  specific. First and 
foremost, they appeared to be largely influenced by individual industries’ technology 
intensity in the production as, on average, low-technology intensive industries appeared 
to be linked to regions endowed with natural resources; in contrast, location of high-
technology intensive industries and services appeared to be rather dependent on regions’ 
proximity to the core EU markets.
Building on those insights, we have launched an econometric analysis into determining 
industry location factors that  matter in the context of transition economies. A salient 
conclusion coming out of our inquiry  is that more accessible regions appear to be, all else 
equal, characterised by a more extensive agglomeration process within their respective 
borders. At the same time, we have provided further robust evidence on the role of 
transportation infrastructure as a crucial factor in reducing the incurred trade costs and 
thus achieving higher levels of industry concentration. As a matter of fact, our empirical 
findings corroborate two major propositions from NEG literature in that market potential 
along with the availability of hard infrastructure represent significant  drivers of industry 
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concentration, also at the regional level. As regards the policy  aspect, the research 
conducted here has delivered a novel insight into the subject matter by including policy 
relevant proxy variables into our empirical model. Hereby, we have produced evidence 
on the existence of a potential signalling effect that active policy  interventions might have 
with respect to advancing the position of border regions in particular. More specifically, 
we have found a positive effect associated with higher spending to advance geographical 
position of Western border regions, while there appears to exist a corresponding negative 
effect associated with higher spending in Eastern border regions. In sum, our analysis of 
development trajectories of the CEEC regions as proxied by industry location patterns 
presented evidence of an ongoing process of regional divergence despite progressive 
regional integration and implementation of regional development policies. 
Regional divergence not only poses a serious threat to domestic economies but can be 
equally detrimental to comprehensive regional integration agreements. Thus, provision of 
regional structural and development funds has been one of the tools at disposal of 
national and supranational policy makers to offset the negative effects stemming from 
diverging growth patterns. In case of the CEEC, national policy makers have regarded the 
inflow of FDI in particular as a potent (regional) development tool able to advance the 
position of industry and host regions by levering on the technology know-how and 
managerial skill of foreign investors. Thus, attracting FDI inflows and raising existing 
FDI stocks has been a paramount task for most governments in the CEEC.
In chapter 4 of the thesis we have assumed that FDI is indeed beneficial for recipient 
countries with the intention to explore factor determinants of FDI location. In particular, 
we focused our analysis on examining the link between institutional factors and location 
decision of foreign investors across sectors, countries and time. Institution building has 
been a remarkable feature of the transition process; as such, both its speed and perceived 
quality are assumed to be a crucial location factor and, as such, subject to policy specific 
measures. Thus, our contribution is of particular relevance to the nascent FDI literature 
focused on a more detailed understanding of endogenous institutional factors that may 
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affect location patterns of foreign investors in particular.  Specifically, we follow a novel 
approach in that we base the analytical framework on recent empirical work that 
examines institutional aspects of FDI location by decomposing them into structural 
reforms (efforts) and perceived institutional quality  (outcomes) (see, Campos and 
Kinoshita, 2008). What we have found is a positive and robust relationship going from 
institutional factors to FDI. Hereby, the importance of structural reforms is confirmed and 
appears to be reinforced when considered jointly  with the process of economic 
integration with the EU. Hence, we show that in the context of transition economies the 
EU integration process is to be understood as the driver of the process of institutional 
convergence and as such a major determinant of FDI inflows into the CEEC. 
Nevertheless, it  is worth highlighting that foreign investors assign different values to 
individual reform factors in terms of their respective importance. Accordingly, from 
foreign investors’ perspective, infrastructural reforms rank highest followed by policy 
changes pertaining to competition and privatisation. In contrast, reforms related to 
enterprise restructuring and governance remain positive though mostly  insignificant. 
From the above, it  follows that  foreign investors are placing a certain premium on 
presence of efficient hard infrastructure in a locality  which, according to the conclusions 
in the preceding chapters, is thought to be a major factor in deepening of cross-border 
market integration and expanding of the market potential of a locality.
In addition, we conclude that due consideration should be given to sectoral differences 
when analysing determinants of FDI. The results are indeed interesting as we detect 
diverging pattern in terms of FDI determinants when controlling for different sectors of 
an economy: whereas services FDI appear to be primarily  market-seeking, the same 
motive may be less relevant for foreign investors in the manufacturing sector. In fact, in 
our estimations the latter appears to be drawn to locations that are comparatively more 
endowed with primary input factors; thus we conclude that in the context of CEEC 
manufacturing, FDI may be primarily resource-seeking. More interestingly, however, we 
detect significant differences in terms of the role of institutional factors in affecting FDI 
227
location decisions across sectors. In particular, while institutional factors appear to be of 
importance for services sector FDI, no direct effect is evident  for location of 
manufacturing FDI. We posit that such a finding may be explained by  underlying sector-
specific characteristics, such as services sector reliance on mostly intangible assets that 
rely  on efficient institutional frameworks to enforce and protect intellectual property 
rights. Overall, our analysis implies that due consideration should be given to sectoral 
differences when analysing role of institutional factors in determining location of FDI. 
In a final step, a comparison across different Eastern European sub-regions re-confirms 
the importance of institutional factors for FDI location whereby progress in the reform 
process has considerable explanatory power in all specifications of estimated models. A 
conclusion common to all Eastern European sub-groupings is that  faster adjustment of 
commonly accepted institutional frameworks and standards has had a positive effect  on 
location of foreign investors. 
In sum, the research presented throughout this thesis strongly suggests that (industrial) 
policy aspects indeed have a strong effect on location patterns of industry in transition 
economies. A direct policy  implications coming out of it is that countries and their 
regions, especially  those that are rapidly integrating into larger and more elaborate 
trading blocs, are well advised to invest into their institutional and policy frameworks. 
Our research shows that provision of hard infrastructure, targeted use of structural 
development programmes such as the ERDF, and predictable and efficient institutional 
frameworks are indeed suitable means for reducing trade and transaction costs for both 
foreign and domestic producers (investors), thus directly affecting economic development 
of transition economies. 
228
5.2 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Common to all intellectual exercise are the limitations a researcher is faced with when 
devising and exploring new ideas. The research conducted in this thesis is not much 
different in that respect. Subsequently, we outline some of the perceived limitations of 
our research while simultaneously also suggesting future research topics. 
In particular, in Chapter 2 we have examined changes in location patterns at a relatively 
high level of spatial and industry aggregation. While this allowed for an analysis of broad 
changes affecting both countries and industries, it also limited the analysis to a certain 
extent. In other words, country-level analysis prevented us from delimiting the true extent 
of industry clustering as typically described in the corresponding literature (e.g., Porter, 
1990). Sufficiently  disaggregated and comparable data across space and sectors is only 
slowly emerging and as such remains a major constraint at present. Nevertheless, the 
work currently conducted within the various EU frameworks, such as EU KLEMS and 
ESPON, makes us confident that in the near future a more detailed approach to analysing 
spatial issues will be possible also for the Eastern European countries. Moreover, our 
efforts to account  for the extent to which vertical industrial policies affect industry 
location need to be further substantiated, while more precise policy variables will have to 
be introduced in empirical models. Future research will therefore aim at conducting more 
detailed, micro level studies that may allow for a more nuanced approach to linking 
integration, policy and industry location. In that respect, an interesting line of research 
could examine the emergence of cross-border clusters that are assumed to be especially 
affected by deepening market integration and policy efforts.
An interesting extension of work conducted in Chapter 3 may include a more specific 
analysis of policy  contributions to further improvements in regional infrastructure, 
particularly with the intention to quantify  its effects on, for instance, new investments and 
entrepreneurship. Policies aimed at advancing geographical position of border regions in 
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particular deserve greater scrutiny. In our present approach we have not considered the 
dynamics of changing location patterns on the side of other integrating partner, i.e. EU. 
Thus, an interesting extension of the present research would be to consider the 
contribution of cross-border development programmes on both sides of the border 
simultaneously. 
Finally, given the data limitations in Chapter 4 we were not able to distinguish between 
the various types of FDI. It is rather obvious to think that, for instance, location factors of 
M&A type of investments will differ from those of green-field FDI. Thus, future research 
will be more targeted in this respect by making an attempt at acquiring firm-level datasets 
that allow for a clear delineation of FDI. As an additional advantage, use of firm-level 
data would allow us to simultaneously consider some of the previously raised scale 
issues. Finally, we find that a more pronounced inquiry into location determinants of 
services sector in particular deserves greater attention in the context of economic 
transition. As services sector has been almost completely absent in the pre-transition era, 
further targeted analysis of its location aspects would provide us with yet another quasi 
natural experiment worth further exploration.
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